MCP server GitHub Security Posture
Permite que um agente de IA realize auditorias em organizações, repositórios, workflows do Actions, secrets e controle de acesso do GitHub em busca de configurações de segurança incorretas.
Também conhecido como badchars/github-security-mcp
- Stars
- 15
- Ferramentas
- 39
- Downloads, 30 dias
- 978
- Versão mais recente
- —
- Último commit
- 14 de mar. de 2026
- Licença
- MIT
O que é o MCP GitHub Security Posture?
Permite que um agente de IA realize auditorias em organizações, repositórios, workflows do Actions, secrets e controle de acesso do GitHub em busca de configurações de segurança incorretas. Ele expõe 39 ferramentas, como github_check_org_security, github_check_org_sso, github_check_org_members.
Resumo gerado a partir do README do projeto
Sobre o MCP server de GitHub Security Posture
Auditar organizações e repositórios do GitHub em busca de configurações de segurança incorretas é o que este MCP server permite que agentes de IA façam. Ele oferece uma maneira unificada para uma IA inspecionar configurações de organização, configurações de repositório, workflows do GitHub Actions, status de secret scanning e permissões de controle de acesso. Em vez de clicar manualmente em vários dashboards, um desenvolvedor pode usar um cliente de IA como Claude Desktop ou Cursor para realizar uma análise abrangente da postura de segurança.
O servidor utiliza o Model Context Protocol para fornecer 39 ferramentas específicas e 45 verificações de segurança divididas em seis categorias diferentes. Ele funciona chamando as APIs do GitHub diretamente usando um token do GitHub fornecido, que pode ser um Personal Access Token clássico ou um fine-grained PAT. Ele foi projetado para fornecer visibilidade em áreas como riscos de supply chain, injeção de script em workflows e acesso de colaboradores inativos, sem exigir uma assinatura do GitHub Enterprise para a visibilidade básica que oferece.
O que você pode fazer com ele
- 1Realizar uma auditoria completa da organizaçãoPeça a um agente de IA para executar uma auditoria de segurança completa em toda a sua organização do GitHub para identificar e priorizar descobertas críticas.
- 2Analisar a segurança do workflow de CI/CDPeça a um agente de IA para escanear seus workflows do GitHub Actions em busca de riscos de supply chain, como actions sem versão fixa ou padrões perigosos de pull_request_target.
- 3Revisar o controle de acesso ao repositórioUse o agente para identificar usuários com permissões excessivas ou colaboradores externos inativos que ainda possuem acesso de escrita.
- 4Detectar riscos de exposição de secretsInstrua uma IA a verificar se o secret scanning está habilitado e se os secrets da organização estão devidamente limitados a repositórios específicos.
Escrito a partir do README do projeto. Cada caso de uso é verificado com uma citação dele.
Como instalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture
Formatos verificados em 10 nov 2026Adicionar ao CursorAdicionar ao GooseInstalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no Claude Code
$ claude mcp add github-security-mcp -- npx -y github-security-mcpInstalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"github-security-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"github-security-mcp"
]
}
}
}Instalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"github-security-mcp": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"github-security-mcp"
]
}
}
}Instalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no VS Code CLI
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"github-security-mcp","type":"stdio","command":"npx","args":["-y","github-security-mcp"]}'Instalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no Claude Desktop
claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"github-security-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"github-security-mcp"
]
}
}
}Instalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no Codex
$ codex mcp add github-security-mcp -- npx -y github-security-mcpInstalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no Codex config.toml
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.github-security-mcp] command = "npx" args = ["-y", "github-security-mcp"]
Instalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no Gemini CLI
$ gemini mcp add -s user github-security-mcp npx -- -y github-security-mcpInstalar o MCP GitHub Security Posture no Gemini settings.json
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"github-security-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"github-security-mcp"
]
}
}
}Ferramentas do MCP GitHub Security Posture 39
