Verifies signed digital receipts and audit bundles offline using Ed25519 signatures and independently provided public keys.
Also known as VeritasActa/verify, verify, @veritasacta/verify
- Stars
- 5
- Tools
- —
- Downloads, 30 days
- —
- Latest version
- 0.11.1
- Last commit
- Oct 25, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
What is veritasacta-verify MCP?
veritasacta-verify verifies signed digital receipts and audit bundles offline using Ed25519 signatures and independently provided public keys.
Summary generated from the project's README
About veritasacta-verify MCP server
Verifying signed digital receipts and audit bundles without contacting an issuing service is the primary function of this tool. It allows developers and auditors to check the integrity of records using Ed25519 signatures and public keys obtained through independent, trusted channels. The system operates offline via a command line interface once installed, ensuring that the verification process does not rely on a proxy, signing daemon, or external account.
Users interact with the tool by providing a receipt file and a 64-character hexadecimal public key. The CLI supports complex structures like audit bundles, gate records, and governed receipts, while a browser engine handles individual envelopes and v2 structured receipts. The CLI is necessary for advanced tasks involving selective disclosure, VOPRF, or knowledge units. It enforces strict security by failing if the key provided does not match the key embedded in the receipt, preventing users from accidentally trusting a key supplied alongside an unknown file.
What you can do with it
- 1Verify offline digital receiptsCheck the validity of a JSON receipt using a locally provided public key.
- 2Audit complex record bundlesValidate large audit bundles and specialist artifacts using the command line interface.
- 3Detect key mismatchesEnsure that the signature on a receipt matches the specific independent key you intend to trust.
- 4Perform integrity self-checksVerify that the installed package has not drifted from its original monitored source hashes.
Written from the project's README. Every use case is checked against a quote from it.
How to install veritasacta-verify MCP
Formats verified 10 Nov 2026Add to CursorAdd to GooseInstall veritasacta-verify MCP in Claude Code
$ claude mcp add verify -- npx -y @veritasacta/verifyInstall veritasacta-verify MCP in Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@veritasacta/verify"
]
}
}
}Install veritasacta-verify MCP in VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"verify": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@veritasacta/verify"
]
}
}
}Install veritasacta-verify MCP in VS Code CLI
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"verify","type":"stdio","command":"npx","args":["-y","@veritasacta/verify"]}'Install veritasacta-verify MCP in Claude Desktop
claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@veritasacta/verify"
]
}
}
}Install veritasacta-verify MCP in Codex
$ codex mcp add verify -- npx -y @veritasacta/verifyInstall veritasacta-verify MCP in Codex config.toml
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.verify] command = "npx" args = ["-y", "@veritasacta/verify"]
Install veritasacta-verify MCP in Gemini CLI
$ gemini mcp add -s user verify npx -- -y @veritasacta/verifyInstall veritasacta-verify MCP in Gemini settings.json
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@veritasacta/verify"
]
}
}
}Automated checks
Ran Nov 14, 2026Full report →Passed our automated checks. That is not a security audit: read the code and give the server the narrowest access it needs. How checks work
- Source repository linked and reachableveritasacta/verify is public and reachablegithub.com/veritasacta/verify ↗Pass
- Package names this repository as its source@veritasacta/verify names veritasacta/verify as sourcenpmjs.com/package/@veritasacta/verify ↗Pass
- Build provenance (Sigstore attestation)Sigstore attestation for @veritasacta/verifynpmjs.com/package/@veritasacta/verify/v/0.11.1#provenance ↗Pass
- Open source license (OSI)Apache-2.0spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html ↗Pass
- Commit or release in the last yearLast commit or release 2026-10-25github.com/veritasacta/verify ↗Pass
- OpenSSF ScorecardNot checked
- Package name not close to a popular packageNo popular package one edit away from @veritasacta/verifyPass
- No critical advisory in the package or its dependencies10 resolved dependencies checked; no critical advisoryosv.dev ↗Pass
- No hidden instructions to the model0 tool descriptions and the README read; no override phrases, credential paths or hidden charactersPass
- Destructive tools are labelledNot checked
- Remote endpoint answers the MCP handshakeNot checked
README
View on GitHub@veritasacta/verify
Check signed records yourself, without contacting the issuing service.
An offline CLI and a shared browser receipt engine. Supply a receipt and a public key obtained through a separate trusted channel, then apply your own trust policy. No account, proxy, signing daemon or onboarding step is required to verify a receipt.
Try the browser sample · Receipt specification · Conformance evidence
Verify an existing receipt
npm install -g @veritasacta/verify@0.11.1
verify receipt.json --key YOUR_INDEPENDENTLY_OBTAINED_PUBLIC_KEY
The key is 64 hexadecimal characters. Do not treat a key supplied with an unknown receipt as an independent trust pin. This verification path runs offline once the package is installed; installation and explicitly requested URL/JWKS lookups use the network.
