Web, mobil ve masaüstü uygulamalarını tersine mühendisliğe izin veren zafiyetleri belirlemek için denetler ve yapılandırma düzeltmeleri önerir.
Ayrıca bilinen adı GuardBee/guardbee-mcp, @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield
- Yıldızlar
- 2
- Araçlar
- 5
- İndirmeler, 30 gün
- 2.992
- En son sürüm
- 0.8.0
- Son commit
- 12 Kas 2026
- Lisans
- MIT
reverse-shield MCP nedir?
reverse-shield bir MCP sunucusudur. Web, mobil ve masaüstü uygulamalarını tersine mühendisliğe izin veren zafiyetleri belirlemek için denetler ve yapılandırma düzeltmeleri önerir. 5 araç sunar; örneğin scan_artifact, suggest_fixes, scan_url.
Özet, projenin README dosyasından oluşturuldu
reverse-shield MCP sunucusu hakkında
Güvenlik mühendisleri ve uygulama geliştiricileri, dağıtılan yazılımlarında ne kadar hassas bilginin açığa çıktığını değerlendirmek için reverse-shield kullanabilirler. Sunucuyu APK, IPA, Electron klasörleri veya web paketleri gibi derleme çıktılarına yönlendirerek, tersine mühendisliğe olanak tanıyan zafiyetleri tespit edebilirsiniz. Gömülü source map'ler, minify edilmemiş kodlar, Flutter veya .NET'te eksik obfuscation ve binary dosyaları veya kaynak dosyaları içindeki hardcoded secret'lar gibi sorunları tespit eder.
Sunucu, dosya taramaları için yerel ve çevrimdışı olarak çalışır, ancak scan_url aracılığıyla uzaktan kontroller de gerçekleştirebilir. DEX, ELF, Mach-O ve ASAR gibi formatlar için özelleşmiş dahili ayrıştırıcılar kullanır; bu da apktool gibi harici araçlara ihtiyaç duyulmadığı anlamına gelir. Kullanıcılar, güvenlik durumları için A–F arası bir not almak amacıyla bir AI istemcisi üzerinden sunucuyla etkileşime girebilirler. Tespit işleminin ötesinde, suggest_fixes aracı; Vite, Gradle veya React Native için proje yapılandırmalarını analiz ederek iyileştirme için birleşik diff'ler sağlar.
Neler yapabilirsiniz
- 1Mobil uygulama güvenliğini denetleyinDebug ayarlarını ve eksik obfuscation durumlarını kontrol etmek için bir Android APK veya iOS IPA dosyasını analiz edin.
- 2Sızdırılmış kimlik bilgilerini tespit edinAçığa çıkmış özel anahtarlar ve secret'lar için binary dosyaları, yapılandırma dosyaları ve kaynak havuzlarını tarayın.
- 3Derleme yapılandırma düzeltmelerini otomatize edinWeb veya mobil derleme ayarlarındaki güvenlik açıklarını gidermek için kod yamaları oluşturun.
- 4Web paketi maruziyetini değerlendirinAçığa çıkmış source map'ler ve minify edilmemiş kodlar için canlı bir web sitesini veya yerel bir JS paketini kontrol edin.
Projenin README dosyasından alınmıştır. Her kullanım durumu, oradaki bir alıntı ile kontrol edilir.
reverse-shield MCP nasıl yüklenir
Biçimler 10 Kas 2026 tarihinde doğrulandıCursor'a ekleGoose'a eklereverse-shield MCP'yi Claude Code içine yükleyin
$ claude mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldreverse-shield MCP'yi Cursor içine yükleyin
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}reverse-shield MCP'yi VS Code içine yükleyin
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}reverse-shield MCP'yi VS Code CLI içine yükleyin
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"reverse-shield","type":"stdio","command":"npx","args":["-y","@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]}'reverse-shield MCP'yi Claude Desktop içine yükleyin
claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}reverse-shield MCP'yi Codex içine yükleyin
$ codex mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldreverse-shield MCP'yi Codex config.toml içine yükleyin
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.reverse-shield] command = "npx" args = ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]
reverse-shield MCP'yi Gemini CLI içine yükleyin
$ gemini mcp add -s user reverse-shield npx -- -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldreverse-shield MCP'yi Gemini settings.json içine yükleyin
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}reverse-shield MCP araçları 5
README dosyasından algılandıscan_artifactsuggest_fixesscan_urllist_checksbundle_secret
| scan_artifact | — | |
| suggest_fixes | — | |
| scan_url | — | |
| list_checks | — | |
| bundle_secret | — |
Otomatik kontroller
Çalıştırıldı 13 Kas 2026Tam rapor →Otomatik kontrollerimizden geçti. Bu bir güvenlik denetimi değildir: kodu okuyun ve sunucuya ihtiyaç duyduğu en dar erişimi verin. Kontroller nasıl çalışır
- Kaynak deposu bağlantılı ve erişilebilirGeçti
- Açık kaynak lisansı (OSI)Geçti
- Son bir yıl içinde commit veya sürüm mevcutGeçti
- Paket adı popüler bir pakete yakın değilGeçti
- Uzak uç nokta HTTPS kullanıyorKontrol edilmedi
- Yıkıcı araçlar etiketlenmişGeçti
- Modele yönelik gizli talimat yokGeçti
- Pakette veya bağımlılıklarında kritik uyarı yokGeçti
@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield
🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文
An MCP server that tells you how much your shipped app gives a reverse engineer for free.
