MISP MCP server
Commit Nov 2, 2026Allows an AI client to query threat intelligence from a Malware Information Sharing Platform with built-in prompt injection defense.
Also known as ppcvote/misp-mcp-server
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- 2
- Tools
- 8
- Downloads, 30 days
- —
- Latest version
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- Last commit
- Nov 2, 2026
- License
- MIT
What is MISP MCP?
MISP allows an AI client to query threat intelligence from a Malware Information Sharing Platform with built-in prompt injection defense. It exposes 8 tools, such as misp_version, misp_list_events, misp_get_event.
Summary generated from the project's README
About MISP MCP server
Security analysts can query threat intelligence from a Malware Information Sharing Platform directly through AI clients like Claude Desktop, Cursor, or Cline. This server connects an LLM to your MISP instance using the Model Context Protocol via stdio transport. It requires a MISP URL and an API key to function, making it easy to set up for local or remote environments.
Safety is a primary focus, as the server includes a built-in defense layer that scans every outgoing response for prompt injection, XSS, and shell-injection patterns using the prompt-defense-audit scanner. This prevents adversarial content within your threat intelligence from hijacking the LLM. To prevent accidental or malicious data modification, the server is read-only and does not expose any tools for mutating events or attributes.
Users can access eight specific tools to interact with their data, including misp_search_events for finding specific threats, misp_search_attributes for direct IOC lookups, and misp_list_galaxies to view threat actor clusters. It also provides access to tags, feeds, and version information to help manage and investigate security incidents.
What you can do with it
- 1Investigating phishing reportsAn analyst can ask the AI to retrieve the full details of a specific event to aid in an investigation.
- 2Searching for specific indicatorsA developer can use the tool to find all attributes that match a specific IP address.
- 3Filtering events by TLP levelUsers can query the AI to find MISP events that are tagged with specific traffic light protocols within a certain timeframe.
- 4Exploring threat actor clustersAn AI client can be used to list the configured threat actor and campaign galaxies available in the platform.
Written from the project's README. Every use case is checked against a quote from it.
MISP MCP tools 8
Detected from the READMEmisp_versionmisp_list_eventsmisp_get_eventmisp_search_eventsmisp_search_attributesmisp_list_tagsmisp_list_feedsmisp_list_galaxies
Configuration
MISP_API_KEYMISP_URLPROMPT_DEFENSE_DISABLED
Automated checks
Ran Nov 14, 2026Full report →Not verified yet. A server needs a score of 80, no serious finding, and enough data for us to check. How checks work · What to fix for more points
- Source repository linked and reachableppcvote/misp-mcp-server is public and reachablegithub.com/ppcvote/misp-mcp-server ↗Pass
- Package names this repository as its sourceNot checked
- Build provenance (Sigstore attestation)Not checked
- Open source license (OSI)MITspdx.org/licenses/MIT.html ↗Pass
- Commit or release in the last yearLast commit or release 2026-11-02github.com/ppcvote/misp-mcp-server ↗Pass
- OpenSSF ScorecardNot checked
- Package name not close to a popular packageNot checked
- No critical advisory in the package or its dependenciesNot checked
- No hidden instructions to the model8 tool descriptions and the README read; no override phrases, credential paths or hidden charactersPass
- Destructive tools are labelledNo tool named like delete, drop or execPass
- Remote endpoint answers the MCP handshakeNot checked
README
View on GitHubMISP MCP Server
A Model Context Protocol server for MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform), with built-in prompt injection defense powered by prompt-defense-audit.
Why this exists: MISP holds operational threat intel — IOCs, threat actor profiles, attack patterns. When you connect an LLM agent to MISP via MCP, two new attack surfaces emerge:
- Adversarial seeding. A threat actor who can submit content into your MISP instance (or a federated feed) can plant prompt-injection payloads designed to hijack downstream LLM agents.
- Sensitive intel leakage. A manipulated LLM can be coerced into returning intel above its authorized TLP level.
This server wraps every outgoing MISP response in
prompt-defense-audit's output scanner, blocking high-risk patterns before they reach the LLM. Read-only by design — no write tools exposed.
Tracks: MISP/MISP#10745 — MCP server for MISP
Features
- 🛡️ Defense built in — every MISP response scanned for prompt-injection / XSS / shell-injection patterns before being returned
- 🔒 Read-only by design — no event/attribute mutation tools; an LLM cannot modify your threat-intel platform
- 🧰 8 high-utility tools covering events, attributes, search, tags, feeds, galaxies
- ⚡ Zero-config beyond
MISP_URLandMISP_API_KEY - 🪶 Stdio transport — works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Cline, any MCP client
- 📋 MIT license — fork freely, use commercially
Quick start
1. Install
npm install -g @ultralab/misp-mcp-server
Or use npx directly in your MCP client config (no install needed).
2. Configure your MCP client
Claude Desktop (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on Windows):
{
"mcpServers": {
"misp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@ultralab/misp-mcp-server"],
"env": {
"MISP_URL": "https://misp.your-org.example",
"MISP_API_KEY": "your_misp_api_key_here"
}
}
}
}
Cursor / Continue / Cline — similar pattern, see your client's MCP config docs.