An Acta receipt or audit bundle is never checked with a key taken from the file
being checked. A receipt whose signed bytes carry a key (public_key,
verification_key, verification_jwk) other than the one you supply fails with
key_mismatch, and an envelope whose payload names an issuer_id other than its
signature's kid fails with issuer_kid_mismatch. An audit bundle's own
verification.signing_keys are used only if you pass --trust-bundle-keys, and a
valid result then shows only that the receipts match keys in the same file. Gate
records, macro track records, governed receipts, proof packs, context packs,
repository evidence, standard files and run manifests carry their own key; checked
without --key, the result is undecidable (exit 2). --allow-carried-key accepts
it (exit 0) and says the signature proves nothing about who signed; --strict
refuses it even then. Key windows apply to the issued_at the
signature covers, and disclosures are checked against the commitments the signature
covers; a disclosure that cannot be applied is not checked (exit 2).
To try the public example, download this receipt and use its demonstration-only key:
verify current-receipt.json --key ebb8cf3efc78717c50e7c438c0ad5498f8fa4e09607fea1e030ac129b5965225
A valid signature is not proof of claim truth, complete action coverage, signer authority or recipient acceptance. A signed timestamp is an issuer assertion, not an independent timestamp.
Read the outcome correctly
| Outcome | Meaning | Next step |
|---|---|---|
| Verified / exit 0 | The checks implemented for this profile passed | Apply identity, authority and reliance policies; read warnings and binding scope |
| Failed / exit 1 | A verification check failed | Check the expected key, signature, structure and reported error |
| Not checked / exit 2 | The verifier could not decide | Supply missing material or use a supported format/algorithm |
Exit 1 does not prove tampering. Supplying the wrong expected key can produce
the same result. Some legacy JSON error categories use the name tampered for
compatibility; it denotes failed verification, not a forensic conclusion.
See error codes and the profile-specific output.
Browser and CLI
Both use src/detect.js, src/engines/ed25519-receipt.js and the same canonicalizer.
The browser bundle is published in browser/, with a SHA-256 build manifest.
The browser accepts individual Ed25519 envelopes, v2 structured receipts, v1 flat
receipts and historical website receipt_version: "1.0" receipts. That historical
profile excluded public_key from signing and is explicitly labelled; it is not
silently promoted to draft-03 conformance. All browser profiles require an external
key. Unsupported formats are not checked, not reported as bad signatures.
Both entry points reject duplicate JSON members before parsing. The browser limits input to 1 MiB and depth 64; the CLI file parser allows 50 MiB and depth 128. Bundles and specialist profiles, including selective disclosure, VOPRF, Knowledge Units, Gate evidence and governed-run manifests, require the CLI. Profile success only establishes the checks named in that output, not universal completeness.
Choose a guide
| Task | Guide |
|---|---|
| Verify bundles, chains, prompts or specialist artifacts | Advanced reference |
| See this CLI's results on TRACE's Acta fixtures | TRACE fixture results |
| Issue receipts or configure a proxy/daemon | Issuance and adapters |
| Understand threats and limitations | Threat model |
| Report a vulnerability | Security policy |
| Inspect exact release changes | Changelog |
| Run the tests or contribute a fixture | Contributing |
| Understand project decisions and stewardship | Governance |
Release integrity, not publisher authentication
verify --self-check recomputes monitored source hashes against a bundled integrity
commitment (the Sigil). It detects drift from that commitment. Someone replacing
both the code and commitment can create a new internally consistent package.
It does not independently authenticate the publisher or establish a canonical
release. Pin a reference obtained independently and inspect release provenance.
--attest is a local, self-signed integrity statement; separately pin its key before
relying on it.
Release and standards status
Verifier: 0.11.1. Status reviewed 2026-10-25.
- draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03: active individual Internet-Draft.
- draft-farley-acta-knowledge-units-00: expired individual Internet-Draft (expired 2026-10-08).
Internet-Drafts are proposals, not adopted IETF standards or endorsements.
release-manifest.json is the source for version/status
blocks in this README, the website, the organisation profile and draft index.
node scripts/sync-public-metadata.mjs --check checks sibling repository copies.
No draft is revised or resubmitted by this synchronization.
Development and maintainership
Maintained by Tom Farley / ScopeBlind. Independent verification does not imply independent organizational governance. Contributions should include reproducible fixtures and negative cases. The contribution guide covers a clean checkout, package checks and useful first contributions. See the public project evidence for reproducible interoperability results and their limits.
npm ci
npm test
npm run check:browser
npm run check:sigil
npm run test:conformance
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE and PATENTS.md for the actual terms. The Acta public record is a separate reference application. ScopeBlind's commercial applications are not prerequisites for verification.
veritasacta-verify MCP questions
How do I add veritasacta-verify MCP to Claude Code?
Run claude mcp add verify -- npx -y @veritasacta/verify in your terminal. Add --scope user to make it available in every project.
How do I add veritasacta-verify MCP to Cursor?
Open ~/.cursor/mcp.json and add the server under mcpServers, using the Cursor config shown in the install section above.
Does this tool require an internet connection to verify receipts?
No, the verification path runs offline once the package is installed.
Can I use a key that is included within the receipt file itself?
By default, the tool requires an independently obtained public key. Using a key from the file requires specific flags like --allow-carried-key, but the signature then proves nothing about the signer.
What is the maximum file size supported by the CLI?
The CLI file parser supports files up to 50 MiB in size.