Reverse-engineering MCPs now let an agent take an app it has no source for — a web bundle, an Electron app, an APK, an iOS app, a game, a native or .NET binary — and explain how a feature works, down to the binary. This package is the other side of that: point it at your own build artifact and it reports what such a tool (or a person with jadx, ILSpy, Il2CppDumper, Hopper or the browser's devtools) would get without any effort, with the fix for each — and suggest_fixes turns those fixes into a diff against your build config.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Claude ──► reverse-shield ──► your build artifact / live site
│
├─ web source maps (shipped, inline, publicly reachable), unminified / dev bundles, keys, internal hosts, WebAssembly debug info and names
├─ electron fuses (RunAsNode, --inspect, NODE_OPTIONS, ASAR integrity), unpacked app code, code inside app.asar
├─ android APK and AAB: debuggable, R8/ProGuard missing, signing scheme, backup, plain React Native bundle, unstripped .so
├─ ios IPA and .app: Debug-configuration builds, development profiles, plain React Native bundle, .dSYM in the bundle, the executable
├─ engines Unity (IL2CPP metadata, Mono assemblies), PyInstaller, Java/Spring Boot JARs, Flutter (Dart obfuscation)
├─ native debug info, symbols, get-task-allow, hardened runtime, signing, PIE/NX/RELRO/canary (ELF, Mach-O, PE)
├─ secrets keys in everything above: dex, resources.arsc, plists, config files, Hermes bytecode, .so and executables
└─ .NET obfuscation missing, embedded PDB, leaked build paths
Everything runs locally and offline (except scan_url), with its own parsers for ASAR, the Electron fuse wire, binary AndroidManifest (AXML), DEX, ELF, Mach-O (including universal binaries and code signatures) and PE/.NET metadata — no apktool, jadx or binutils needed.
What it flags
| Check | Severity | Target | What it gives away |
|---|---|---|---|
sourcemap_embeds_source |
critical | web | Full original source via sourcesContent |
sourcemap_shipped / sourcemap_inline / sourcemap_publicly_reachable |
high | web | Original file paths and structure |
eval_devtool_bundle |
high | web | Dev bundle with each module's path |
bundle_secret |
per key type | all | A working credential in client code, an app package or a binary |
wasm_debug_info |
high | web | WebAssembly with DWARF: source files, lines, types |
unminified_bundle / dev_build_framework / wasm_name_section |
medium | web | Readable code / framework dev runtime / named WebAssembly functions |
sourcemap_reference / internal_endpoint |
low | web | Where the map lives / localhost, private IPs, staging hosts |
electron_fuse_run_as_node / electron_fuse_inspect_args |
high | electron | Node runtime or debugger inside the signed app |
electron_app_unpacked |
high | electron | App code as an editable folder |
electron_fuse_node_options / _asar_integrity_off / _load_outside_asar |
medium | electron | Code injection and ASAR tampering |
apk_debuggable |
critical | android | Debugger attach and run-as into app data |
apk_no_obfuscation / apk_js_bundle_plaintext / apk_unsigned |
high | android | jadx output with real names / readable RN bundle / no tamper evidence |
apk_allow_backup / apk_v1_only_signature |
medium | android | Data pulled via backup / Janus-style repackaging |
native_debug_info / native_debuggable_entitlement |
high | native | Source-level debug data / lldb attach |
native_symbols_not_stripped / native_no_hardened_runtime / native_injection_entitlement / native_unsigned |
medium | native | Named functions / dylib injection / patched copies run |
native_no_pie / native_no_nx |
medium | native | Exploit-friendly fixed addresses / executable stack |
native_no_relro / native_no_stack_canary / native_adhoc_signed / native_build_path_leak |
low | native | Hardening gaps and build-host details |
ios_debug_build / ios_js_bundle_plaintext / ios_dsym_shipped |
high | ios | Unoptimised code with full symbols and preview stubs / readable RN bundle / full DWARF symbols in the bundle |
ios_development_profile |
medium | ios | Debugger attach on registered devices |
unity_il2cpp_metadata / unity_mono_assemblies |
high | engines | Every class, method and string of the game / C# scripts via dnSpy |
flutter_not_obfuscated |
high | engines | Dart class and method names for blutter / reFlutter |
hermes_names_not_minified |
medium | engines | React Native function names in Hermes bytecode for hermes-dec / hbctool |
python_pyinstaller_bundle / java_not_obfuscated |
high | engines | Decompilable .pyc files / Java classes with original names |
dotnet_not_obfuscated / dotnet_embedded_pdb |
high | .NET | ILSpy/dnSpy output close to the original source |
list_checks returns the full catalog with fixes. Every result carries an A–F grade: F when anything critical (or several high findings) is exposed, A when nothing is.
