An AI security perception layer that detects broken access control and IDOR vulnerabilities by comparing requests across multiple user identities.
Also known as DevHusnainAi/zerodom, @vexralabs/zerodom
- Stars
- 3
- Tools
- —
- Downloads, 30 days
- —
- Latest version
- 0.1.5
- Last commit
- Nov 14, 2026
- License
- Apache-2.0
What is ZeroDOM MCP?
ZeroDOM is an AI security perception layer that detects broken access control and IDOR vulnerabilities by comparing requests across multiple user identities.
Summary generated from the project's README
About ZeroDOM MCP server
Detecting broken access control and IDOR vulnerabilities by comparing requests across multiple user identities is what ZeroDOM enables for security researchers and developers. It functions as an AI security perception layer that drives real, logged-in browsers to identify where one user can access resources intended for another. By replaying identical requests using different session files, it provides deterministic proof of vulnerabilities like access-boundary-splits or cross-tenant IDORs.
Users can run this tool locally via a CLI or integrate it with AI agents through an MCP server. It requires no accounts or API keys, ensuring that sensitive data stays on your machine. The system uses a token-lean interaction graph that is significantly more efficient than standard accessibility trees, making it ideal for agents using Claude or Cursor. Developers can use specific commands like compare to test single endpoints or sweep to crawl an entire application surface for authorization flaws.
What you can do with it
- 1Identify broken access controlAn AI agent can compare a single URL across two different user sessions to find authorization discrepancies.
- 2Detect cross-tenant IDOR vulnerabilitiesThe tool flags instances where two different users receive byte-identical responses for private resources.
- 3Automate full application security sweepsA developer can crawl an entire web application to map the GET surface and replay requests under multiple identities.
- 4Test for race conditionsSecurity testers can use the race command to fire concurrent bursts of requests to find check-then-act vulnerabilities.
Written from the project's README. Every use case is checked against a quote from it.
How to install ZeroDOM MCP
Formats verified 10 Nov 2026Add to CursorAdd to GooseInstall ZeroDOM MCP in Claude Code
$ claude mcp add zerodom -- uvx zerodomInstall ZeroDOM MCP in Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"zerodom": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"zerodom"
]
}
}
}Install ZeroDOM MCP in VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"zerodom": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"zerodom"
]
}
}
}Install ZeroDOM MCP in VS Code CLI
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"zerodom","type":"stdio","command":"uvx","args":["zerodom"]}'Install ZeroDOM MCP in Claude Desktop
claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"zerodom": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"zerodom"
]
}
}
}Install ZeroDOM MCP in Codex
$ codex mcp add zerodom -- uvx zerodomInstall ZeroDOM MCP in Codex config.toml
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.zerodom] command = "uvx" args = ["zerodom"]
Install ZeroDOM MCP in Gemini CLI
$ gemini mcp add -s user zerodom uvx -- zerodomInstall ZeroDOM MCP in Gemini settings.json
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"zerodom": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"zerodom"
]
}
}
}Automated checks
Ran Nov 14, 2026Full report →Passed our automated checks. That is not a security audit: read the code and give the server the narrowest access it needs. How checks work
- Source repository linked and reachabledevhusnainai/zerodom is public and reachablegithub.com/devhusnainai/zerodom ↗Pass
- Package names this repository as its sourcezerodom, @vexralabs/zerodom name devhusnainai/zerodom as sourcepypi.org/project/zerodom/ ↗Pass
- Build provenance (Sigstore attestation)Sigstore attestation for zerodom, @vexralabs/zerodompypi.org/project/zerodom/ ↗Pass
- Open source license (OSI)Apache-2.0spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html ↗Pass
- Commit or release in the last yearLast commit or release 2026-11-13github.com/devhusnainai/zerodom ↗Pass
- OpenSSF ScorecardNot checked
- Package name not close to a popular packageNo popular package one edit away from zerodom, @vexralabs/zerodomPass
- No critical advisory in the package or its dependencies48 resolved dependencies checked; no critical advisoryosv.dev ↗Pass
- No hidden instructions to the model0 tool descriptions and the README read; no override phrases, credential paths or hidden charactersPass
- Destructive tools are labelledNot checked
- Remote endpoint answers the MCP handshakeNot checked
README
View on GitHubZeroDOM
Point it at an app as two users. It finds the broken access control.