Detectadas a partir do READMEgithub_check_org_securitygithub_check_org_ssogithub_check_org_membersgithub_check_org_appsgithub_check_org_webhooksgithub_check_org_audit_loggithub_list_org_reposgithub_check_repo_branch_protectiongithub_check_repo_secretsgithub_check_repo_code_scanninggithub_check_repo_dependabotgithub_check_repo_settings
| github_check_org_security | — | |
| github_check_org_sso | — | |
| github_check_org_members | — | |
| github_check_org_apps | — | |
| github_check_org_webhooks | — | |
| github_check_org_audit_log | — | |
| github_list_org_repos | — | |
| github_check_repo_branch_protection | — | |
| github_check_repo_secrets | — | |
| github_check_repo_code_scanning | — | |
| github_check_repo_dependabot | — | |
| github_check_repo_settings | — |
Mostrar todas as 39 ferramentasMostrar menos ferramentas
github_check_repo_webhooksgithub_check_repo_deploy_keysgithub_check_repo_codeownersgithub_check_workflow_injectiongithub_check_workflow_pr_targetgithub_check_workflow_permissionsgithub_check_workflow_pinninggithub_check_workflow_runnersgithub_check_workflow_environmentsgithub_check_workflow_secretsgithub_check_workflow_oidcgithub_check_secret_scanninggithub_check_push_protectiongithub_check_secret_patternsgithub_check_secret_scopinggithub_check_dependency_graphgithub_check_dependabot_updatesgithub_check_sbomgithub_check_vulnerabilitiesgithub_check_team_permissionsgithub_check_collaboratorsgithub_check_app_permissionsgithub_check_pat_usagegithub_list_checksgithub_audit_summarygithub_audit_reportgithub_run_all
| github_check_repo_webhooks | — | |
| github_check_repo_deploy_keys | — | |
| github_check_repo_codeowners | — | |
| github_check_workflow_injection | — | |
| github_check_workflow_pr_target | — | |
| github_check_workflow_permissions | — | |
| github_check_workflow_pinning | — | |
| github_check_workflow_runners | — | |
| github_check_workflow_environments | — | |
| github_check_workflow_secrets | — | |
| github_check_workflow_oidc | — | |
| github_check_secret_scanning | — | |
| github_check_push_protection | — | |
| github_check_secret_patterns | — | |
| github_check_secret_scoping | — | |
| github_check_dependency_graph | — | |
| github_check_dependabot_updates | — | |
| github_check_sbom | — | |
| github_check_vulnerabilities | — | |
| github_check_team_permissions | — | |
| github_check_collaborators | — | |
| github_check_app_permissions | — | |
| github_check_pat_usage | — | |
| github_list_checks | — | |
| github_audit_summary | — | |
| github_audit_report | — | |
| github_run_all | — |
Configuração
GITHUB_TOKEN
| Nome | Descrição | Tipo |
|---|---|---|
| GITHUB_TOKEN | — |
Verificações automatizadas
Executado em 14 de nov. de 2026Relatório completo →Ainda não verificado. Um servidor precisa de uma pontuação de 80, nenhum problema grave e dados suficientes para verificarmos. Como as verificações funcionam · O que corrigir para ganhar mais pontos
- Repositório de origem vinculado e acessívelbadchars/github-security-mcp is public and reachablegithub.com/badchars/github-security-mcp ↗Passou
- O pacote indica este repositório como sua origemgithub-security-mcp names badchars/github-security-mcp as sourcenpmjs.com/package/github-security-mcp ↗Passou
- Proveniência da build (atestação Sigstore)No build attestation published for this releaseNão verificado
- Licença de código aberto (OSI)MITspdx.org/licenses/MIT.html ↗Passou
- Commit ou release no último anoLast commit or release 2026-03-14github.com/badchars/github-security-mcp ↗Passou
- OpenSSF ScorecardNão verificado
- Nome do pacote não é próximo a um pacote popularNo popular package one edit away from github-security-mcpPassou
- Nenhum aviso crítico no pacote ou em suas dependênciasNão verificado
- Sem instruções ocultas para o modelo39 tool descriptions and the README read; no override phrases, credential paths or hidden charactersPassou
- Ferramentas destrutivas estão rotuladasNo tool named like delete, drop or execPassou
- O endpoint remoto responde ao handshake do MCPNão verificado
README
Ver no GitHubThe Problem
GitHub security is fragmented. You need separate tools for org settings, repo configurations, Actions workflow analysis, secret scanning, supply chain, and access control. No single tool covers it all, and none work with AI agents.
Traditional workflow:
manually check org settings → click through 15 pages
run github-advisory-db for each repo → one at a time
grep workflows for script injection → miss half the patterns
review collaborator access → spreadsheet hell
check secret scanning alerts → another dashboard
──────────────────────────────────────────
Total: hours of manual work per org
github-security-mcp gives your AI agent 39 tools and 45 security checks via the Model Context Protocol. The agent calls GitHub APIs directly, understands what it finds, and tells you exactly what to fix.