How the trickier checks decide
- R8/ProGuard: reads class descriptors from every
classes*.dexand looks at classes under your application id (and under the packages of components your manifest names, for.debug-style ids). Dozens of descriptive class names with almost no one- or two-letter names means R8 did not run. - .NET obfuscation: reads the metadata
#Stringsheap. Known obfuscator markers (ConfuserEx, Dotfuscator, SmartAssembly, …) pass immediately; otherwise an assembly passes when at least 10% of its identifiers are one- or two-letter names, bare numbers or non-ASCII junk. Checked against an Obfuscar build (21%, passes) and 400 unobfuscated NuGet assemblies (383 flagged; the other 17 are resource-only assemblies with too few names to judge). - Private keys: only reported when base64 key material follows the PEM header — crypto libraries bundled into apps carry the header as a string constant.
- Credentials outside JavaScript: Android dex strings, the
resources.arsc/resources.pbstring pool (wherestrings.xmland google-services values end up),assets/andres/raw/; iOS plists (GoogleService-Info.plist) and the executable; JSON/plist/.env/properties/YAML files in an ASAR, a JAR (Spring Bootapplication.properties) or a build folder; Hermes bytecode,.solibraries and native/.NET binaries by their printable strings. Only fixed-format keys are matched there, as in bundles. A Google/Firebase API key in an Android or iOS package is reported as medium: those ship by design and must be restricted to the app's package name or bundle id. - Repeats: one key in 30 chunks is one finding (“also in 29 other files”), and long lists of unminified files collapse into one.
- iOS Debug builds: Xcode 16 puts a Debug build's code in
<App>.debug.dylibnext to__preview.dylib; either one in a bundle means the Debug configuration was shipped. - Unity: IL2CPP's
global-metadata.datis flagged only when its standard header is intact (protected builds encrypt it); a MonoAssembly-CSharp.dllgoes through the .NET name check. - PyInstaller: the CArchive cookie is searched across the whole file (on macOS the archive sits in its own section before the code signature); PyArmor and Nuitka builds are noted, not flagged.
- Flutter: reads the identifiers in the AOT snapshot (
libapp.so,App.framework/App).--obfuscaterenames everything the program defines to two- or three-letter names while the Dart VM's own names stay, so a snapshot passes when at least 10% of its identifiers are that short. Checked against one program built both ways with the Dart SDK'sgen_snapshot: 1% without the flag, 31% (unstripped) and 37% (stripped) with it. Fewer than 200 identifiers is a note, not a verdict. - WebAssembly: custom sections only —
.debug_*(DWARF),name(function names) andsourceMappingURL; the code itself is not judged. - Live URLs: only the site's own scripts are read. Platform-served code (HubSpot
/hs/hsstatic/, WordPress/wp-includes/) and open-source libraries (jQuery, Bootstrap, polyfills, vendor bundles) are skipped, and a reachable map whose sources are all dependencies is not reported. Internal hosts count only when they point into the site (private IPs,.internal/.corp/.lan, its own staging hosts); thelocalhostURLs frameworks ship are ignored. A Google browser key is reported as medium (restrict it to the site's referrers), and a Supabaseanonkey is not reported, since the browser is meant to hold it (aservice_rolekey still is). - React Native with Hermes: reads the bytecode's string table and function headers. Metro's minifier renames functions to one- or two-letter names; without it hermes-dec and hbctool print the source's names back. A bundle passes when at least 15% of its named functions have names that short. Checked against one bundle (lodash + zod + app code) compiled with hermesc
-Oboth ways: 1% unminified, 57% minified. Function names are read for bytecode versions 84–100 that share the v98 12-byte small-header layout; other versions, 16-byte headers, and bundles with fewer than 50 named functions are a note, not a verdict.
Quick start
{
"mcpServers": {
"guardbee-reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]
}
}
}
Then ask your agent: “How easy is it to reverse engineer ./release/MyApp.app? Fix what you can in the build config.”
