Serveur MCP cmdshellmcp

cmdshellmcp

cmdshellmcp is a constrained command-shell MCP server for AI agents. It exposes a small allowlisted Unix command set, somewhat safe file operations, patch application, and URL fetching so an MCP client can perform limited local tasks without unrestricted shell access.

The server is implemented in Python and runs as an MCP server using the fastmcp package. By default it listens on 127.0.0.1:8003 using the streamable HTTP transport unless --sse is selected.

Added setup files for a full featured Docker Debian based sandbox system container with cmdshellmcp (setup scripts, guides DOCKER.md, Dockerfile, cmdshellmcp.service unit file that runs cmdshellmcp in the container).

[!CAUTION]

This server provides remote command execution (RCE), which is normally considered a critical security vulnerability. Allow-listing powerful commands—such as bash, sh, python, perl, sudo, docker, or commands capable of writing files—may allow an attacker or untrusted LLM to bypass intended restrictions and take control of the system. For example, allowing python or bash can effectively permit arbitrary code execution and file access. If the server lacks strong authentication, is reachable by untrusted clients, or is controlled by an untrusted or prompt-injected LLM, it may cause severe damage, including data loss, credential theft, malware installation, or compromise of other systems. Run cmdshellmcp (cmdshellmcp2.py) only in a protected, disposable sandbox with carefully scoped privileges limited to those required for its intended task and limited access to files, credentials, devices, and networks—for example, disposable Docker container or virtual machine that can be safely destroyed after use.

Warning

This is a scratch / experimental app that evolved out of using an MCP server (tools) that allow running shell commands for coding purpose. Unfortunately, for such a purpose, one often needs to provide the LLM (model) client with rather powerful shell commands to "do its job" for a particular scope / context / intent.

The default allowed commands are not necessarily safe, i.e. LLM agents or practically clients calling the MCP api can 'escape' and do things outside a context e.g. the working directory defined with --cwd option. It validates the arguments in a limited way, i.e. looking for string path patterns if they seem to escape the current directory. This is a heuristic check, i.e. this check is pattern matching, it does not know if that argument is intended to be a file or directory. Nor does it know the argument's context for a particular command, or if they are after all safe. e.g. it may prevent a ls / (listing a root directory), but sometimes that is what you need. But it may prevent by sheer pattern matching e.g. rm /PreciousFile.txt i.e. remove a file in the root directory. This is not an always secure check, but added as it is better than no checks at all.

There are also tools (MCP functions exposed) that expose write and file modification ops, including executing shell commands.

• Authentication is enabled by default. Keep the randomly generated token, or set a fixed auth_token using the auth field in the config file or --auth. Using --noauth practically means you are giving remote command execution (RCE) to any (including possibly malicious or rogue) clients that can reach the server.
• Run this as an unprivileged user. Running as root is at best foolish
• Do not use this with untrusted clients or untrusted LLMs
• Use it in a disposable sandbox e.g. a standalone docker container or virtual machine that you can afford to throw away including the contents
• Review the allow list in cmdshellmcp.json and the hardcoded defaults, revise them before using.

Features

• Allowlisted shell execution for a curated set of commands
• File read/write/list/copy/move/rename/delete operations and basic directory creation/removal under a configured working directory
• Transactional text-file editing with sed, numbered backups, and unified diffs
• Unified diff patch application via patch
• HTTP fetch support with optional HTML prettification
• Bearer token authentication with a secure, randomly generated token by default
• Audit logging to stdout and/or a file
• Path restrictions to prevent escaping the current working directory
• Setup files for a delightful, full featured Docker Debian based sandbox system container with cmdshellmcp (setup scripts, guides DOCKER.md, Dockerfile, cmdshellmcp.service unit file that runs cmdshellmcp in the container).

AI use in this repo

This app and its contents e.g. this page, is created with the aid of LLM (large language models) such as

• ChatGPT 5.6 sol (light), Codex
• Github Co-pilot MAI-Code-1.1-Flash

Initial codes is written by the author and refactored with aid of the LLMs and updates is also done partly manually. After features are added or changed, additional tests is often done by manually running them e.g. in llama.cpp's llama-server Web UI

Installation

1. Clone the repository.
2. Create and activate a virtual environment if desired.
3. Install dependencies:

python -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install fastmcp requests beautifulsoup4

If your environment uses a requirements.txt, you can also install from there:

pip install -r requirements.txt

The editFile tool also requires GNU sed (including its --sandbox option) and diff to be installed on the server. These programs are invoked directly by the dedicated tool and do not need to appear in allowed_commands.