With github-security-mcp:
You: "Audit my GitHub org for security issues and prioritize the fixes"
Agent: → checks org settings (2FA, SSO, member privileges)
→ scans repos (branch protection, secret scanning, Dependabot)
→ analyzes workflows (script injection, unpinned actions, OIDC)
→ reviews access (teams, collaborators, PATs, GitHub Apps)
→ "12 critical, 8 high — here are the top 5 to fix now"
How It's Different
Existing tools focus on one slice of GitHub security. github-security-mcp covers the full stack and works with any AI agent.
| Tool | What it does | What it can't do |
|---|---|---|
| Allstar | Enforce repo settings via GitHub App | No Actions analysis, no secret scanning, no access audit |
| Scorecard | OpenSSF security score for repos | Single-repo focus, no org-level checks, no real-time interaction |
| Legitify | Org + repo policy enforcement | CLI output, no AI integration, limited Actions analysis |
| step-security/harden-runner | Runtime Actions security | Only Actions, no org/repo/access checks |
| GitGuardian | Secret detection in commits | SaaS only, no self-hosted, limited to secrets domain |
| Socket | Supply chain risk analysis | Package-focused, no org/Actions/access analysis |
All of these are excellent tools. github-security-mcp doesn't replace them — it fills the gap of giving an AI agent unified, interactive access across all GitHub security domains.
Quick Start
Install
git clone https://github.com/badchars/github-security-mcp.git
cd github-security-mcp
bun install
Set up authentication
# Classic PAT (requires: repo, admin:org, admin:org_hook, admin:repo_hook)
export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
# Fine-grained PAT (preferred — least privilege)
# Organization: Members (read), Administration (read)
# Repository: Administration, Code scanning, Dependabot, Secret scanning,
# Actions, Environments, Webhooks (all read-only)
Connect to your AI agent
claude mcp add github-security -- bun run /path/to/github-security-mcp/src/index.ts
Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"github-security": {
"command": "bun",
"args": ["run", "/path/to/github-security-mcp/src/index.ts"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": "ghp_your_token_here"
}
}
}
}
Same JSON config format. Point the command to your installation path.
Start auditing
You: "Audit my GitHub org for security misconfigurations"
That's it. The agent handles the rest.
What The AI Can Do
Full Organization Audit
You: "Run a complete security audit on our GitHub org"
Agent: → github_run_all {org: "myorg", repo: "main-app"}
→ 45 checks across 6 categories
→ github_audit_report
→ "34 findings: 4 critical, 7 high, 12 medium.
Critical #1: No branch protection on main (REPO-001)
Critical #2: Script injection in deploy.yml (ACT-001)
Critical #3: 3 critical Dependabot alerts unfixed 90+ days (REPO-007)
Critical #4: Unresolved secret scanning alerts (SEC-002)
Here are the exact fixes for each..."
Actions Workflow Security
You: "Check our CI/CD workflows for supply chain risks"
Agent: → github_check_workflow_injection
Found ${{ github.event.issue.title }} in run: block (deploy.yml:47)
→ github_check_workflow_pinning
12 actions use tags instead of SHA pins
→ github_check_workflow_pr_target
build.yml uses pull_request_target with checkout — critical risk
→ github_check_workflow_permissions
Default GITHUB_TOKEN has write-all permissions
→ "4 supply chain risks found. The PR target + checkout pattern
allows any fork to execute arbitrary code with write access
to your repo. Fix this first."
Access Control Review
You: "Who has too much access to our repositories?"
Agent: → github_check_team_permissions
"platform" team has admin on 47 repos, only 3 members
→ github_check_collaborators
8 outside collaborators with write access
→ github_check_app_permissions
"old-ci-bot" GitHub App has admin + all repos
→ github_check_pat_usage
14 classic PATs with repo scope (should be fine-grained)
→ "Reduce blast radius: restrict platform team to maintain,
remove 3 stale outside collaborators, limit old-ci-bot
to specific repos, migrate classic PATs to fine-grained."
Secret Exposure Detection
You: "Are we properly protecting secrets across our repos?"
Agent: → github_check_secret_scanning
Secret scanning disabled on 5 private repos
→ github_check_push_protection
3 push protection bypasses in the last month
→ github_check_secret_patterns
No custom secret patterns defined
→ github_check_secret_scoping
2 org secrets available to all repos (should be scoped)
→ "Enable secret scanning on all repos, review the 3 bypasses,
add custom patterns for internal API keys, and scope
org secrets to only the repos that need them."