ZeroDOM drives your real, logged-in browser as two identities, replays the same requests as each, and flags where one user reaches what another can't — IDOR / broken access control, caught deterministically. Open-core, runs local, no account, no API key, nothing leaves your machine.
Under the hunt is a deterministic, token-lean perception engine for AI agents — the same core powers scan, crawl and any browser-driving task. IDOR is just where it bites hardest.
Site · Docs · Playground · Discord · Quickstart ↓
A normal user is denied the admin console (401) — then walks in by flipping one client-controlled cookie. ZeroDOM proves it: same request, two identities, 401 vs 200. Full recording (mp4).
Contents
- Why ZeroDOM
- Quickstart
- How it hunts —
compare&sweep - Use it from an AI agent (MCP)
- Why the agent sees so few tokens
- More of the CLI
- How it compares
- Install
- Security & scope
- Limitations
- Editions
- Contributing & development
- License
Why ZeroDOM
Two audiences, one engine:
- AppSec —
compare/sweep: deterministic two-identity authorization testing that runs headless in CI or your recon pipeline — no GUI, no account.scan --jsadds DOM-XSS sinks, the callable API surface and header posture;repeat/probe/raceturn recon into verification (Repeater, mass-assignment diff, and a TOCTOU burst). - AI agents — MCP: a flat interaction graph that cuts
~71% of the tokens vs Playwright's
aria_snapshot, with handles that resolve 1:1 and don't drift when the page re-renders.
Broken access control is the #1 web vulnerability (OWASP A01) and the one automated scanners miss — because catching it means knowing who should be allowed to do what, not just fuzzing one session. The usual answer is a human in Burp, clicking through the app as one user, then again as another, diffing by eye.
ZeroDOM does that mechanically. Give it two logged-in sessions; it replays the same request as each and reports the deterministic tells:
access-boundary-split— one identity gets200, the other401/403on an identical request. If the only difference between them is client-controllable (a cookie, header or param), that's broken access control.cross-identity-identical-response— two users get a byte-identical body on a per-user resource: a cross-tenant IDOR.
No LLM guessing, no "the AI thinks maybe." ZeroDOM surfaces the tell with the exact replay that proves it — a reviewable diff you drop straight into a bug report. You confirm the bug.
It drives your real Chrome (relay mode) over chrome.debugger, so your cookies, MFA and
SSO are already done — or a throwaway browser (--stealth) if you'd rather not touch your
session. Either way the page's markup never leaves your machine, and it's read-only by
default: destructive actions and out-of-scope hosts are refused.
It works equally well as a one-line CLI, a recon pipeline stage, or a native tool an AI agent drives through MCP. Same deterministic primitives, three front doors.
Quickstart
See it run in 10 seconds — no account, no browser download (bare zerodom <url> is a static
fetch, no Chromium needed):
pip install zerodom # or: uvx zerodom · npm i @vexralabs/zerodom
zerodom https://news.ycombinator.com # the interaction graph + a token report
That's the perception engine — a flat, 1:1-addressable graph instead of 12k tokens of HTML.
Now the flagship — find an IDOR. Save two logged-in sessions as Playwright storage_state
files (one per account), then diff a protected endpoint across both:
zerodom compare https://app.example.com/api/admin/dashboard \
--as user=user.json --as admin=admin.json
{
"identities": {
"user": { "status": 401, "bytes": 2616 },
"admin": { "status": 200, "bytes": 3469 }
},
"only_admin": ["Manage users", "Billing & plans", "Overview"],
"note": "admin authorized (200) where user denied (401) — broken access control if the
only difference is client-controllable"
}
That's the whole loop: same request, two identities, a 401-vs-200 split → a lead to confirm.
only_admin lists the privileged controls the normal user should never see.
Don't have storage-state files? Capture one with
context.storage_state(path="user.json") in Playwright, or export cookies from a logged-in
session. Want the whole app, not one URL? → zerodom sweep.