Configuration

A configuration file is mandatory. The server selects one JSON file in this order (files are not merged):

1. The file specified by --conf, when given (no automatic search).
2. /etc/cmdshellmcp.d/cmdshellmcp.json.
3. /usr/local/python/cmdshellmcp/cmdshellmcp.json.

The current directory is never searched automatically. If no config is found, startup exits with an error suggesting --conf FILE. A missing explicit file, unreadable file, or invalid selected JSON file also fails startup. Command-line options override their configuration keys; omitted optional settings retain internal defaults within the required configuration.

Example:

{
  "host": "127.0.0.1",
  "port": 8003,
  "cwd": "/path/to/project",
  "shellnopathchk": false,
  "editdelbk": false,
  "quiet": false,
  "auditlog": null,
  "disableTools": ["writeFile", "editFile", "applyPatch", "copyFile", "moveRenameFile", "deleteFile", "mkdir", "rmdir"],
  "allowed_commands": [
    "ls", "pwd", "date", "cat", "grep", "egrep",
    "whoami", "head", "tail", "sed", "wc", "file", "du", "df",
    "free", "ps", "uname", "hostname", "uptime", "w", "last",
    "mkdir", "cp", "mv", "awk"
  ],
  "auth": "_my_secret_auth_token_"
}

Supported configuration keys:

• host: bind host; default 127.0.0.1
• port: bind port; default 8003
• cwd: working directory path; required unless --cwd is supplied
• shellnopathchk: boolean; bypasses shell argument path checks when true; default false
• editdelbk: boolean; deletes successful edit backups after composing the diff when true; default false
• quiet: suppresses audit output to stdout when true
• auditlog: optional path to an audit log file
• allowed_commands: list of commands permitted for execution
• disableTools: list of MCP tool names to omit from the server, case sensitive and exact name match is required
• auth: optional fixed bearer token string; when omitted, a random token is generated at startup

Running the server

Start with an explicit configuration and working directory:

python cmdshellmcp2.py --conf /path/to/cmdshellmcp.json --cwd /path/to/project

If the config is installed in a default search location and supplies cwd, python cmdshellmcp2.py is sufficient. Startup fails when neither --cwd nor config cwd supplies a directory. There is no prompt or automatic working directory fallback. The selected directory is logged before the server starts. By default, the server listens on 127.0.0.1:8003 using streamable HTTP. The following examples assume a config is installed in a default search location; otherwise add --conf FILE. Supply --cwd PATH if the config leaves cwd unset.

SSE mode

python cmdshellmcp2.py --sse

This runs the server on the SSE transport instead of streamable HTTP.

Browser clients and CORS

Both HTTP transports include CORS middleware for browser-based MCP clients. The server accepts requests from any origin, supports the MCP GET, POST, and DELETE methods and browser preflight OPTIONS requests, and exposes the mcp-session-id response header to browser JavaScript.

Because all origins are allowed, do not expose the server to an untrusted network without authentication and appropriate network controls. To restrict browser access, replace allow_origins=["*"] in CORS_MIDDLEWARE with the specific trusted origins.

Custom working directory

python cmdshellmcp2.py --cwd /path/to/project

This overrides config cwd for file and shell tools. A configuration file is still required. The path must exist and must be a directory; ~ is expanded and the selected path is normalized to an absolute path.

Custom host and port

python cmdshellmcp2.py --host 0.0.0.0 --port 9000

Authentication

Authentication is enabled by default. If neither --auth nor an auth value in the configuration file supplies a fixed token, the server generates a cryptographically secure, base64-encoded token and displays it in the startup log. The generated token is shown in bold when stdout supports ANSI styling. Configure the MCP client to send that value as its bearer token.

To use a fixed token instead:

python cmdshellmcp2.py --auth my-secret-token

To explicitly run without authentication:

python cmdshellmcp2.py --noauth

--auth and --noauth are mutually exclusive. --noauth also overrides an auth value in the configuration file. Disabling authentication is unsafe on any network that is not completely trusted.

Audit logging

python cmdshellmcp2.py --quiet --auditlog /tmp/cmdshellmcp.log

• --quiet disables audit logging to stdout.
• --auditlog appends audit events to the specified file.

