appCrane MCP server
Commit Nov 13, 2026An AI-driven self-hosted PaaS that enables agents to deploy, inspect, and rollback applications through a governed MCP control plane.
Also known as gitayg/appCrane
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- AGPL-3.0
What is appCrane MCP?
appCrane is an AI-driven self-hosted PaaS that enables agents to deploy, inspect, and rollback applications through a governed MCP control plane.
Summary generated from the project's README
About appCrane MCP server
AppCrane provides a self-hosted platform as a service designed for teams that require strict governance and data residency. It allows AI agents to act as operators, managing the entire application lifecycle directly through a controlled MCP interface. Instead of relying on manual browser interactions or command-line tools, developers can use an agent to deploy, inspect, and manage applications on a server they own.
The platform distinguishes itself by providing 74 specific MCP tools, including commands like appcrane_deploy, appcrane_rollback, and appcrane_set_secret. It features built-in support for enterprise protocols such as SAML 2.0, OIDC, and SCIM provisioning without requiring a paid license. A key security feature is that platform administrators are prevented from reading the plaintext secrets of applications they are not explicitly assigned to.
Every action taken by an agent or a human is recorded in an audit log that distinguishes between automated and manual actors. This setup is ideal for organizations needing to maintain an internal-only network while allowing AI-driven development workflows to function within a sanctioned, audited environment.
What you can do with it
- 1Automated application deploymentAn AI agent can create and ship a new application to your server using specialized deployment tools.
- 2Reverting failed updatesYou can instruct an AI client to undo a recent deployment if it causes issues.
- 3Auditing agent activitySecurity teams can query the logs to see exactly what actions were performed by automated agents versus human users.
- 4Securing application secretsEnsure that even the person managing the server cannot access sensitive environment variables for specific apps.
Written from the project's README. Every use case is checked against a quote from it.
Configuration
OLD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
Automated checks
Ran Nov 14, 2026Full report →Not verified yet. A server needs a score of 80, no serious finding, and enough data for us to check. How checks work · What to fix for more points
- Source repository linked and reachablegitayg/appcrane is public and reachablegithub.com/gitayg/appcrane ↗Pass
- Package names this repository as its sourceNot checked
- Build provenance (Sigstore attestation)Not checked
- Open source license (OSI)AGPL-3.0spdx.org/licenses/AGPL-3.0.html ↗Pass
- Commit or release in the last yearLast commit or release 2026-11-13github.com/gitayg/appcrane ↗Pass
- OpenSSF ScorecardNot checked
- Package name not close to a popular packageNot checked
- No critical advisory in the package or its dependenciesNot checked
- No hidden instructions to the model0 tool descriptions and the README read; no override phrases, credential paths or hidden charactersPass
- Destructive tools are labelledNot checked
- Remote endpoint answers the MCP handshakeNot checked
README
View on GitHubAppCrane
Self-hosted PaaS where the agent is the operator and the platform keeps the receipts.
appcrane.dev · How it compares · Deploy from Claude · MCP connector · Changelog
AppCrane runs the internal apps your team builds with Claude Code or Cursor, on a server you own. An agent creates the app, deploys it, reads the logs and rolls it back through 74 MCP tools — no browser, no curl — while the platform enforces SSO and per-app roles, records every action against the actor that took it (tagged agent or human), and keeps app secrets out of reach of the person administering the box.
It is for teams that have to self-host — data residency, a customer contract, an internal-only network — and still have to answer who deployed this, what was in it, and can we undo it?
What is actually uncommon here
Self-hosted PaaS caught up on governance during 2026. Coolify shipped structured audit logging and first-class OIDC; Dokploy shipped SSO, SCIM, custom roles and audit logs. Komodo has had granular per-resource permissions and a full audit trail for longer than either. Most of what used to be a differentiator here no longer is, and the claims below are the ones that survived checking their docs. Four things still stand out:
1. Governance is in the open-source build, not behind a license key. SAML 2.0, OIDC, SCIM provisioning, per-app roles and the audit log are all in the AGPL-3.0 build with nothing to activate. Dokploy ships the same category of capability as Enterprise, gated on a license key. Coolify's are free, but its changelog lists OIDC and audit logging without SAML or SCIM. Komodo's are free too — GPL-3.0, with per-resource permissions and an audit trail in the box — but its documented sign-on is username/password and OAuth (GitHub, Google, generic OIDC), with no SAML or SCIM in the docs. So the free-versus-paid line is really only Dokploy's; against Coolify and Komodo the difference is which enterprise-directory protocols are covered, not what you have to pay to turn them on.
