Audite les applications web, mobiles et desktop pour identifier les vulnérabilités permettant l'ingénierie inverse et suggère des correctifs de configuration.
Aussi connu sous GuardBee/guardbee-mcp, @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield
- Étoiles
- 2
- Outils
- 5
- Téléchargements, 30 jours
- 2 992
- Dernière version
- 0.8.0
- Dernier commit
- 12 nov. 2026
- Licence
- MIT
Qu'est-ce que reverse-shield MCP ?
reverse-shield est un serveur MCP. Audite les applications web, mobiles et desktop pour identifier les vulnérabilités permettant l'ingénierie inverse et suggère des correctifs de configuration. Il expose 5 outils, comme scan_artifact, suggest_fixes, scan_url.
Résumé généré à partir du README du projet
À propos du MCP server reverse-shield
Les ingénieurs en sécurité et les développeurs d'applications peuvent utiliser reverse-shield pour évaluer la quantité d'informations sensibles exposées dans leurs logiciels distribués. En pointant le serveur vers des artefacts de build tels que des APK, des IPA, des dossiers Electron ou des bundles web, l'outil identifie les vulnérabilités permettant l'ingénierie inverse. Il détecte des problèmes tels que l'intégration de source maps, le code non minifié, l'absence d'obfuscation dans Flutter ou .NET, et les secrets codés en dur dans les binaires ou les fichiers de ressources.
Le serveur fonctionne localement et hors ligne pour les scans de fichiers, bien qu'il puisse également effectuer des vérifications à distance via scan_url. Il utilise des parseurs internes spécialisés pour des formats comme DEX, ELF, Mach-O et ASAR, ce qui signifie que des outils externes comme apktool ne sont pas nécessaires. Les utilisateurs peuvent interagir avec le serveur via un client IA pour recevoir une note de A à F concernant leur posture de sécurité. Au-delà de l'identification, l'outil suggest_fixes analyse les configurations de projet pour Vite, Gradle ou React Native afin de fournir des diffs unifiés pour la remédiation.
Ce que vous pouvez faire avec
- 1Auditer la sécurité d'une application mobileAnalysez un APK Android ou un IPA iOS pour vérifier les paramètres de débogage et l'absence d'obfuscation.
- 2Identifier les identifiants fuitésRecherchez dans les binaires, les fichiers de configuration et les pools de ressources des clés privées et des secrets exposés.
- 3Automatiser les correctifs de configuration de buildGénérez des patchs de code pour corriger les failles de sécurité dans les paramètres de build web ou mobile.
- 4Évaluer l'exposition des bundles webVérifiez un site web en direct ou un bundle JS local pour détecter les source maps exposées et le code non minifié.
Extrait du README du projet. Chaque cas d'utilisation est vérifié par rapport à une citation du document.
Comment installer reverse-shield MCP
Formats vérifiés le 10 nov. 2026Ajouter à CursorAjouter à GooseInstaller reverse-shield MCP dans Claude Code
$ claude mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldInstaller reverse-shield MCP dans Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Installer reverse-shield MCP dans VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Installer reverse-shield MCP dans VS Code CLI
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"reverse-shield","type":"stdio","command":"npx","args":["-y","@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]}'Installer reverse-shield MCP dans Claude Desktop
claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Installer reverse-shield MCP dans Codex
$ codex mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldInstaller reverse-shield MCP dans Codex config.toml
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.reverse-shield] command = "npx" args = ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]
Installer reverse-shield MCP dans Gemini CLI
$ gemini mcp add -s user reverse-shield npx -- -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldInstaller reverse-shield MCP dans Gemini settings.json
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Outils MCP reverse-shield 5
Détectés depuis le READMEscan_artifactsuggest_fixesscan_urllist_checksbundle_secret
| scan_artifact | — | |
| suggest_fixes | — | |
| scan_url | — | |
| list_checks | — | |
| bundle_secret | — |
Vérifications automatisées
Exécuté le 13 nov. 2026Rapport complet →A passé nos vérifications automatisées. Il ne s'agit pas d'un audit de sécurité : lisez le code et donnez au serveur l'accès le plus restreint dont il a besoin. Fonctionnement des vérifications
- Dépôt source lié et accessibleRéussi
- Licence open source (OSI)Réussi
- Commit ou version publiée au cours de l'année écouléeRéussi
- Nom du package non proche d'un package populaireRéussi
- L'endpoint distant utilise HTTPSNon vérifié
- Les outils destructifs sont étiquetésRéussi
- Aucune instruction cachée destinée au modèleRéussi
- Aucun avis critique dans le package ou ses dépendancesRéussi
README
Voir sur GitHub@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield
🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文
An MCP server that tells you how much your shipped app gives a reverse engineer for free.