A full featured Docker Debian based sandbox system container with cmdshellmcp

This project provides setup files for a delightful, full featured Docker Debian based sandbox system container with cmdshellmcp (setup scripts, guides DOCKER.md, Dockerfile, cmdshellmcp.service unit file that runs cmdshellmcp in the container).

Using the docker sandbox container gives you a "system in a system" experience, e.g. that Debian boots up within the container just like a full Unix / Linux system. It gives you 3 userids within the container:

• root: (superuser)
• admin (this is for you / human user), admin has sudo access, i.e. practically can do anything root does, install files, change system configs, permissions etc
• codeagent: cmdshellmcp runs under this user, in the user's /home/codeagent home directory. codeagent has no sudo access.

For more details review DOCKER.md

Command-line options

python cmdshellmcp2.py [--cwd PATH] [--host HOST] [--port PORT] \
  [--allow COMMAND [COMMAND ...]] [--conf FILE] [--auth TOKEN | --noauth] \
  [--disableTools TOOL[,TOOL...]] [--editdelbk] [--shellnopathchk] [--sse] [--quiet] \
  [--auditlog FILE] [--stdio]

Options:

• --cwd: working directory used for file and shell operations; when omitted, use config cwd, otherwise exit with a missing working directory error
• --host: server bind host
• --port: server bind port
• --allow: override the allowlist for the current process; may be repeated
• --disableTools: comma-separated MCP tool names to omit; overrides the disableTools list from the config file; case sensitive and exact name match is required
• --editdelbk: delete the numbered backup after editFile has completed successfully and composed its unified diff response; overrides config editdelbk
• --shellnopathchk: bypass _local_path_error checks on cmdshell arguments for this server process; overrides config shellnopathchk; file tools continue to check their paths
• --conf: explicit JSON config file path; when omitted, search the locations listed in Configuration
• --auth: use a fixed bearer token instead of generating one
• --noauth: explicitly disable bearer authentication; mutually exclusive with --auth and unsafe on untrusted networks
• --sse: use SSE transport instead of streamable HTTP
• --quiet: suppress audit output on stdout
• --auditlog: write audit logs to a given file
• --stdio: start the server in stdio mode, i.e. listen for clients/ tool calls on stdio.
  warning: this implies --noauth, stdio clients connect without auth and runs with the authorizations of the userid running it, including shell commands. This server is not intended to be used with --stdio as it compromise the security posture as documented in the RCE (remote command execution) warning section, this is provided for specific use cases e.g. such as with a mcp-proxy in which the mcp proxy handles authentication and that it is run in its own sandbox container etc.

Allowlist override

python cmdshellmcp2.py --allow ls pwd date whoami cat grep

This overrides allowed_commands from the config file for that process.

Disabling tools

python cmdshellmcp2.py --disableTools writeFile,editFile,applyPatch,fetch

This prevents matching tools from being registered by the server. Tool names are case-sensitive and must match the function names in the MCP tools exposed to AI agents section below. The command-line option overrides the disableTools list from the config file.

Security model

This server is intentionally restricted. It is designed to be somewhat safe in a controlled environment rather than as a general unrestricted shell.

Security features include:

• Shell commands must be explicitly present in the allowlist
• Command names are checked before execution
• The cmdshell tool expects a command name and argument array, not a raw shell string
• Piping is not supported by design
• cmdshell checks every argument with _local_path_error after escape decoding and removal of surrounding double quotes, before expanding globs. Expanded filenames are also checked before execution. Empty arguments are allowed; absolute paths and paths containing a .. component are rejected by default.
• Start the server with --shellnopathchk or set config shellnopathchk to true when shell commands need access to shared resources such as /usr/share or /usr/include. This bypass applies only to cmdshell; the command allowlist remains enforced.
• File tools require non-empty paths and perform basic _local_path_error checks intended to keep file paths within --cwd: absolute paths and paths containing .. are rejected
• These are basic lexical path checks rather than a complete filesystem sandbox. They do not resolve symlinks or interpret command-specific options such as --file=/absolute/path, scripts, or expressions. Choose the command allowlist carefully for your intended usage.
• editFile accepts only a small allowlist of non-file-selecting sed options, runs GNU sed in sandbox mode, and does not invoke a shell
• editFile writes successful output to a temporary file before atomically replacing the source; failed sed runs leave the source unchanged
• Patch application blocks dangerous path-changing options

In short: the shell is a narrow sandbox for controlled read/write operations, not a full-host terminal.