2. The built-in agent interface can change things. Coolify's instance-level MCP server is deliberately read-only — ten list/get tools. AppCrane's 74 include appcrane_deploy, appcrane_rollback, appcrane_promote, appcrane_set_secret and appcrane_grant_app_access. Dokploy's official MCP package is write-capable too, and far larger (508 tools across 49 categories) — AppCrane's surface is smaller by choice, not by capability, and is paired with appcrane_get_guide(topic="onboarding"|"operations"), which serves the current playbook from the server so the agent reads the procedure instead of inferring it from a tool list. Komodo ships no MCP server of its own; neither its repo nor its docs contain one, and the several that exist are third-party wrappers over its REST API.
3. The audit log tells an agent from a person. Every row carries actor_kind, so "what did the agents do on this box last week" is one query. The others record a user identity — Komodo's trail records "who made it and when" (intro) — but none of their docs describe separating automated actors from humans.
4. The operator is locked out of app secrets. Env-var access follows app assignment, and that holds for platform_admin as well — the role that installs and updates the platform cannot read the plaintext of an app it is not assigned to. Reveals are throttled and audited across both doors, HTTP and MCP, so switching transport does not buy a fresh allowance. Komodo documents the opposite arrangement explicitly: marking a variable secret prevents access to the value for non-admin users, which is to say an admin can read it.
Four more that are unusual but worth measuring against your own requirements rather than reading as headlines: per-tenant data isolation for deployed apps; repo-less uploads identified by a server-side SHA-256 over the received bytes instead of a self-reported commit SHA; a daily vulnerability digest mailed per recipient — fleet-wide to a platform admin, own-apps-only to an app owner, so the digest cannot leak which other apps are exposed; and managed repos, so an agent can create and ship an app for someone who has no GitHub account at all.
Versus vendor-hosted governed platforms (Replit, Lovable, Retool, Superblocks), the trade is the usual one: their governance is more mature, and your app data, database connections and API keys live on their infrastructure.
Against self-hosted PaaS
| AppCrane | Coolify | Dokploy | Komodo | CapRover / Dokku | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Multi-host / fleet deploys | no — single host | yes (experimental) | yes, remote servers | yes, agent per host | Swarm cluster (CapRover) |
| Built-in MCP that can deploy | 74 tools, incl. rollback | 10 tools, read-only | 508 tools (official package), incl. rollback | community projects only | community projects only |
| SAML 2.0 | yes | not in changelog | Enterprise | not documented | no |
| OIDC | yes | yes (v4.4-rc.1) | Enterprise | yes, generic OIDC | no |
| SCIM provisioning | yes | not in changelog | Enterprise | not documented | no |
| Audit log | yes, agent vs human attributed | yes, structured (v4.1.0) | Enterprise | yes, full change trail | no |
| Governance behind a paid tier | no | no | yes | no | n/a |
| Operator cannot read app secrets | yes | not documented | not documented | no — admins can | no |
| Per-tenant data isolation for apps | yes | not documented | not documented | not documented | no |
| Deploy identity for repo-less uploads | server-side SHA-256 | not documented | not documented | not documented | no |
| Core license | AGPL-3.0 | Apache-2.0 | Apache-2.0 + paid Enterprise | GPL-3.0 | open source |
The first row is the one AppCrane loses outright. Komodo is built around fleet management: a Core web server plus a stateless Periphery agent on every connected machine, with "no limit to the number of servers you can connect", Docker Swarm management, and declarative resource sync from a git repo. AppCrane has no agent, no host registry and no remote-execution path — it deploys containers on the machine it is installed on, and that is the whole design. Coolify and Dokploy both reach other servers too, and CapRover joins nodes through Docker Swarm.
CapRover and Dokku are in one column because their access model is the same shape: a single admin account (CapRover) or SSH keys where the word admin in a key name grants key-management rights (Dokku), with multi-user access an explicitly out-of-scope request in one and an unaudited community plugin in the other. That is a reasonable design for a one-operator box; it is not something to put an IdP in front of.
Checked against each project's own documentation and changelog in September 2026. "not documented" means the capability does not appear in their docs — that is not proof it is absent, and a vendor page is a claim, not a test. Verify anything load-bearing on your own install.
Honest scope. Coolify has a far larger template marketplace, a much bigger community, and multi-server orchestration; if you want one-click Postgres and hundreds of app templates, use Coolify. Dokploy's API surface is broader than AppCrane's and it sells support with an SLA. Komodo is the better choice the moment the answer involves more than one machine — a fleet of hosts, a Swarm, builds farmed out to spot instances, configuration synced declaratively from git; AppCrane deploys to the box it runs on and nowhere else, so a multi-host estate is not a smaller version of this, it is a different product. Dokku and CapRover are simpler and lighter if one person operates the box. Choose AppCrane when the apps are agent-built, the agent should do the deploying, everything lands on one server you own, and someone will later ask you to prove who did what.