3. Restart your MCP client and start asking
"What MISP events are tagged tlp:white from the last 7 days?"
"Show me event 12345 — I'm investigating a phishing report."
"What threat actor galaxies do we have configured?"
"Find all attributes matching the IP 198.51.100.42."
Tools exposed
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
misp_version |
Health check + server version |
misp_list_events |
Paginated event headers |
misp_get_event |
Full event with attributes (scanned for injection) |
misp_search_events |
Search by tag / type / value / date range |
misp_search_attributes |
Direct IOC lookup |
misp_list_tags |
All configured tags (TLP, taxonomy, etc.) |
misp_list_feeds |
Configured threat-intel feeds |
misp_list_galaxies |
Threat actor / campaign clusters |
Mutation tools intentionally not included. An LLM with write access to MISP is a supply-chain compromise vector. If you need agent-driven MISP mutations, build a per-tool allowlist with human-in-the-loop confirmation.
Defense layer
Every tool response is run through prompt-defense-audit's scanOutput before being returned to the LLM client.
High-risk patterns (critical / high severity) — response is blocked and replaced with a safe summary. Example trigger patterns:
- Script-tag injection (
<script>...</script>) - Iframe / object injection
- JavaScript URLs (
javascript:) - Shell-command patterns in unexpected contexts
- Known prompt-injection vector signatures from
prompt-defense-audit's 17+ vector library
Low/medium-risk patterns — response annotated with a [defense] prefix listing matched patterns but still returned.
Opt out (not recommended)
PROMPT_DEFENSE_DISABLED=true
Use only if you fully trust your MISP instance + all federated feeds and need raw response fidelity for a specific debugging scenario.
Environment variables
| Variable | Required | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
MISP_URL |
✅ | — | Base URL of your MISP instance (e.g. https://misp.example.com) |
MISP_API_KEY |
✅ | — | MISP automation API key (Profile → Auth Keys) |
MISP_INSECURE_TLS |
❌ | false |
Set to true only for self-signed dev instances |
PROMPT_DEFENSE_DISABLED |
❌ | false |
Set true to skip output scanning (NOT recommended) |
For enterprise users
The free OSS defense layer ships with prompt-defense-audit (17+ regex-based vectors, ~3ms latency, deterministic).
For deployments that need:
- 🔍 Persistent audit logs of every MISP query an LLM has made
- 👥 Team policies (per-role allowlists, per-TLP gating, escalation flows)
- 🌏 Jurisdictional compliance (EU GDPR / TW 個資法 / 中國 PIPL data-residency)
- 🚨 Live threat intel updates to the defense ruleset (new injection vectors pushed daily)
- 📊 SLA-backed uptime and response
→ Upgrade path: route MCP server through Quartz Cloud — Taiwan-domiciled runtime AI firewall, drop-in passthrough.
Development
git clone https://github.com/ppcvote/misp-mcp-server.git
cd misp-mcp-server
npm install
npm test # smoke tests, no live MISP
npm run dev # tsx watch mode
npm run build # produce dist/
Architecture
LLM client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.)
│ stdio
▼
@ultralab/misp-mcp-server
│
├─ src/tools.ts — 8 read-only tool definitions + dispatch
├─ src/misp-client.ts — minimal MISP REST API wrapper
└─ src/index.ts — MCP Server + scanOutput() defense layer
│
▼
MISP REST API (/events, /attributes, /tags, /feeds, /galaxies)
Project context
Built by Ultra Lab — a one-person AI products company in Taiwan, focused on AI safety, threat intel, and the supply chain between LLM agents and operational security tooling.
This server is part of a broader thesis: the MCP ecosystem will be a major prompt-injection vector unless servers default to defensive output handling. We're shipping reference implementations for high-leverage targets (MISP first, OpenCTI / TheHive / Vault next) to anchor the standard.
Companion projects:
prompt-defense-audit— the underlying detection engineultraprobe— CLI scanner for AI app system promptsquartz.tw— paid runtime firewall (audit logs, team policies, jurisdictional moat)
License
MIT © 2026 Ultra Lab — see LICENSE.
Contributing
PRs welcome. Please:
- Keep the read-only invariant. Mutation tools must be argued explicitly with a threat-model writeup.
- Add a test for any new tool.
- If you add new MISP API coverage, link to the relevant OpenAPI spec section in your PR.
For discussion, see MISP/MISP#10745.
MISP MCP questions
What tools does MISP MCP provide?
It exposes 8 tools, including misp_version, misp_list_events, misp_get_event, misp_search_events, misp_search_attributes.
Can the LLM modify data in my MISP instance?
No, the server is read-only by design and does not expose any tools for event or attribute mutation.
How does the server protect against prompt injection?
Every outgoing MISP response is scanned using prompt-defense-audit to block high-risk patterns like script tags or shell-command patterns.
What environment variables are required to set up the server?
You must provide the MISP_URL and the MISP_API_KEY.