Tools Reference (39 tools)
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
github_check_org_security |
2FA enforcement, default repo visibility, member creation privileges |
github_check_org_sso |
SSO/SAML configuration via GraphQL |
github_check_org_members |
Outside collaborators, stale member detection |
github_check_org_apps |
OAuth credential authorizations, GitHub App installation permissions |
github_check_org_webhooks |
Insecure webhook URLs (HTTP, no secret) |
github_check_org_audit_log |
Suspicious audit log activity (Enterprise) |
github_list_org_repos |
List all repos in an org with security metadata |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
github_check_repo_branch_protection |
Branch protection rules on default branch |
github_check_repo_secrets |
Secret scanning and push protection enablement |
github_check_repo_code_scanning |
CodeQL / code scanning enabled, open alerts |
github_check_repo_dependabot |
Dependabot enabled, critical alert triage |
github_check_repo_settings |
SECURITY.md, private vulnerability reporting, fork restrictions |
github_check_repo_webhooks |
Insecure repo-level webhook URLs |
github_check_repo_deploy_keys |
Deploy key permissions (read-only vs read-write) |
github_check_repo_codeowners |
CODEOWNERS file presence and enforcement |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
github_check_workflow_injection |
Script injection via ${{ github.event.* }} in run: blocks |
github_check_workflow_pr_target |
pull_request_target + checkout pattern (critical) |
github_check_workflow_permissions |
GITHUB_TOKEN default permission scope |
github_check_workflow_pinning |
Unpinned third-party actions (tag vs SHA) |
github_check_workflow_runners |
Self-hosted runner exposure |
github_check_workflow_environments |
Missing environment protection rules |
github_check_workflow_secrets |
Secret exfiltration patterns in workflows |
github_check_workflow_oidc |
OIDC subject claim customization |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
github_check_secret_scanning |
Coverage gaps and unresolved alerts |
github_check_push_protection |
Push protection bypass tracking |
github_check_secret_patterns |
Custom secret pattern configuration |
github_check_secret_scoping |
Environment, repo, and org-level secret scoping |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
github_check_dependency_graph |
Dependency graph enablement |
github_check_dependabot_updates |
Dependabot security updates configuration |
github_check_sbom |
SBOM generation capability |
github_check_vulnerabilities |
Known vulnerabilities, critical unfixed > 90 days |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
github_check_team_permissions |
Team permission levels across repos |
github_check_collaborators |
External collaborator access audit |
github_check_app_permissions |
GitHub App permission scope review |
github_check_pat_usage |
Classic vs fine-grained PAT usage |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
github_list_checks |
Browse all 45 checks, filter by category/severity |
github_audit_summary |
Aggregate findings by category, severity, status |
github_audit_report |
Full markdown or JSON audit report |
github_run_all |
Execute all checks for an org/repo |
Check Registry (45 checks)
| ID | Check | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| ORG-001 | 2FA not enforced | CRITICAL |
| ORG-002 | Default repo visibility is public | HIGH |
| ORG-003 | Members can create public repos | MEDIUM |
| ORG-004 | SSO/SAML not configured | HIGH |
| ORG-005 | Outside collaborators with access | MEDIUM |
| ORG-006 | Stale organization members | LOW |
| ORG-007 | Risky OAuth app authorizations | HIGH |
| ORG-008 | Over-permissive GitHub App installations | HIGH |
| ORG-009 | Insecure webhook URLs | MEDIUM |
| ORG-010 | Suspicious audit log activity | INFO |
| ID | Check | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| REPO-001 | Missing or weak branch protection | CRITICAL |
| REPO-002 | Secret scanning not enabled | HIGH |
| REPO-003 | Push protection not enabled | HIGH |
| REPO-004 | Code scanning not enabled | MEDIUM |
| REPO-005 | Open code scanning alerts | HIGH |
| REPO-006 | Dependabot not enabled | MEDIUM |
| REPO-007 | Critical Dependabot alerts | CRITICAL |
| REPO-008 | No SECURITY.md policy file | LOW |
| REPO-009 | Private vulnerability reporting off | LOW |
| REPO-010 | Unrestricted fork settings | LOW |
| REPO-011 | Insecure repo webhooks | MEDIUM |
| REPO-012 | Read-write deploy keys | HIGH |
| REPO-013 | Missing CODEOWNERS file | LOW |
| ID | Check | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| ACT-001 | Script injection via untrusted inputs | CRITICAL |
| ACT-002 | pull_request_target with checkout | CRITICAL |
| ACT-003 | Over-permissive GITHUB_TOKEN | HIGH |
| ACT-004 | Unpinned third-party actions | MEDIUM |
| ACT-005 | Self-hosted runner exposure | HIGH |
| ACT-006 | