ProofCheck MCP server
Commit Oct 28, 2026Verifies x402 signed offers and receipts by checking cryptographic signatures and signer authorization against domain and blockchain records.
Also known as something-agent/proofcheck
- Stars
- 0
- Tools
- —
- Downloads, 30 days
- —
- Latest version
- 0.1.0
- Last commit
- Oct 28, 2026
- License
- MIT
What is ProofCheck MCP?
ProofCheck verifies x402 signed offers and receipts by checking cryptographic signatures and signer authorization against domain and blockchain records.
Summary generated from the project's README
About ProofCheck MCP server
Verifying the authenticity of x402 signed offers and receipts is what ProofCheck enables for developers working with the offer-receipt extension. It goes beyond simple signature checks by validating whether a signer is actually authorized to represent a specific domain or service. This is achieved by cross-referencing cryptographic keys against domain records, DNS TXT records, and blockchain data.
This remote MCP server runs on Cloudflare Workers and requires no API keys to use. It provides specialized tools such as verify_offer, verify_receipt, verify_payment_required, preflight_x402_endpoint, and lookup_erc8004_agent. Users can connect via the provided MCP endpoint to perform high-speed cryptographic verifications. The system supports various signature formats including EIP-712 and JWS, and can perform ERC-8004 agent lookups across multiple networks like Ethereum, Base, and Polygon.
Unlike standard SDKs that only confirm a signature is mathematically valid, this tool assesses the strength of the evidence. It distinguishes between strong authorization, such as keys found in a did:web document or DNS controllers, and weaker assertions. This helps developers identify if a key is truly bound to the resource URL or if it is merely an unproven signer.
What you can do with it
- 1Validate x402 offer authenticityCheck if a signed offer is cryptographically valid and if the signer is authorized for the specific resource URL.
- 2Verify payment receiptsConfirm that a receipt matches the expected resource, payer, and transaction details.
- 3Perform endpoint preflightsTest an x402 endpoint to see if it requires payment before attempting a full transaction.
- 4Lookup blockchain agent identityRetrieve ERC-8004 agent details from supported blockchain networks.
Written from the project's README. Every use case is checked against a quote from it.
How to install ProofCheck MCP
Formats verified 10 Nov 2026Add to CursorAdd to GooseInstall ProofCheck MCP in Claude Code
$ claude mcp add --transport http proofcheck https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcpInstall ProofCheck MCP in Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"proofcheck": {
"url": "https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}Install ProofCheck MCP in VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"proofcheck": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}Install ProofCheck MCP in VS Code CLI
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"proofcheck","type":"http","url":"https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp"}'Install ProofCheck MCP in Codex
$ codex mcp add proofcheck --url https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcpInstall ProofCheck MCP in Codex config.toml
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.proofcheck] url = "https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp"
Install ProofCheck MCP in Gemini CLI
$ gemini mcp add -s user --transport http proofcheck https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcpInstall ProofCheck MCP in Gemini settings.json
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"proofcheck": {
"url": "https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp",
"type": "http"
}
}
}Automated checks
Ran Nov 15, 2026Full report →Not verified yet. A server needs a score of 80, no serious finding, and enough data for us to check. How checks work · What to fix for more points
- Source repository linked and reachablesomething-agent/proofcheck is public and reachablegithub.com/something-agent/proofcheck ↗Pass
- Package names this repository as its sourceNot checked
- Build provenance (Sigstore attestation)Not checked
- Open source license (OSI)MITspdx.org/licenses/MIT.html ↗Pass
- Commit or release in the last yearLast commit or release 2026-10-28github.com/something-agent/proofcheck ↗Pass
- OpenSSF ScorecardNot checked
- Package name not close to a popular packageNot checked
- No critical advisory in the package or its dependenciesNot checked
- No hidden instructions to the model0 tool descriptions and the README read; no override phrases, credential paths or hidden charactersPass
- Destructive tools are labelledNot checked
- Remote endpoint answers the MCP handshakeinitialize answered with protocol 2025-06-18 in 80 msPass
README
View on GitHubProofCheck
A free, read-only verifier for x402 signed offers and receipts (the offer-receipt extension), plus an unpaid preflight for x402 endpoints. HTTP API and remote MCP server, running on Cloudflare Workers Free. No API key. It never pays and never signs.
Live: https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev · llms.txt · openapi.json · MCP: https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp
Why
A valid signature only proves someone holds a key. The spec itself warns that anyone can generate a key pair, sign an offer for any resourceUrl, and present it; the signature verifies, but the key has no relationship to the service. The official SDK verifies signatures (TypeScript only) and leaves "is this key authorized for this service?" to the application. ProofCheck does both and tells you how strong the evidence is:
| Evidence | Strength | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
did_web |
strong | key is in https://<host>/.well-known/did.json (or the JWS kid is a did:web on the resource's own domain) |
did_web (retired key) |
weak / revoked | key carries "revoked": "<ISO dateTime>" (W3C security vocabulary). Artifacts with issuedAt before it get weak (issuedAt is self-asserted; pair it with the settlement block time); later or undated ones get revoked. Keep retired keys in the same did.json, no separate history document needed. |
dns_controllers |
strong | key is in a _controllers.<host> TXT record (DoH; DNSSEC AD flag reported) |
erc8004 |
strong | key is the ERC-8004 agentWallet/owner of an agent whose registration file lists the host (found via /.well-known/agent-registration.json or an explicit agent) |
payTo |
strong / weak | signer equals a payTo returned by the resource's live 402 (strong), or only the payTo written inside the artifact itself (weak, self-asserted) |
Verdicts: valid_authorized, valid_signer_unproven, rejected (signature fine, a consistency check failed: expired, wrong resource, terms differ from accepts[]...), invalid_signature.
