Fatstack MCP server
2026년 9월 28일 커밋비수탁형 marketplace를 통해 AI agent가 Base network 상의 USDC로 MCP tool call을 검색하고 결제할 수 있도록 지원합니다.
다른 이름 f4tst4ck/fatstack-tools, fatstack-tools
- 스타
- 0
- Tools
- —
- 다운로드, 30일
- —
- 최신 버전
- 1.0.0
- 마지막 커밋
- 2026년 9월 28일
- 라이선스
- MIT
Fatstack MCP란?
비수탁형 marketplace를 통해 AI agent가 Base network 상의 USDC로 MCP tool call을 검색하고 결제할 수 있도록 지원합니다.
프로젝트 README에서 생성된 요약
Fatstack MCP server 정보
Fatstack은 AI agent가 API 및 MCP tool call에 대한 액세스 권한을 검색하고 구매할 수 있도록 설계된 비수탁형 marketplace를 제공합니다. Base network의 x402 protocol을 사용하여 USDC 기반의 호출당 과금 방식을 지원합니다. 이 플랫폼은 제공자가 도구를 등록하고 agent가 이를 찾아 작업을 수행하는 registry 역할을 합니다. 비수탁형 방식이므로 서비스 과정에서 사용자의 자금, 개인 키 또는 플랫폼 wallet을 전혀 보유하지 않습니다. 대신 결제는 agent의 wallet에서 제공자의 wallet으로 직접 이동합니다.
개발자는 제공자를 위한 @fatstack/x402 SDK 또는 agent를 위한 @fatstack/ai-sdk-tools package를 사용하여 이 시스템을 통합할 수 있습니다. agent는 wallet을 신원으로 사용하므로 전통적인 계정이나 API key가 필요하지 않습니다. 통제되지 않는 지출을 방지하기 위해 agent client는 maxPerDay 또는 maxPerCall 제한과 같은 특정 가드(guard)를 설정해야 합니다. 시스템은 EIP-3009 승인 프로세스를 사용하여 agent가 매번 개별 트랜잭션에 gas를 지불하는 대신 권한에 서명하도록 합니다.
활용 사례
- 1기존 API route 수익화개발자는 기존 Hono, Express 또는 Next.js route에 페이월(paywall)을 추가하여 호출당 특정 USDC 가격을 부과할 수 있습니다.
- 2agent에게 유료 도구 제공AI agent에게 엄격한 일일 및 호출당 지출 한도를 적용하면서 도구 카탈로그에 대한 액세스 권한을 부여할 수 있습니다.
- 3도구 검색 자동화단일 MCP server endpoint를 추가하는 것만으로 agent가 전체 marketplace 카탈로그를 탐색할 수 있습니다.
프로젝트의 README를 바탕으로 작성되었습니다. 모든 활용 사례는 해당 내용의 인용문과 대조하여 확인합니다.
Fatstack MCP 설치 방법
형식 확인: 2026년 11월 10일Cursor에 추가Goose에 추가Claude Code에 Fatstack MCP 설치
$ claude mcp add --transport http fatstack-tools https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcpCursor에 Fatstack MCP 설치
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"fatstack-tools": {
"url": "https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcp"
}
}
}VS Code에 Fatstack MCP 설치
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"fatstack-tools": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcp"
}
}
}VS Code CLI에 Fatstack MCP 설치
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"fatstack-tools","type":"http","url":"https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcp"}'Codex에 Fatstack MCP 설치
$ codex mcp add fatstack-tools --url https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcpCodex config.toml에 Fatstack MCP 설치
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.fatstack-tools] url = "https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcp"
Gemini CLI에 Fatstack MCP 설치
$ gemini mcp add -s user --transport http fatstack-tools https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcpGemini settings.json에 Fatstack MCP 설치
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"fatstack-tools": {
"url": "https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcp",
"type": "http"
}
}
}자동 검사
2026년 11월 15일에 실행됨전체 보고서 →아직 인증되지 않았습니다. 서버는 80점 이상의 점수, 심각한 결함 없음, 그리고 검사에 충분한 데이터를 갖추어야 합니다. 검사 방식 · 점수를 높이기 위해 수정할 항목
- 소스 저장소 연결 및 접근 가능f4tst4ck/fatstack-tools is public and reachablegithub.com/f4tst4ck/fatstack-tools ↗통과
- 패키지가 이 저장소를 소스로 명시검사되지 않음
- 빌드 출처(Sigstore 증명)검사되지 않음
- 오픈 소스 라이선스 (OSI)MITspdx.org/licenses/MIT.html ↗통과
- 최근 1년 내 커밋 또는 릴리스Last commit or release 2026-09-28github.com/f4tst4ck/fatstack-tools ↗통과
- OpenSSF Scorecard검사되지 않음
- 패키지 이름이 인기 패키지와 유사하지 않음검사되지 않음
- 패키지 및 해당 종속성에 중요한 보안 권고 없음검사되지 않음
- 모델에 대한 숨겨진 지침 없음0 tool descriptions and the README read; no override phrases, credential paths or hidden characters통과
- 파괴적인 도구에 라벨 표시됨검사되지 않음
- 원격 엔드포인트가 MCP 핸드셰이크에 응답initialize answered with protocol 2025-06-18 in 506 ms통과
README
GitHub에서 보기Fatstack
A non-custodial marketplace where AI agents discover and pay for API and MCP tool calls in USDC, per call, over x402 on Base.