Configuration file resolution and placement

The server requires a configuration file. --conf FILE selects it explicitly; otherwise only /etc/cmdshellmcp.d/cmdshellmcp.json and then /usr/local/python/cmdshellmcp/cmdshellmcp.json are checked. A config in the process's current directory is never loaded automatically. Missing or invalid configuration fails startup, preventing an unintended policy from being loaded from the client's working files.

Keep the configuration outside the tool working directory and protect it with filesystem ownership and permissions that prevent the server account from modifying it. At startup, after logging the working directory, the server checks both the selected config path and its resolved symlink target. If either lies within the working directory, it logs a warning naming the config and working directory: the MCP client may read or modify the config and compromise the sandbox's security posture. This check warns and allows startup; it does not block access or enforce isolation. Placing the config outside the working directory helps prevent access through local file tools, but lexical path checks, symlinks, and powerful allowlisted commands still require careful permissions and sandboxing.

Working directory resolution

The directory used by shell and file tools is selected in this order:

1. --cwd PATH, when given.
2. cwd from the selected configuration file.

If neither supplies a path, startup exits with a missing working directory error. There is no interactive prompt and no fallback to the process's current directory. Paths must exist and be directories; ~ is expanded and paths are resolved to absolute paths. Relative paths are resolved against the process's current directory, including paths from config (not against the config file's location). Invalid paths fail startup. The selected absolute directory is logged. Set an absolute --cwd or config cwd for services so the tool directory is independent of the launch directory. This directory scopes local operations but does not provide a complete filesystem sandbox.

MCP tools exposed to AI agents

The server registers the following tools:

1. cmdshell(command, args)

Runs one configured Unix command with arguments.

Parameters:

• command: the command name, which must appear in the allowlist
• args: list of arguments/flags to pass to the command

Example:

cmdshell("ls", ["-la"])
cmdshell("grep", ["-R", "needle", "."])

Notes:

• The command name must be in the allowlist.

• Arguments are passed as a list, reducing shell injection risk.

• Arguments are checked with _local_path_error by default, including decoded arguments and expanded glob matches. This also checks arguments used as flags or text; empty arguments are allowed, while absolute paths and .. path components are rejected.

• Glob patterns may be expanded automatically relative to --cwd.

• Quoted globs can be passed literally to prevent expansion.

• Pipes and redirects are not allowed

• To bypass only the shell argument path checks, start the server with:

  python cmdshellmcp2.py --cwd /path/to/project --shellnopathchk
  

  The MCP tool's parameters remain command and args; the bypass is configured at server startup, and file tools still enforce their path checks.

2. writeFile(file, text, append=False, newline=True)

Writes text to a file beneath the current working directory.

Parameters:

• file: a relative path under cwd
• text: content to write
• append: if true, append instead of overwrite
• newline: append a trailing newline when true

Example:

writeFile("notes.txt", "hello from the agent")

This is restricted to relative paths below the configured working directory.

3. readFile(file)

Reads a UTF-8 text file beneath the current working directory.

Example:

readFile("README.md")

4. listFiles(path=".")

Lists the entries in a directory beneath the configured working directory.

Example:

listFiles(".")
listFiles("src")

Returns a newline-separated list of entries, with / appended for directories.

5. copyFile(source, destination)

Copies a regular file beneath the configured working directory using Python's standard-library file operations. Both source and destination are checked with _local_path_error.

Example:

copyFile("src/example.py", "src/example.py.copy")

6. moveRenameFile(source, destination)

Moves or renames a regular file using os.rename. Both source and destination are checked with _local_path_error.

Example:

moveRenameFile("draft.txt", "archive/draft.txt")

7. deleteFile(file)

Deletes a regular file using os.remove after checking the path with _local_path_error.

Example:

deleteFile("obsolete.txt")

8. mkdir(path)

Creates one directory using os.mkdir after checking the path with _local_path_error.

Example:

mkdir("build")

The parent directory must already exist.

9. rmdir(path)

Removes one empty directory using os.rmdir after checking the path with _local_path_error.

Example:

rmdir("build")

The directory must be empty; this tool does not recursively delete directory contents.