Claude Code plugins
6 plugins from public Claude Code marketplaces. Each one bundles skills, slash commands, agents, hooks or MCP servers that install together.
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Organic LinkedIn presence, end to end, with LinkedIn's own rules enforced in code. Orchestrator (context: fork) gates every request against User Agreement §8.2 — refusing automation, scraping, engagement pods, bulk DMs, fake identity and fabricated proof, each with a compliant substitute — then routes to profile / strategy / content / engagement / analytics. Headline and whole-profile scoring with fixes ranked by points per hour; positioning brief with a mandatory exclusion list; cadence priced against real hours with a 90-minute floor; newsletter eligibility + six-month sustainability gate; post linter blocking on engagement bait and screen-reader-hostile Unicode pseudo-bold; repurposing with a reuse ledger; capped commenting roster and template-refusing outreach; analytics that test patterns against a seeded permutation null and refuse to conclude below 10 posts. 17 stdlib tools, 15 references with per-claim confidence levels. No credentials, no API calls, nothing auto-sent. Answers
Converts books, documentation folders, and source collections (PDF, EPUB, DOCX, HTML, Markdown, RST, AsciiDoc, RTF, MOBI/AZW) into structured agent skills: a master SKILL.md with core frameworks and a topic index, on-demand chapter files, a glossary, a patterns file, and a decision cheatsheet. Ships 4 stdlib-only tools (multi-format extractor with invisible-Unicode sanitization, four-family generated-skill validator covering frontmatter/safety/budget/index, pre- and post-flight token budget estimator with a worth-converting verdict, and a plugin emitter that wraps a compiled skill as an installable claude-skills package behind a rights gate), 5 references citing 7-8 sources each, a cs-book-to-skill agent, and /cs-book-to-skill + /cs-book-to-plugin commands. Derived from virgiliojr94/book-to-skill (MIT).
Ship a new language without the usual breakage. Three deterministic stdlib scripts: a translation-file checker for JSON/ARB (i18next, ICU), .properties, .strings, Android strings.xml and gettext .po that blocks on missing keys, renamed placeholders, ICU syntax errors, plural/select without other, zero branches that never match and plural categories the target locale needs, from the embedded Unicode CLDR 49 table (ru few/many, ar six forms); a hardcoded-string scanner for React, Vue, Svelte and HTML that flags text and user-facing attributes outside t(), concatenated translations, locale-less toLocaleString and '$' + amount; and a pseudo-locale generator (en-XA accented and expanded, ar-XB right-to-left) that keeps placeholders and ICU syntax intact. Ships cs-i18n-engineer agent, /cs-i18n-check and /cs-pseudo-locale commands and 3 cited references.
Detects prompt injection hidden in documents from the other side (pleadings, skeletons, bundles, served evidence, opponents' emails and attachments) before an AI reads them, so the model is not turned against your client. Checks word by word that the text an extractor hands the model was visibly drawn on the page: white, near-white, covered, clipped, off-page, tiny, transparent and invisible-mode text in PDF (ink test plus OCR); Word formatting resolved as Word does (styles, shading, theme colours, scaling, off-page frames, fallbacks, unused headers); HTML/CSS, RTF, email with attachments and zips, xlsx/pptx and legacy formats. Flags Unicode smuggling, text addressed to an AI and authorities found only in hidden text. Fails closed. Optional Read-tool hook. Use BEFORE any AI summary or analysis of an opposing or third-party document. Triggers: 'scan for injection', 'is this document safe', 'check the other side's skeleton', 'injection guard'.
Use this skill for any task involving Thai text in code — word segmentation, Unicode normalization, sorting/collation, search indexing, romanization, truncation, or database/Elasticsearch configuration for Thai.
language
Detects hidden text and manipulation attempts in PDF and DOCX documents: white-on-white text, sub-legible fonts, off-page text, invisible render mode, Word hidden attribute, and invisible Unicode characters.