Reverse-engineering MCPs now let an agent take an app it has no source for — a web bundle, an Electron app, an APK, an iOS app, a game, a native or .NET binary — and explain how a feature works, down to the binary. This package is the other side of that: point it at your own build artifact and it reports what such a tool (or a person with jadx, ILSpy, Il2CppDumper, Hopper or the browser's devtools) would get without any effort, with the fix for each — and suggest_fixes turns those fixes into a diff against your build config.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Claude ──► reverse-shield ──► your build artifact / live site
│
├─ web source maps (shipped, inline, publicly reachable), unminified / dev bundles, keys, internal hosts, WebAssembly debug info and names
├─ electron fuses (RunAsNode, --inspect, NODE_OPTIONS, ASAR integrity), unpacked app code, code inside app.asar
├─ android APK and AAB: debuggable, R8/ProGuard missing, signing scheme, backup, plain React Native bundle, unstripped .so
├─ ios IPA and .app: Debug-configuration builds, development profiles, plain React Native bundle, .dSYM in the bundle, the executable
├─ engines Unity (IL2CPP metadata, Mono assemblies), PyInstaller, Java/Spring Boot JARs, Flutter (Dart obfuscation)
├─ native debug info, symbols, get-task-allow, hardened runtime, signing, PIE/NX/RELRO/canary (ELF, Mach-O, PE)
├─ secrets keys in everything above: dex, resources.arsc, plists, config files, Hermes bytecode, .so and executables
└─ .NET obfuscation missing, embedded PDB, leaked build paths
Everything runs locally and offline (except scan_url), with its own parsers for ASAR, the Electron fuse wire, binary AndroidManifest (AXML), DEX, ELF, Mach-O (including universal binaries and code signatures) and PE/.NET metadata — no apktool, jadx or binutils needed.
What it flags
| Check | Severity | Target | What it gives away |
|---|---|---|---|
sourcemap_embeds_source |
critical | web | Full original source via sourcesContent |
sourcemap_shipped / sourcemap_inline / sourcemap_publicly_reachable |
high | web | Original file paths and structure |
eval_devtool_bundle |
high | web | Dev bundle with each module's path |
bundle_secret |
per key type | all | A working credential in client code, an app package or a binary |
wasm_debug_info |
high | web | WebAssembly with DWARF: source files, lines, types |
unminified_bundle / dev_build_framework / wasm_name_section |
medium | web | Readable code / framework dev runtime / named WebAssembly functions |
sourcemap_reference / internal_endpoint |
low | web | Where the map lives / localhost, private IPs, staging hosts |
electron_fuse_run_as_node / electron_fuse_inspect_args |
high | electron | Node runtime or debugger inside the signed app |
electron_app_unpacked |
high | electron | App code as an editable folder |
electron_fuse_node_options / _asar_integrity_off / _load_outside_asar |
medium | electron | Code injection and ASAR tampering |
apk_debuggable |
critical | android | Debugger attach and run-as into app data |
apk_no_obfuscation / apk_js_bundle_plaintext / apk_unsigned |
high | android | jadx output with real names / readable RN bundle / no tamper evidence |
apk_allow_backup / apk_v1_only_signature |
medium | android | Data pulled via backup / Janus-style repackaging |
native_debug_info / native_debuggable_entitlement |
high | native | Source-level debug data / lldb attach |
native_symbols_not_stripped / native_no_hardened_runtime / native_injection_entitlement / native_unsigned |
medium | native | Named functions / dylib injection / patched copies run |
native_no_pie / native_no_nx |
medium | native | Exploit-friendly fixed addresses / executable stack |
native_no_relro / native_no_stack_canary / native_adhoc_signed / native_build_path_leak |
low | native | Hardening gaps and build-host details |
ios_debug_build / ios_js_bundle_plaintext / ios_dsym_shipped |
high | ios | Unoptimised code with full symbols and preview stubs / readable RN bundle / full DWARF symbols in the bundle |
ios_development_profile |
medium | ios | Debugger attach on registered devices |
unity_il2cpp_metadata / unity_mono_assemblies |
high | engines | Every class, method and string of the game / C# scripts via dnSpy |
flutter_not_obfuscated |
high | engines | Dart class and method names for blutter / reFlutter |
hermes_names_not_minified |
medium | engines | React Native function names in Hermes bytecode for hermes-dec / hbctool |
python_pyinstaller_bundle / java_not_obfuscated |
high | engines | Decompilable .pyc files / Java classes with original names |
dotnet_not_obfuscated / dotnet_embedded_pdb |
high | .NET | ILSpy/dnSpy output close to the original source |
list_checks returns the full catalog with fixes. Every result carries an A–F grade: F when anything critical (or several high findings) is exposed, A when nothing is.
How the trickier checks decide
- R8/ProGuard: reads class descriptors from every
classes*.dexand looks at classes under your application id (and under the packages of components your manifest names, for.debug-style ids). Dozens of descriptive class names with almost no one- or two-letter names means R8 did not run. - .NET obfuscation: reads the metadata
#Stringsheap. Known obfuscator markers (ConfuserEx, Dotfuscator, SmartAssembly, …) pass immediately; otherwise an assembly passes when at least 10% of its identifiers are one- or two-letter names, bare numbers or non-ASCII junk. Checked against an Obfuscar build (21%, passes) and 400 unobfuscated NuGet assemblies (383 flagged; the other 17 are resource-only assemblies with too few names to judge). - Private keys: only reported when base64 key material follows the PEM header — crypto libraries bundled into apps carry the header as a string constant.
- Credentials outside JavaScript: Android dex strings, the
resources.arsc/resources.pbstring pool (wherestrings.xmland google-services values end up),assets/andres/raw/; iOS plists (GoogleService-Info.plist) and the executable; JSON/plist/.env/properties/YAML files in an ASAR, a JAR (Spring Bootapplication.properties) or a build folder; Hermes bytecode,.solibraries and native/.NET binaries by their printable strings. Only fixed-format keys are matched there, as in bundles. A Google/Firebase API key in an Android or iOS package is reported as medium: those ship by design and must be restricted to the app's package name or bundle id. - Repeats: one key in 30 chunks is one finding (“also in 29 other files”), and long lists of unminified files collapse into one.
- iOS Debug builds: Xcode 16 puts a Debug build's code in
<App>.debug.dylibnext to__preview.dylib; either one in a bundle means the Debug configuration was shipped. - Unity: IL2CPP's
global-metadata.datis flagged only when its standard header is intact (protected builds encrypt it); a MonoAssembly-CSharp.dllgoes through the .NET name check. - PyInstaller: the CArchive cookie is searched across the whole file (on macOS the archive sits in its own section before the code signature); PyArmor and Nuitka builds are noted, not flagged.
- Flutter: reads the identifiers in the AOT snapshot (
libapp.so,App.framework/App).--obfuscaterenames everything the program defines to two- or three-letter names while the Dart VM's own names stay, so a snapshot passes when at least 10% of its identifiers are that short. Checked against one program built both ways with the Dart SDK'sgen_snapshot: 1% without the flag, 31% (unstripped) and 37% (stripped) with it. Fewer than 200 identifiers is a note, not a verdict. - WebAssembly: custom sections only —
.debug_*(DWARF),name(function names) andsourceMappingURL; the code itself is not judged. - Live URLs: only the site's own scripts are read. Platform-served code (HubSpot
/hs/hsstatic/, WordPress/wp-includes/) and open-source libraries (jQuery, Bootstrap, polyfills, vendor bundles) are skipped, and a reachable map whose sources are all dependencies is not reported. Internal hosts count only when they point into the site (private IPs,.internal/.corp/.lan, its own staging hosts); thelocalhostURLs frameworks ship are ignored. A Google browser key is reported as medium (restrict it to the site's referrers), and a Supabaseanonkey is not reported, since the browser is meant to hold it (aservice_rolekey still is). - React Native with Hermes: reads the bytecode's string table and function headers. Metro's minifier renames functions to one- or two-letter names; without it hermes-dec and hbctool print the source's names back. A bundle passes when at least 15% of its named functions have names that short. Checked against one bundle (lodash + zod + app code) compiled with hermesc
-Oboth ways: 1% unminified, 57% minified. Function names are read for bytecode versions 84–100 that share the v98 12-byte small-header layout; other versions, 16-byte headers, and bundles with fewer than 50 named functions are a note, not a verdict.
Quick start
{
"mcpServers": {
"guardbee-reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]
}
}
}
Then ask your agent: “How easy is it to reverse engineer ./release/MyApp.app? Fix what you can in the build config.”