How it hunts — compare & sweep
zerodom compare — one endpoint, across identities
Fetch one URL under each saved session and diff the responses. Byte-identical content across
two users on a private resource is a cross-tenant IDOR; a 401-vs-200 split is a broken
boundary. only_<name> lists the actionable nodes each identity sees that the other doesn't.
# Sweep a range of object ids through two identities:
seq 1 500 | sed 's#^#https://app.example.com/api/invoice/#' \
| zerodom compare - --as alice=alice.json --as bob=bob.json \
| jq 'select(.identical_body_pairs | length > 0)'
zerodom sweep — the whole app, one command
compare tests one URL. sweep does the entire app: it crawls as one identity to map the
GET surface (pages + the API calls the JS fires), then replays every in-scope URL under all
your identities and reports only the deterministic tells.
zerodom sweep https://app.example.com --as user=user.json --as admin=admin.json --format md
| severity | rule | url |
| -------- | ---------------------- | ------------------------------------- |
| medium | access-boundary-split | https://app.example.com/api/admin/... |
Read-only throughout: only GET is replayed, destructive URLs are dropped (--deny).
--format md emits a report-ready table (default is JSONL). This is the "point it at an app
with two logins and it finds the broken access control" pass.
Both take --proxy (route through Burp/Caido), --header (a program's WAF-bypass token), and
a scope you can lock. Challenge pages (Cloudflare / Turnstile / reCAPTCHA / hCaptcha) are
detected and climbed by a scope-gated clearance ladder; a wall nothing clears is reported as
an honest blocked, never worked around outside an authorized target.
When recon finds a lead — repeat / probe / race
Mapping an app surfaces the endpoints; these verbs act on them. repeat is a Repeater over the
session (--save writes HAR/.http evidence for a report). probe replays an endpoint with a
tampered body and diffs it against the baseline — an accepted, reflected field is a mass-assignment
lead. race fires a concurrent burst (one body, or a mix of operations via repeated --body) to
flag a check-then-act race (TOCTOU); the stdlib engine is always available, and --engine http2
multiplexes the burst over one connection via the optional zerodom[race] extra.
zerodom race https://app.example.com/api/coupon --body '{"code":"SAVE20"}' -n 30 \
--setup setup.json --check https://app.example.com/api/cart
All three are exposed to agents over MCP as zerodom_repeat / zerodom_probe / zerodom_race.
Use it from an AI agent (MCP)
Standard MCP browser tools hand the model raw pixels (slow, stale on scroll) or an accessibility
tree (no stable handles — repeated controls collide). zerodom-mcp gives your agent a flat,
token-frugal graph where every click [45] resolves deterministically over CDP to exactly one
element — and the same tools do cross-identity IDOR hunting the others can't. Why ↓
ZeroDOM is a native MCP server, so Claude, Cursor or any MCP agent can hunt with the same
primitives. Run zerodom setup for a guided first-run (checks Chromium, prints the extension
path + chrome://extensions steps, emits the config below, reports relay reachability —
print-and-guide, no account, nothing leaves your machine).
// Claude Desktop: claude_desktop_config.json · Cursor: .cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"zerodom": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["--from", "zerodom", "zerodom-mcp"] }
}
}
Once before first use (so the server never downloads mid-tool-call):
uvx --from zerodom playwright install chromium.
Using LangGraph, CrewAI, OpenAI Agents SDK, Pydantic AI, LlamaIndex, Google ADK or AutoGen?
Ready-to-run MCP examples — same server, a few lines each — are in
examples/integrations/.