Why it matters now. Three things changed in 2026:
- The bottleneck moved from writing software to operating it. In Anthropic's Claude Code study (~400k sessions), "operating software" — deploying, configuring, running pipelines — grew from 14% to 21% of sessions while fixing broken code fell from 33% to 19%. Non-engineers now ship deployable code within 7 points of professional engineers. The scarce thing isn't the app any more; it's somewhere safe to run it.
- Shadow AI became measurable. The 2026 Verizon DBIR reports shadow-AI detections up 4×, AI use on corporate devices rising 15% → 45% in a year with 67% through non-corporate accounts — and source code as the most commonly submitted data type. Bans make it worse; a sanctioned platform is the answer that works.
- Governance-by-console is the failure mode. Platforms that gate every app behind a human clicking through an approval UI stall once there are hundreds of apps. AppCrane's answer is different in kind: the agent drives the governed lifecycle over MCP, and the platform records and constrains it — rather than a person mediating each step.
Features
- Each app on its own address (app isolation) — every app used to be served at
/<slug>on the platform's host, so every app and the dashboard shared one browser origin: one app's script could call any other app as the visitor (AppCrane's sign-in accepted the visitor's one session for every app), and could read the dashboard's session token from browser storage — a full AppCrane session, a platform admin's if an admin opened that app. A platform admin can now set an apps domain (Settings > Security > App isolation;PUT /api/settings/isolation). Each app then answers athttps://<slug>.<domain>/and its sandbox athttps://<slug>-sandbox.<domain>/, and the visitor is signed in there by a one-time handoff from the platform host into a cookie that only that app and environment accept (__Host-cc_app); the platform API never accepts it, and signing out of AppCrane ends it. Old/<slug>links redirect (308) to the new address, and a path still starting with/<slug>/has that prefix removed, so apps need no change and keep theirAPP_BASE_PATH./api/meand/api/directorykeep working from an app's own pages. With it on, the platform cookie becomes__Host-cc_token(everyone signs in again once). The domain can be the platform host itself (apps at<slug>.<platform host>) or another name such asapps.<platform domain>. Needs a wildcard DNS record*.<domain>pointing at the server, and either a wildcard certificate (file paths in the same card) or Caddy's on-demand certificates, which AppCrane approves only for its own app addresses. Use a domain under the same registrable domain as the platform host, or apps opened inside the dashboard lose their sign-in (browsers block third-party cookies). Off (no domain) changes nothing. Custom domains can now use AppCrane sign-in too: per app, "Require AppCrane sign-in on the custom domain" (custom_domain_auth, also onappcrane_set_app_meta), off by default. App objects now carryurlandsandbox_url. With it on, the dashboard's own policy allows frames fromhttps://*.<domain>, so app tabs keep working. - Dependency fixes: body-parser, multer, nodemailer — body-parser 2.4.0 (CVE-2026-111181, denial of service through bytes trailing a compressed request body), multer 2.5.0 (CVE-2026-113872, denial of service through a file filter still pending after the request ends) and nodemailer 10.2.1 (three advisories). The floors in
package.jsonmove with them.npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities. - Files uploaded into /data no longer leave root-owned folders —
appcrane_cpwriting into a folder that did not exist yet left that folder (and the file) owned by root, so an app running asnodegot EACCES on every later write there until the next deploy re-owned/data. New folders and the file now belong to whoever owns the app's/data(1000:1000 after a deploy), whether the write goes into the container withdocker cpor onto the host. Folders that already exist are left exactly as they are, owner and mode included. - Node 22 is the default for generated Node builds — an app with no Dockerfile used to build on
node:20-alpine, which is end of life and gets no fix for Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497). The Node line is nownode_versionindeployhub.json, elseengines.nodeindeployhub.json, elseengines.nodeinpackage.json, else 22. When the stated range allows 22, 22 is used; otherwise the newest of 26, 24 and 22 that satisfies it, and Node 20 or 18 only when the range allows nothing newer (with a warning in the deploy log). Adeployhub.jsonvalue no buildable line satisfies fails the build and names it; apackage.jsonvalue that cannot be satisfied falls back to 22 with a warning. The deploy log says which line was chosen and why. App Studio's coding image moves to Node 22 as well. - Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497) protection — AppCrane refuses request bodies compressed with Brotli before any parser reads them, and Caddy refuses them for every hosted app (Settings > Security > Brotli-compressed uploads, on by default). Self-update and safe-boot move a vulnerable Node 22/24/26 host to 22.23.4 / 24.22.1 / 26.12.1, the boot log and Job Health warn while it is unpatched, and runtime auto-patch rebuilds affected Node apps on a freshly pulled patched base. Blocking Brotli uploads does not cover responses AppCrane or an app fetches from other servers; only a patched Node fixes that. Node 20, 23 and 25 get no fix: move to 22, 24 or 26. Without self-update, upgrade by hand:
curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | sudo -E bash - && sudo apt-get install -y nodejs && sudo systemctl restart appcrane, then checknode -v. - Immediate vulnerability e-mail — when any scan (deploy, scheduled or manual; sandbox or production; lockfile or image) finds a vulnerable package not reported before, the app's owners and every platform admin get one e-mail per scan. It lists each new finding (package@version, advisory with link, fixed version or "no fix yet", severity and remote-code-execution flag when known), the request that was opened, whether RCE auto-patch will try the fix or a person needs to act, and whether the release check will block production. Each finding is mailed once (again only if it is fixed and later comes back); findings already present at upgrade are not mailed. Platform setting
vuln_alerts_immediate(Settings > Security, on by default) turns it off. The daily digest is unchanged. Each batch is recorded as avuln.alertevent. - Runtime patching (PHP2Shell and similar) — every build pulls a fresh copy of its base image (generated Dockerfiles always; app Dockerfiles unless a platform admin turns it off in Settings > Security), falling back to the cached copy with a deploy-log warning when the registry cannot be reached. Each image records the base and digest it was built on. An hourly sweep finds apps whose running PHP is affected by a remote-code-execution advisory (OSV Bitnami/php plus a bundled list; PHP2Shell CVE-2026-109618/109619 is fixed in 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35). For hosted-repository and GitHub apps, under the RCE auto-patch policy (same switch and per-app opt-out), it rebuilds the same commit on the newer base: sandbox, health check, a check that the new PHP is fixed, release check, production, health check, with automatic rollback. The run is audited as
change.auto_approved(actor "AppCrane runtime patch"), owners are e-mailed and a request is recorded. Prebuilt-image apps, uploads, PHP branches with no fix (8.1 and older) and non-Docker Hub bases are listed in Job Health for a person, and platform admins get one e-mail per advisory. - Managed MongoDB checks the server's kernel — MongoDB 8.0 stops at startup on Linux 6.19 through 7.0.13, Docker images included. AppCrane reads the kernel Docker runs on and refuses a MongoDB database at once with "MongoDB 8.0 can't run on this server's kernel (X); upgrade to Linux 7.0.14 or later" (error code
MONGO_KERNEL_INCOMPATIBLE). Settings > Job Health ("Managed MongoDB kernel check") and the managed-database status show the same warning. A database server that stops while starting is now reported within seconds with its exit code and last log lines, instead of after a 2-minute wait.MANAGED_DB_MONGO_SKIP_KERNEL_CHECK=1turns AppCrane's own pre-check off; MongoDB still runs its own. - RCE auto-patch (on by default) — when the dependency scan finds a remote-code-execution advisory (CWE-77/78/94/95/502/917/1336, or advisory text that says code execution) with a published fix on an app whose repository AppCrane hosts, AppCrane bumps only that npm package in package-lock.json using npm in a confined container, once the fixed version has been on the registry for 24 hours and has no advisory of its own. It then deploys to sandbox, runs the release check and promotes to production without a person, rolling production back if its health check fails. Every run is audited as
change.auto_approved(actor: AppCrane auto-patch) and owners are e-mailed. It runs only when the branch tip is exactly the commit live in production, so changes a person has not promoted are never shipped with the bump, and it re-checks the switch, the app opt-out and any running restore right before promoting and before any rollback. Any guardrail that does not hold, and every non-RCE fix, stays with a person. A platform admin can turn it off or change the cooldown in Settings → Security; owners can opt an app out on its Manage page. Supported today: npm with a root package-lock.json; other ecosystems keep the human flow. The npm helper runs on an internal Docker network whose only exit is a proxy that allows a tunnel to registry.npmjs.org:443 and nothing else, from a node image pinned by digest; if that confinement cannot be set up, the fix goes to a person. When the lowest fixed version is deprecated on npm, AppCrane picks the lowest release in the same major version that is newer than it, not deprecated, has no advisory of its own on OSV and is past the cooldown, and bumps to that. It never follows the maintainer's suggested version on its own, and if no such release exists the fix goes to a person. An exact version pin stays exact. For auto-patch and runtime-patch runs only, the release check's dependency step passes when the target advisory is gone and every fixable finding left in the candidate is one the live production scan already has. Those findings are listed as unchanged in the release check record, thechange.auto_approvedaudit row and the owner e-mail. A missing or failed production scan, or any new fixable finding, stops the run for a person. Every other release-check step, and every deploy or promote a person starts, is checked exactly as before. Auto-heal after a restart redeploys the exact commit that was live and is not re-checked, so an app with an older known issue still comes back. - Two-factor sign-in and session timeouts (SOC 2) — password sign-in supports TOTP authenticator apps (SHA-1 default, SHA-256 optional) with 10 single-use recovery codes, enrolled under Settings → Account. Settings → Security sets who must use it (off / platform admins only, the default / everyone); anyone required but not enrolled sets it up at their next password sign-in. Platform admins can reset a user's MFA (audited, user e-mailed). Single sign-on users get MFA from their identity provider and are not asked twice; API keys are unaffected. Sessions end at the earlier of an absolute lifetime and an idle timeout, enforced on the server for every session whatever issued it: platform admins 8 h / 30 min idle, everyone else 24 h / 8 h idle by default (configurable: lifetime 15 min-30 days, idle 5 min-24 h, changes audited), with a 2-minute warning in the dashboard.