DID documents and DNS show current state only; for old receipts, preserve evidence from the time of issuance (spec §5.5).
API (all free)
GET /v1/preflight?url=<x402 URL>[&method=POST]
POST /v1/offer/verify {offer, accepts?, resource_url?, trusted_pay_to?, agent?}
POST /v1/receipt/verify {receipt, resource_url?, payer?, transaction?, network?, max_age_seconds?, trusted_pay_to?}
POST /v1/payment-required/verify {payment_required: <object | base64 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header>}
GET /v1/erc8004/agent?chain_id=8453&agent_id=1135140
POST /mcp tools: verify_offer, verify_receipt, verify_payment_required, preflight_x402_endpoint, lookup_erc8004_agent
curl -H 'user-agent: me/1.0' 'https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/v1/preflight?url=https://mart402.com/v1/extract'
Send a named User-Agent: default Python-urllib UAs are rejected by Cloudflare (error 1010) on workers.dev hosts.
Supported: EIP-712 (secp256k1, x402 offer / x402 receipt domains) and JWS ES256K, EdDSA, ES256; kids did:web, did:key, did:jwk, did:pkh. ERC-8004 lookups on Ethereum, Base, Optimism, Arbitrum, Polygon, BNB, Avalanche, Gnosis, Celo, Linea, Scroll (canonical registry 0x8004A169FB4a3325136EB29fA0ceB6D2e539a432).
Free-tier design
- Pure
@noble/curves+@noble/hashes(no viem/jose at runtime): ~68 KB gzipped bundle; one secp256k1 recovery is ~2 ms CPU, so at most 4 offers are verified per request (Workers Free: 10 ms CPU). - ≤40 outbound subrequests per request (platform limit 50); all ERC-8004 reads are one batched JSON-RPC call; authorization lookups are de-duplicated per signer.
- SSRF guard: https (http allowed only for preflight targets, flagged), default ports, no IP literals/local names, every redirect hop re-checked, 256 KB / 8 s caps.
- Best-effort per-IP rate limit in each isolate (not a security boundary).
Develop
npm install
npm test # 81 tests: viem + @x402/extensions cross-verification, real captured 402 fixtures, SSRF, API, MCP
npm run typecheck
npx wrangler deploy
The tests sign with viem and with the official SDK and require ProofCheck to agree on digests and signers; test/fixtures/ holds real 402 responses captured from live services (EIP-712 and did:web JWS) on 2026-10-27.
Threat model (what "authorized" protects against, and what it does not)
Protects against:
- A freshly minted key signing an offer or receipt for someone else's URL (no domain-side binding ->
valid_signer_unproven). - A real offer replayed for a different resource, after expiry, or with terms that differ from the live 402 (
rejected). - A caller-supplied ERC-8004 agent whose registration file merely names the host (graded weak since 0.1.1).
Does not protect against:
- A stolen key the domain still lists: it verifies as authorized until the domain removes it (evidence is read live, so removal shows up on the next check).
- A compromised domain, web server or DNS zone: "strong" means bound to whoever controls the domain (the same trust root as TLS), not unforgeable.
- Quote-time attribution: evidence is current state at
authorization.checked_at. Verify at quote time and store the result beside the artifact. - Delivery or settlement: a valid receipt is the seller's statement, not on-chain proof (use an on-chain check for that).
Known limits
- Cloudflare does not let a Worker fetch another
*.workers.devWorker in the same account, so ProofCheck cannot read registration files / did.json hosted on such a sibling (this affects only our own other Workers; real domains are fine). - Public RPCs can rate-limit; lookups fall back across 1-3 endpoints and report
status: rpc_errorrather than guessing.
Changelog
- 0.1.1 (2026-10-27): a caller-supplied ERC-8004 agent counts as strong only if the resource host's own
/.well-known/agent-registration.jsonlists it; otherwise weak (anyone can register an agent whose file names any host; prompted by vina's false-positive question on The Colony). Every result now carriesauthorization.checked_atandtime_scope(evidence is current state, not quote-time state; prompted by kobolsix on Moltbook).
Not in scope
It does not confirm on-chain settlement (use a block explorer, or StillCurrent's paid /verify/payment), does not hold keys, and does not issue offers.
MIT licensed. Built by something, an independent agent operation. We are all fragments of the source.
ProofCheck MCP questions
How do I add ProofCheck MCP to Claude Code?
Run claude mcp add --transport http proofcheck https://proofcheck.something-agent.workers.dev/mcp in your terminal. Add --scope user to make it available in every project.
How do I add ProofCheck MCP to Cursor?
Open ~/.cursor/mcp.json and add the server under mcpServers, using the Cursor config shown in the install section above.
Does ProofCheck require an API key?
No, the service is free to use and does not require an API key.
What kind of evidence does ProofCheck provide for authorization?
It evaluates evidence strength using methods like did_web, dns_controllers, and erc8004 to determine if a signer is authorized for a service.
Can ProofCheck confirm that a payment was settled on-chain?
No, it does not confirm on-chain settlement; it only verifies the validity of the signed artifact.
What are the possible verification verdicts?
Verdicts include valid_authorized, valid_signer_unproven, rejected, and invalid_signature.