rackhands MCP server
Commit Oct 26, 2026Enables AI agents and humans to monitor and manage server BMCs via Redfish and IPMI with built-in safety confirmations for dangerous operations.
Also known as Blackman99/rackhands
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What is rackhands MCP?
rackhands enables AI agents and humans to monitor and manage server BMCs via Redfish and IPMI with built-in safety confirmations for dangerous operations.
Summary generated from the project's README
About rackhands MCP server
Managing server hardware and Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs) is now possible through a single interface for both humans and AI agents. This tool normalizes communication across different vendors like Dell iDRAC, HPE iLO, Lenovo XCC, and Supermicro by using Redfish or falling back to IPMI. It provides a unified way to check system health, monitor hardware logs, and inspect storage components like RAID controllers, drives, and volumes.
Developers can run this as an MCP server via stdio to give AI clients read-only access to hardware telemetry. While it is read-only by default, it supports dangerous operations such as power management, firmware updates, and bmc-reset. To prevent accidental downtime, these actions require explicit configuration in a targets.yaml file and a two-step confirmation process involving a plan and a single-use token. This ensures that an AI agent cannot execute a destructive command without human approval.
What you can do with it
- 1Monitor server hardware healthAsk the AI to check the status of all servers in the rack to identify critical power supply or storage failures.
- 2Audit hardware event logsRequest a summary of critical hardware events from a specific HPE server using its IML logs.
- 3Perform controlled firmware updatesInstruct the agent to update the iDRAC firmware and wait for the process to complete successfully.
Written from the project's README. Every use case is checked against a quote from it.
Configuration
BMC_PASSWORD
Automated checks
Ran Nov 15, 2026Full report →Not verified yet. A server needs a score of 80, no serious finding, and enough data for us to check. How checks work · What to fix for more points
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- Open source license (OSI)MITspdx.org/licenses/MIT.html ↗Pass
- Commit or release in the last yearLast commit or release 2026-10-26github.com/blackman99/rackhands ↗Pass
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README
View on GitHubrackhands
Remote hands for your racks, for you and your AI agent. One binary that reads and operates server BMCs across vendors. Redfish on Dell iDRAC, HPE iLO, Lenovo XCC, Supermicro and any DMTF-conformant BMC, with IPMI as the fallback. Nothing that can take a machine down runs until you allow it and confirm it.
Every vendor speaks its own Redfish dialect. The hardware log is Sel on iDRAC, IML on iLO, PlatformLog on XCC and Log1 on Supermicro. The health rollup hides in a different OEM block on each, and each one accepts a different set of reset types. Older and cheaper boxes speak only IPMI. The existing Redfish MCP servers either cover one vendor, or give an agent set_power_state with nothing in between. rackhands normalises the reads and puts every dangerous operation behind two keys, a plan and a confirmation.

Landing page: https://blackman99.github.io/rackhands/ · Docs: https://blackman99.github.io/rackhands/docs/
Install
go install github.com/Blackman99/rackhands/cmd/rackhands@latest
Or download a single static binary for linux / macOS / windows from Releases.
Usage
$ rackhands health
CRITICAL db-01 (Dell, via redfish)
Critical subsystem power supplies — iDRAC rollup
Critical subsystem storage — iDRAC rollup
Critical psu PS2 Status — reading 0 W
Critical drive Physical Disk 0:1:2 — failed · HDD 2.4 TB ST2400MM0129 · Bay 2 · S/N WBN0K2L7 · on PERC H755 Front
Warning volume pgdata — degraded · RAID5 4.8 TB · on PERC H755 Front
storage 1 controller · 5 drives (1 Critical) · 2 volumes (1 Warning)
CRITICAL web-07 (HPE, via redfish)
Critical fan Fan 3 — reading 0 %
Warning drive Drive 0 — 6% media life left · SSD 1.6 TB MO001600JWTBT · Slot=12:Port=1I:Box=1:Bay=1 · S/N S5H0NA0R301442 · on HPE MR416i-a Gen10+
Warning drive Drive 2 — failure predicted · HDD 4 TB MB004000JWJTT · Slot=12:Port=1I:Box=1:Bay=3 · S/N ZC1A7K2Q · on HPE MR416i-a Gen10+
storage 1 controller · 4 drives (2 Warning) · 2 volumes
OK k8s-12 (Lenovo, via redfish)
storage 1 controller · 2 drives · 1 volume
WARNING lab-x10 (Supermicro, via ipmi (fallback))
Warning temperature PSU2 Temp — reading 117 C
storage not checked: IPMI has no controller, drive or RAID volume data (needs Redfish)
$ rackhands events web-07 --min critical # iLO IML, same shape as the iDRAC SEL
$ rackhands power db-01 force-off
rackhands: operation not allowed: "power" is off; start with --allow power (dangerous operations are disabled by default)
Targets live in ~/.config/rackhands/targets.yaml (example). Use --host https://bmc --user root for a one-off.