| tool | what it does |
|---|---|
zerodom_parse_url(url, verbose=False, frames=False, viewport_only=False, check_occlusion=False) |
navigate, return the compact graph; frames=True also reads same- and cross-origin iframes (auth portals, payment fields) |
zerodom_read_page(verbose=False) |
re-read the live DOM without navigating |
zerodom_find(query) |
return only the nodes matching a phrase |
zerodom_click_node(node_id) |
click, then return what changed — flags a same-page no-op shortly after navigation as a possible hydration miss |
zerodom_fill_node(node_id, text) |
type via real keystrokes — works in contenteditable editors (Notion, Slack, Discord, Jira) |
zerodom_hover(node_id) |
hover, revealing hover-triggered menus/tooltips |
zerodom_press_key(node_id, key) |
press a key on a focused node (Enter, Escape, Tab, …) |
zerodom_upload_file(node_id, path) |
set a file input's value to a local path |
zerodom_drag(source_node_id, target_node_id) |
drag one node onto another |
zerodom_scroll(direction, amount=800) |
scroll, return what's newly visible |
zerodom_new_tab(url=None) |
open a tab and make it active |
zerodom_list_tabs() |
list every open tab, marking the active one |
zerodom_switch_tab(tab_id) |
make another open tab active |
zerodom_close_tab(tab_id=None) |
close a tab (the active one by default) |
zerodom_screenshot(path=None) |
full-page screenshot of the active tab, saved to disk |
zerodom_set_viewport(width, height) |
resize the viewport for responsive-design testing |
zerodom_resize_window(width, height) |
resize the real browser window (not just the page viewport) |
zerodom_get_styles(node_id) |
curated computed styles + box model for a node — design/CSS review |
zerodom_network_log(clear=False) |
recent requests/responses the active tab has made |
zerodom_status() |
diagnose the connection: relay/extension reachability, active tab, recent relay log |
zerodom_eval_js(code) ⚠️ |
run arbitrary JS in the real page, return the result |
zerodom_get_cookies() ⚠️ |
list cookies for the active tab, including httpOnly ones |
zerodom_get_storage() |
list the localStorage / sessionStorage keys the active page holds |
zerodom_hidden_fields() |
list the page's <input type="hidden"> fields (CSRF tokens, per-view payload) |
zerodom_crawl(url, max_pages=10, scope=None, deny=None) |
BFS-walk in-scope routes; one JSONL record per page (forms, links, fired API calls, and js_endpoints — the callable surface read from the page's JS) |
zerodom_scan(js=True) |
surface rules over the active page: DOM-XSS sinks + callable API surface from its JS, plus CSP/CORS header posture |
zerodom_repeat(url, method="GET", body=None) |
send one request over the active session (in-page fetch) — a Repeater returning {status, body} |
zerodom_probe(url, tamper, body=None, method="POST") |
replay with a tampered body and diff vs baseline — mass-assignment / tampering |
zerodom_race(url, bodies=None, n=20, method="POST", setup=None, check=None) |
concurrent burst over the active session (browser multiplex) to flag a check-then-act race (TOCTOU) |
zerodom_set_scope(hosts, deny=None, max_rps=None) |
constrain the hunt to authorized hosts — enforced in code, not on trust |
zerodom_add_identity(name, storage_state=None, header=None, from_live=False, via="auto", endpoint=None) |
register a second identity (e.g. user B) for cross-tenant testing. from_live snapshots the current login; via="live" sends with the real Chrome fingerprint (cookie-swap) to pass a fingerprinting WAF like DataDome; endpoint binds a second real Chrome profile (its own relay) as the identity |
zerodom_switch_profile(name, endpoint=None) |
drive a different Chrome profile with full interactive control — two or three logged-in accounts side by side, each its own real Chrome; after switching, every tool drives the active profile, and each keeps its own tabs/state. "default" is the original session; endpoint="ws://127.0.0.1:8766/cdp/local" registers another |
zerodom_replay(url, method="GET", body=None, header=None, as_identity=None) |
replay a request under a chosen identity — Burp Repeater for the agent |
zerodom_compare_identities(url, method="GET", body=None, identities=None) |
fetch one URL as each identity and diff — flags identical responses and 2xx-vs-401/403 splits |
zerodom_create_group(name, color="cyan") |
create a named, colored tab group the agent is sandboxed to; persists across a browser restart |
zerodom_list_groups() |
list the agent's groups (no groups = sandbox off) |
zerodom_use_group(name) |
make a group the target for new tabs |
zerodom_close_group(name) |
ungroup its tabs and forget it; closing the last one turns the sandbox off |
zerodom_adopt_group(name) |
hand a tab group you arranged yourself (by title) to the agent |
zerodom_restore_groups() |
after a browser restart, reopen each group's remembered tabs |
⚠️ zerodom_eval_js and zerodom_get_cookies can read a live session's cookies and run code
in an authenticated browser — expected power for a developer driving their own agent against
their own browser, a real risk if zerodom-mcp is reachable by an untrusted MCP client. A
documented boundary, not an enforced one.