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --fail-on=high
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release.apk
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan "/Applications/My App.app" --format=json
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan https://app.example.com --format=sarif > reverse-shield.sarif
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./build/MyApp.ipa
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield suggest . --format=patch | git apply # review first: suggest . prints the same as text
Tools
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
scan_artifact |
Scan a file or directory: APK, AAB, IPA, iOS or macOS .app, Electron folder, app.asar, JAR, ELF/Mach-O/PE/.NET binary, JS bundle, source map, or a build output folder (Unity and Python builds included). Optional ignore and baseline |
suggest_fixes |
Read the project's build config (Vite, webpack, Next.js, Angular, CRA, Android Gradle and manifest, React Native, electron-builder / Forge, .NET project files, Flutter) and return the changes as unified diffs. Never writes files |
scan_url |
Fetch a live page, check its same-site bundles, follow sourceMappingURL and probe <bundle>.map (third-party scripts are not fetched) |
list_checks |
The check catalog with what each finding gives away and how to fix it |
Directories are walked including dist/, build/ and out/ (that is the point); node_modules, VCS and cache folders are skipped, and a macOS .app or Electron folder found inside is scanned as one unit — its fuses, its ASAR and its own executable, not the bundled third-party frameworks.
guardbee.yml:
reverse-shield:
fail-on: high
max-files: 5000
baseline: .reverse-shield-baseline.json
exclude:
- "vendor/"
ignore: # accepted exposures: a rule id, or rule:path-substring
- bundle_secret:firebase-config.js
CI and baselines
Record what the current release exposes, then let CI fail only on what a change adds:
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --update-baseline # writes .reverse-shield-baseline.json
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --baseline=.reverse-shield-baseline.json --fail-on=high
# Compared to baseline (grade C → D): 1 new, 2 fixed, 4 unchanged
Findings are matched by check and location, with bundler content hashes (index-BvL4J5f8.js, 7321-dd7cb90a7de65945.js) normalised, so a rebuild does not make old findings look new. SARIF results carry baselineState (new / unchanged).
The repository ships a composite action that scans, uploads SARIF, writes a job summary and exposes grade / new-findings outputs:
- uses: GuardBee/guardbee-mcp/.github/actions/reverse-shield@main
with:
target: dist
fail-on: high
baseline: .reverse-shield-baseline.json
Library use
@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield/scan exports the scanners (scanUrl, scanPath, analyzeJavaScript, …) without the MCP server, for tools that embed reverse-shield:
import { scanUrl } from "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield/scan";
const result = await scanUrl("https://example.com/", { maxScripts: 15, timeoutMs: 8_000 });
console.log(result.grade, result.findings);
Limits
- Obfuscation is judged from names, not control flow: a build that only renames passes, and string encryption or control-flow flattening is not measured.
- Web checks look at what is shipped; they cannot tell whether a key is meant to be public (some, like Firebase web keys, are restricted server-side). Rotate or restrict it, then accept it with an
ignoreentry (bundle_secret:firebase-config.js). - Strings are read from dex and resource tables by their structure, from other binaries as printable runs; a key split across string constants, encrypted or assembled at runtime is not found (that is the point of doing so, but it only slows a reverse engineer down).
- Native hardening checks (PIE/NX/RELRO/canary) are exploit-mitigation signals rather than reverse-engineering ones; they are reported low/medium for that reason.
- App Store IPAs are FairPlay-encrypted on distribution; the scanner reads the IPA you export (development, ad hoc or App Store export before Apple encrypts it), which is what a jailbroken device would also yield.
suggest_fixesedits the common shapes of each config; unusual layouts (computed webpack configs, Gradle convention plugins) get no diff, and Forge and Flutter get instructions rather than a patch. Always review before applying.
License
MIT
reverse-shield MCP soruları
reverse-shield MCP'yi Claude Code'a nasıl eklerim?
Terminalinizde claude mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield komutunu çalıştırın. Her projede kullanılabilir olması için --scope user ekleyin.
reverse-shield MCP'yi Cursor'a nasıl eklerim?
~/.cursor/mcp.json dosyasını açın ve yukarıdaki yükleme bölümünde gösterilen Cursor yapılandırmasını kullanarak sunucuyu mcpServers altına ekleyin.
reverse-shield MCP hangi araçları sunar?
5 araç sunar; bunlar arasında scan_artifact, suggest_fixes, scan_url, list_checks, bundle_secret yer alır.
Hangi uygulama türleri taranabilir?
Sunucu; web paketlerini, Electron uygulamalarını, APK'ları, iOS uygulamalarını, oyunları, yerel binary dosyalarını, .NET binary dosyalarını, Unity, PyInstaller ve Java/Spring Boot JAR dosyalarını denetleyebilir.
Araç jadx veya apktool gibi harici tersine mühendislik araçlarına ihtiyaç duyar mı?
Hayır; ASAR, DEX, ELF, Mach-O ve PE dahil olmak üzere çeşitli dosya formatları için kendi dahili ayrıştırıcılarını kullanır.