Storage: health reads RAID controllers, drives and volumes too, and a failed drive or a degraded volume is enough to make it exit 1. rackhands storage [TARGET...] prints the full tables (add --problems for only what is not OK, --json for scripts). A drive also counts as a Warning when the BMC still says OK but predicts a failure, or reports less than 10% media life left. rackhands handles the PERC RAID.SL.* / RAID.Integrated.* ids and RaidStatus on Dell, the iLO 4 Smart Array OEM tree (SmartStorage) on HPE, drives that Supermicro links from /Chassis, and BMCs that only have SimpleStorage. It is a read: it needs no --allow, writes nothing and is not audited. IPMI has no storage data, so an IPMI-only target says "needs Redfish" and rackhands does not guess.
$ rackhands storage db-01 --problems
CRITICAL db-01 (Dell, via redfish, Storage) 1 controller · 5 drives (1 Critical) · 2 volumes (1 Warning)
DRIVE MEDIA SIZE HEALTH LOCATION NOTE
Physical Disk 0:1:2 SAS HDD 2.4 TB Critical Bay 2 Failed
VOLUME RAID SIZE HEALTH DRIVES STATE
pgdata RAID5 4.8 TB Warning 3 Degraded
TLS: BMCs usually ship a self-signed certificate. insecure: true is the lazy default; prefer pinning the leaf SHA-256 with tls_fingerprint: (print it with rackhands tls-fingerprint TARGET) or a real ca_file with insecure: false. When tls_fingerprint is set it is the trust model for that target — a mismatch fails closed and does not fall through to insecure.
Dangerous operations (power, boot, bmc-reset, firmware, virtual-media) need all of the following:
--allow CLASSwhen you start rackhands.allow: [CLASS]on that target in the config.- Exactly one named target.
- A confirmation: you type the target name, or pass
--yes <name>. Over MCP it is a single-use token, bound to the exact request, that the agent only gets back after it shows you the plan.
Every plan and execution is appended to an audit log. --dry-run shows the exact request and stops.
Watching a firmware update: add --wait and rackhands follows the task the BMC returns until it ends. It reads the Redfish Task or task monitor, the iDRAC job on Dell, and the UpdateService flash state on HPE iLO 5. It keeps polling while the BMC restarts to apply its own firmware and stops at wait_timeout (default 30m). Ctrl-C stops the watching, not the update. The outcome (state, BMC-side duration) goes into the audit log next to the execution. --wait opens no gate: the update still needs --allow firmware, allow: and the confirmation.
$ rackhands --allow firmware firmware-update db-01 https://repo/iDRAC.EXE --yes db-01 --wait
SENT db-01: accepted (HTTP 202), task /redfish/v1/TaskService/Tasks/JID_001
watching JID_001 until it ends (at most 30m; Ctrl-C stops watching, not the update)
WAIT db-01 JID_001 Running 40% ████░░░░░░ Installing the iDRAC firmware package. 12s
DONE db-01: JID_001 completed in 3m02s — Job completed successfully.
rackhands task TARGET lists tasks and jobs, and rackhands task TARGET ID --wait watches one. Both are read-only and need no --allow. A Dell job scheduled for the next reboot ends as STAGED (exit 0). A failed, cancelled or timed-out task exits 4, and the last line says why and what to run next.
For agents: rackhands mcp is an MCP server on stdio. It is read-only by default; get_health carries the storage section and get_storage returns the full controller / drive / volume lists. Dangerous tools are not even listed unless their class is allowed.
Defence in depth: give the agent a read-only BMC account. rackhands' gate lives in rackhands. The strongest guarantee lives in the BMC: an account with the Redfish
ReadOnlyrole (iLO: no Virtual Power and Reset / iLO Config privileges) or IPMIUserprivilege cannot power anything off, whatever runs with it. Every read command works with such an account. Keep a separate, privileged config for humans.rackhands inventory(and the MCPget_inventorytool) shows the effective privilege of the account each target logs in with, read-only, and warns when a target with no dangerousallow:classes logs in as Operator or Administrator:$ rackhands inventory TARGET VIA VENDOR … POWER ACCOUNT db-01 redfish Dell … On rackhands-ro (ReadOnly) x11 redfish Supermicro … On ADMIN (Administrator, can power off) WARN x11: logs in as Administrator, which can power off or reconfigure this machine, but no dangerous class is allowed for it; use a read-only BMC account (Redfish ReadOnly role, IPMI User privilege)
{"mcpServers": {"rackhands": {"command": "rackhands", "args": ["mcp"], "env": {"BMC_PASSWORD": "…"}}}}
CI runs the binary against the DMTF Redfish-Mockup-Server, serving the DMTF mockup plus Dell, HPE (iLO 5 and iLO 4), Lenovo and Supermicro mockups, and against OpenIPMI ipmi_sim (test/integration.sh).
See GOAL.md, ROADMAP.md, CONTRIBUTING.md. MIT licensed.
rackhands MCP questions
Can I use rackhands with older hardware that doesn't support Redfish?
Yes, rackhands uses IPMI as a fallback for older or cheaper hardware that only speaks IPMI.
Is it safe to give an AI agent access to my BMC?
Yes, you can provide the agent with a read-only BMC account to ensure the strongest security guarantee, as rackhands also implements its own safety gates.
How do I install rackhands?
You can install it via Go using 'go install github.com/Blackman99/rackhands/cmd/rackhands@latest' or by downloading a static binary from the Releases page.