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --fail-on=high
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release.apk
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan "/Applications/My App.app" --format=json
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan https://app.example.com --format=sarif > reverse-shield.sarif
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./build/MyApp.ipa
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield suggest . --format=patch | git apply # review first: suggest . prints the same as text
Tools
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
scan_artifact |
Scan a file or directory: APK, AAB, IPA, iOS or macOS .app, Electron folder, app.asar, JAR, ELF/Mach-O/PE/.NET binary, JS bundle, source map, or a build output folder (Unity and Python builds included). Optional ignore and baseline |
suggest_fixes |
Read the project's build config (Vite, webpack, Next.js, Angular, CRA, Android Gradle and manifest, React Native, electron-builder / Forge, .NET project files, Flutter) and return the changes as unified diffs. Never writes files |
scan_url |
Fetch a live page, check its same-site bundles, follow sourceMappingURL and probe <bundle>.map (third-party scripts are not fetched) |
list_checks |
The check catalog with what each finding gives away and how to fix it |
Directories are walked including dist/, build/ and out/ (that is the point); node_modules, VCS and cache folders are skipped, and a macOS .app or Electron folder found inside is scanned as one unit — its fuses, its ASAR and its own executable, not the bundled third-party frameworks.
guardbee.yml:
reverse-shield:
fail-on: high
max-files: 5000
baseline: .reverse-shield-baseline.json
exclude:
- "vendor/"
ignore: # accepted exposures: a rule id, or rule:path-substring
- bundle_secret:firebase-config.js
CI and baselines
Record what the current release exposes, then let CI fail only on what a change adds:
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --update-baseline # writes .reverse-shield-baseline.json
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --baseline=.reverse-shield-baseline.json --fail-on=high
# Compared to baseline (grade C → D): 1 new, 2 fixed, 4 unchanged
Findings are matched by check and location, with bundler content hashes (index-BvL4J5f8.js, 7321-dd7cb90a7de65945.js) normalised, so a rebuild does not make old findings look new. SARIF results carry baselineState (new / unchanged).
The repository ships a composite action that scans, uploads SARIF, writes a job summary and exposes grade / new-findings outputs:
- uses: GuardBee/guardbee-mcp/.github/actions/reverse-shield@main
with:
target: dist
fail-on: high
baseline: .reverse-shield-baseline.json
Library use
@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield/scan exports the scanners (scanUrl, scanPath, analyzeJavaScript, …) without the MCP server, for tools that embed reverse-shield:
import { scanUrl } from "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield/scan";
const result = await scanUrl("https://example.com/", { maxScripts: 15, timeoutMs: 8_000 });
console.log(result.grade, result.findings);
Limits
- Obfuscation is judged from names, not control flow: a build that only renames passes, and string encryption or control-flow flattening is not measured.
- Web checks look at what is shipped; they cannot tell whether a key is meant to be public (some, like Firebase web keys, are restricted server-side). Rotate or restrict it, then accept it with an
ignoreentry (bundle_secret:firebase-config.js). - Strings are read from dex and resource tables by their structure, from other binaries as printable runs; a key split across string constants, encrypted or assembled at runtime is not found (that is the point of doing so, but it only slows a reverse engineer down).
- Native hardening checks (PIE/NX/RELRO/canary) are exploit-mitigation signals rather than reverse-engineering ones; they are reported low/medium for that reason.
- App Store IPAs are FairPlay-encrypted on distribution; the scanner reads the IPA you export (development, ad hoc or App Store export before Apple encrypts it), which is what a jailbroken device would also yield.
suggest_fixesedits the common shapes of each config; unusual layouts (computed webpack configs, Gradle convention plugins) get no diff, and Forge and Flutter get instructions rather than a patch. Always review before applying.
License
MIT
Questions sur reverse-shield MCP
Comment ajouter reverse-shield MCP à Claude Code ?
Exécutez claude mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield dans votre terminal. Ajoutez --scope user pour le rendre disponible dans tous les projets.
Comment ajouter reverse-shield MCP à Cursor ?
Ouvrez ~/.cursor/mcp.json et ajoutez le serveur sous mcpServers, avec la configuration Cursor indiquée dans la section d'installation ci-dessus.
Quels outils reverse-shield MCP fournit-il ?
Il expose 5 outils, dont scan_artifact, suggest_fixes, scan_url, list_checks, bundle_secret.
Quels types d'applications peuvent être scannés ?
Le serveur peut auditer des bundles web, des applications Electron, des APK, des applications iOS, des jeux, des binaires natifs, des binaires .NET, Unity, PyInstaller et des JAR Java/Spring Boot.
L'outil nécessite-t-il des outils d'ingénierie inverse externes comme jadx ou apktool ?
Non, il utilise ses propres parseurs internes pour divers formats de fichiers, notamment ASAR, DEX, ELF, Mach-O et PE.