- Periodic access reviews (SOC 2) — campaigns on a set cadence (optionally per data classification). App owners keep, remove or change each person's access and platform admins review each other; Remove and Change apply at once and are audited, and access granted through SCIM groups is flagged as managed by the identity provider. Reminders, escalation of overdue campaigns to platform admins, and CSV/JSON reports. Pages: My reviews, and Access reviews for admins; API
/api/access-reviews/*. - Tamper-evident audit (SOC 2) — audit log and event rows are sealed into a SHA-256 hash chain every 5 minutes with HMAC-signed checkpoints (key derived from
ENCRYPTION_KEY). Verification every 6 hours and on demand (Audit integrity page,/api/audit-chain/*) names the first row that was modified, deleted or inserted out of order and catches forged checkpoints; platform admins get one critical e-mail per failure. Rows removed by event retention are told apart from rows deleted by hand, and checkpoints go into the event/SIEM stream so a third party can hold them. Limit: someone with both the database andENCRYPTION_KEYcan rebuild the chain; only checkpoints held outside AppCrane detect that. - Restore drills (SOC 2) — weekly by default, the newest local backup (and the newest off-site set, if configured) is restored into an isolated scratch area and checked: database integrity, row counts against live, decryption, repository bundles, managed database dump headers. It records RPO and RTO, cleans up, never touches live data, and e-mails admins on failure. Settings → Backup → Restore drills.
- Compliance evidence pack (SOC 2) — a signed, downloadable .tar.gz of evidence mapped to SOC 2 CC6/CC7/CC8/A1/C1 for a chosen period (users and roles, sign-in and key policy, access reviews, audit log and chain verification, deploys and release checks, scans, backups and drills, encryption), scanned for secrets before it is written and verifiable later. Settings → Compliance. It supports an audit; it is not a SOC 2 report or a certification.
- FIPS 140-3 mode —
APPCRANE_FIPS=requirerefuses to start unless Node runs a FIPS provider and a startup self-check (known-answer tests, MD5 refused) passes. Passwords are PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (600k iterations) and old scrypt hashes convert at each user's next sign-in. S3 DeleteObjects uses a SHA-256 checksum instead of MD5 (with a fallback for buckets that insist on MD5).APPCRANE_TDE_KDF=pbkdf2-sha256moves the MariaDB key file off SHA-1 (needs MariaDB 12). Settings → Security → Cryptography shows the status and anything still on a legacy algorithm. The deployer provides the FIPS Node build, a FIPS Caddy, FIPS base images and host FIPS mode; see docs/FIPS.md. - App intake, data classification and release check — every new app answers a s
appCrane MCP questions
Can an AI agent deploy applications using AppCrane?
Yes, the platform provides 74 MCP tools including deployment, rollback, and secret management specifically for agents.
How does AppCrane handle security and governance?
It includes built-in SAML 2.0, OIDC, SCIM provisioning, and per-app roles, with an audit log that distinguishes between agent and human actions.
Can the platform administrator read application secrets?
No, the platform is designed so that even the administrator cannot read the plaintext of an app they are not assigned to.
Does AppCrane support multi-host deployments?
No, AppCrane is designed to deploy containers on the specific machine it is installed on.
What is the license for AppCrane?
AppCrane is released under the AGPL-3.0 license.