A provider lists a tool. An agent finds it in the registry and calls it. The tool answers
402 Payment Required with a price. The agent signs a USDC payment authorisation and
retries. The call goes through and the money moves wallet to wallet.
Fatstack never touches the money. There is no custody, no withdrawal function, no platform wallet in the payment path, and no stored private keys. Payment is a direct transfer from the agent's wallet to the provider's — or, once a provider's promotional period ends, through an immutable splitter contract that pays the provider and a 2% platform fee in one atomic transaction. If a change would let Fatstack move someone else's money, it is a bug.
Use it from an agent, in one line
Add one MCP server and your agent has the whole catalog:
https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcp
Listing what is available is free; only calls cost anything. There is no account, no API key
and no signup — the wallet is the identity. Paying needs an
x402-capable client; any MCP client can browse.
Published in the official MCP registry as net.fatstack/registry.
This repository holds the parts you run, audit, or depend on. The marketplace application itself is closed; everything an integrator touches is here, under MIT.
The payment cycle
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Agent
participant T as Tool (provider)
participant F as Facilitator
participant C as USDC on Base
A->>T: call the tool
T-->>A: 402 Payment Required + price, asset, payTo, resource
Note over A: signs an EIP-3009 authorisation<br/>covering exactly this resource
A->>T: retry with X-PAYMENT
T->>F: verify
F-->>T: valid
T->>T: run the handler
T->>F: settle
F->>C: transferWithAuthorization
C-->>F: mined
T-->>A: 200 + result
The agent signs an authorisation, not a transaction: it never pays gas and never sends a transfer itself. The facilitator broadcasts it and pays the gas.
Payments are final. Once settled on chain the transfer cannot be reversed, and there are no refunds. That sentence appears in every 402 body, every quote object, and every payment-facing page, and it is not decoration — it is the property that makes per-call pricing work without an escrow.
Quickstart — providers
Put a paywall in front of a route you already have. Two lines of setup, and the price is per call.
npm install @fatstack/x402
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { paywall } from '@fatstack/x402';
import { honoPaywall } from '@fatstack/x402/hono';
const app = new Hono();
app.use(
'/convert',
honoPaywall(
paywall({
price: '0.001', // USDC, per call
wallet: '0xYourWallet', // paid directly, wallet to wallet
toolId: 'unit-convert',
network: 'base-sepolia', // test here before base
}),
),
);
app.post('/convert', (c) => c.json({ celsius: 20, fahrenheit: 68 }));
Adapters ship for Hono, Express and Next on their own entry points —
@fatstack/x402/hono, /express, /next — so importing the client into an edge runtime
does not drag a Node framework in with it.
Full walkthrough, including listing the tool: docs/provider-quickstart.md
Quickstart — agents
Give a model a set of paid tools it can call, with a spending limit it cannot exceed.
npm install @fatstack/ai-sdk-tools ai viem
import { generateText } from 'ai';
import { fatstackTools } from '@fatstack/ai-sdk-tools';
import { privateKeyToAccount } from 'viem/accounts';
const tools = await fatstackTools({
wallet: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY),
networks: ['base'], // the catalogue is mainnet-only; USDC here is real
guards: {
maxPerDay: 0.5, // hard ceiling per UTC day, in USD
maxPerCall: 0.01, // refuse any single call dearer than this
},
});
const { text } = await generateText({ model, tools, prompt: 'Convert 20C to F.' });
guards is a required argument with no default. A tool set that can spend money should
never be constructible by accident, so omitting it is a type error rather than an
unlimited budget.
Full walkthrough: docs/agent-quickstart.md
What is in here
| Path | What it is |
|---|---|
sdk/ |
@fatstack/x402 — provider middleware and agent client |
integrations/ai-sdk-tools/ |
@fatstack/ai-sdk-tools — a Vercel AI SDK tool set that pays per call |
contracts/ |
The USDC payment splitter and its factory, with tests and deployment gates |
facilitator/THREAT-MODEL.md |
Written verdicts on six attack classes against the payment path |
docs/ |
Provider and agent quickstarts, and the registry format |
Packages: @fatstack/x402 ·
@fatstack/ai-sdk-tools
Marketplace: fatstack.net ·
Registry: registry.json
Security
The payment path was audited against six attack classes — replay, concurrency, cross-resource substitution, verify/settle ordering, field binding, and misconfiguration. Each has a written verdict and at least one test that proves the safe behaviour, run against a real facilitator and real settlements on Base Sepolia rather than mocks.
facilitator/THREAT-MODEL.md has the verdicts. contracts/SECURITY.md covers the splitter.
One class came back vulnerable, and it is worth reading even if you never use Fatstack, because it is a property of x402 rather than of this implementation.
Cross-resource replay
An EIP-3009 authorisation covers (from, to, value, validAfter, validBefore, nonce). It
does not cover what was bought. So an authorisation signed to pay for one tool was
accepted by a different, more expensive tool from the same provider — same payee, same
asset, a valid signature, and nothing in the signed material to say otherwise.
Reproduced on Base Sepolia, settled on chain:
0xd95ea771333c8f33f346c316fad30a64585156831d09e298d501c5b1e17e5659
Fixed in @fatstack/x402 0.2.0 (current release 0.2.1, which is the same code
under the correct MIT licence metadata). The middleware now binds a payment to the resource it
was quoted for and refuses a mismatch with resource_mismatch, before the facilitator is
called — so a mismatched payment costs nothing and is never settled. Nothing a 402 quotes
to agents changed.
If you built on x402 without checking that the payment in hand was quoted for the resource in hand, check now.
The finding that shaped the contract
An earlier draft of the splitter took the provider as a call argument. That argument is not covered by the payer's signature either, so anyone observing a pending authorisation could have submitted it with their own address and taken the provider's 98%. The provider is now fixed at construction — one splitter per provider, its address derivable in advance with CREATE2 — which removes the parameter and with it the attack.
See The finding that changed the design in contracts/SECURITY.md.
Reporting
Found something? Open an issue for anything already public. For an unreported vulnerability in the payment path, please report privately through GitHub's security advisories on this repository rather than in a public issue.
The contracts are unaudited
The splitter is small, immutable, and has no owner, no pause, no proxy, and no upgrade
path. It is covered by 34 tests including a fork test against real USDC on Base, and its
fee arithmetic is asserted against the same
vectors.json as the TypeScript implementation, so an
on-chain split and a quoted price cannot drift apart.
No third party has reviewed it. Read it yourself before depending on it — it is about fifteen lines of code that move money and a hundred lines explaining why.
Contributing to this repository
Some files here differ from their counterparts in the closed repository, because operator
detail has been removed. .redactions lists them and scripts/check-redactions.sh refuses
anything that puts that material back. Run it before pushing.
Licence
MIT. See LICENSE.
Fatstack MCP 질문
Fatstack MCP를 Claude Code에 추가하려면 어떻게 하나요?
터미널에서 claude mcp add --transport http fatstack-tools https://www.fatstack.net/api/mcp를 실행합니다. 모든 프로젝트에서 사용할 수 있게 하려면 --scope user를 추가합니다.
Fatstack MCP를 Cursor에 추가하려면 어떻게 하나요?
~/.cursor/mcp.json를 열고 mcpServers 아래에 서버를 추가합니다. 위 설치 섹션에 표시된 Cursor 구성을 사용합니다.
agent가 도구 비용을 어떻게 결제하나요?
agent가 특정 리소스에 대한 USDC 결제 승인에 서명하면, Base network 상의 facilitator를 통해 정산됩니다.
Fatstack이 사용자 자금을 보유하나요?
아니요, Fatstack은 비수탁형 marketplace이며 사용자의 자금을 보유하거나 개인 키를 저장하지 않습니다.
결제 후 환불이 가능한가요?
아니요, 블록체인에서 정산이 완료된 모든 결제는 최종적입니다.
registry 사용을 위해 계정이나 API key가 필요한가요?
아니요, 별도의 가입이나 API key가 필요하지 않으며 사용자의 wallet이 곧 신원 역할을 합니다.