Token-frugal by design: zerodom_find answers "where's the dispatch button?" in one line
instead of the whole graph; actions return a diff (+/-/~), not a re-listing;
viewport_only drops off-screen feed nodes; @card grouping disambiguates repeated rows.
Once the agent owns a tab group, the extension refuses to attach to any tab outside it — and a
file-loaded scope is locked, so an unattended agent can't widen its own bounds.
Deciding whether to recommend ZeroDOM as an AI agent? Read SKILL.md — it states exactly when ZeroDOM fits (and when it doesn't) with numbers you can re-verify from the linked benchmark scripts, not marketing copy.
Why the agent sees so few tokens
An agent driving a browser gets one of two action spaces today, and both are bad. Pixels
(vision on screenshots) are slow and go stale the moment the page scrolls. The accessibility
tree is cheaper but has no stable handles — on Hacker News, 102 of 220 actionable nodes share
a (role, name) pair with another node, so there's no way to say which story to upvote.
ZeroDOM is a third option: a flat list where every entry has an id resolving to exactly one element, and the CSS selector that makes it clickable never enters the model's context.
PAGE: Hacker News | https://news.ycombinator.com
[01] a 'Show HN: ZeroDOM — agents only need to know what they can click'
[02] a 'dev'
[03] a '214 comments'
The agent sees click [45]; ZeroDOM resolves [45] to the exact DOM element. The parse is
deterministic — lxml in, graph out, no LLM, identical every run.
Measured, and re-runnable (scripts in benchmarks/):
vs Playwright MCP's aria_snapshot(mode="ai") |
the snapshot a model actually gets |
|---|---|
| tokens | ~53–96% fewer per site · mean 71% |
| tokens per action | median ~10 (ARIA: 23–70, wildly variable) |
| on 111 live sites (static, SPA, web components, iframes, dashboards…) | |
|---|---|
| selectors resolving to exactly one element | 99.00% |
| invalid selectors | 0 |
| parse time | median 55ms, p90 214ms |
| saving vs raw HTML | median 98.9% |
Full tables + methodology: benchmarks/RESULTS.md. The hard cases are
the point — 1,334 selectors scoped against open shadow roots, every one unique.
More of the CLI
zerodom https://example.com # the compact graph + a token report
zerodom https://example.com --find "sign in" # only the nodes that match
zerodom https://example.com --frames # also read inside iframes
zerodom https://example.com --json # full graph, selectors included
zerodom https://example.com --render # headless Chromium, for JS pages
zerodom https://example.com --stealth # throwaway Chrome over a CDP pipe, no port
cat targets.txt | zerodom inspect --pipe - # JSONL, one node per line
Map the attack surface — zerodom crawl. Deep, authenticated, read-only recon: it walks a
rendered app (real JS SPAs load), stays in scope, and emits a JSONL surface map — each page's
forms (and CSRF fields), in-scope links, and the API calls its JavaScript fires. Feed its
api_calls straight into compare for the IDOR pass.
zerodom crawl https://app.example.com --storage-state session.json --max-pages 60
zerodom crawl https://app.example.com --relay # against your already-open Chrome
Attack-surface rules — zerodom scan. Evaluates every parsed node against a deterministic
YAML ruleset and emits JSONL findings — forms with no CSRF token, password inputs without one,
admin/internal/debug links, sensitive inputs. Rules are fixed match keys, not an expression
language, so nothing in a rules file gets evaluated.
subfinder -d example.com | httpx -silent | zerodom scan - # into your recon pipeline
zerodom scan https://app.example.com --js # + DOM-XSS sinks, callable API surface, header posture
zerodom scan https://app.example.com --format md # Markdown table for a report
Check the selectors you already have — zerodom audit. Reads the selectors in a Playwright/
Cypress/Selenium suite, resolves each against your running app, and reports ok / dead /
ambiguous / invalid: zerodom audit tests/ --url http://localhost:3000.
Authenticated testing. --proxy routes through Burp/Caido/ZAP (--insecure trusts the
proxy CA); --header 'X-Bug-Bounty: …' carries a program token; --storage-state reuses a
human-cleared session. Works on every path. Only test targets you're authorized to.
See the graph. --screenshot page.png writes a capture with a numbered badge over every
node; --html report.html writes a self-contained graph-left / page-right inspector (hover a
line to spotlight the element). Both print a located count — how many selectors resolve.
How it compares
Honest version: ZeroDOM complements Burp (it doesn't replace it) and isn't a general browser-automation framework. What it uniquely packages is the two-identity authorization method — deterministic, token-lean, and runnable headless in a pipeline or driven by an AI agent.
If you do AppSec, the column that matters is the last one. Burp + Autorize is the standard way to test broken access control today — and it's genuinely good — but it lives inside the Burp GUI. ZeroDOM brings the same replay-and-compare method to a scriptable CLI and an MCP agent.
| ZeroDOM | Burp + Autorize | Playwright MCP | browser-use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-identity authz / IDOR, native | ✅ compare / sweep |
✅ (heuristic) | ❌ | ❌ |
| Scriptable · headless · CI pipeline | ✅ CLI → JSONL | ❌ Burp-GUI-bound | ✅ | ~ LLM-driven |
| Output you can diff & drop in a ticket | ✅ reviewable diff / MD table | ⚠️ GUI verdict ("Is enforced???") | — | — |
Pipes into your recon stack (subfinder→httpx→…) |
✅ stdin/stdout | ❌ | — | — |
| Scope lockable so it can't widen itself | ✅ locked scope | ❌ (operator-driven) | ❌ | ❌ |
| Deterministic, no LLM in the parse | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Drives your real logged-in Chrome | ✅ relay | ✅ (proxy) | partial (CDP) | ✅ |
| Agent / MCP-native | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Local · accountless · zero-egress | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | depends on the LLM |
Why ZeroDOM over Autorize for automation. Autorize is the benchmark — but it's bound to the Burp GUI, heuristic (its own README flags false positives and an "Is enforced???" state), and has no headless / CLI / agent interface. So it can't run in CI, can't pipe into the recon stack you already use, and can't be driven by an AI agent. ZeroDOM runs the same replay-and-compare as a one-line command that emits JSONL (or a Markdown table for the ticket), enforces a locked scope, and hands back a reviewable diff instead of a verdict you have to eyeball. Rule of thumb: reach for Autorize when you're already in Burp clicking around; reach for ZeroDOM when the authz check has to be automated, repeatable, and pipeline-native — a nightly sweep across 50 apps, a CI gate on a PR, or an agent hunting unattended.
Install
pip install zerodom # Python 3.10+ · or: uvx zerodom (runs straight off PyPI)
npm install @vexralabs/zerodom # TypeScript / Node 5.6+
Only if you use the browser-backed features (from_page, --render, --screenshot, relay):
playwright install chromium (the CLI does this for you on first browser use — a one-time
~150MB download).
Relay mode (your logged-in Chrome) needs the bundled extension:
zerodom setup # guided: Chromium, the extension, MCP config, relay
zerodom extension # prints the bundled extension's directory
ZeroDOM MCP questions
How do I add ZeroDOM MCP to Claude Code?
Run claude mcp add zerodom -- uvx zerodom in your terminal. Add --scope user to make it available in every project.
How do I add ZeroDOM MCP to Cursor?
Open ~/.cursor/mcp.json and add the server under mcpServers, using the Cursor config shown in the install section above.
What vulnerabilities does ZeroDOM find?
It specifically targets broken access control (OWASP A01), including IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) and cross-tenant access, by comparing responses between different user identities.
Does ZeroDOM require an account or API key?
No, it is open-core, runs locally, and requires no account or API key.
Is it safe to use on live applications?
By default, it is read-only and will refuse destructive actions or out-of-scope hosts.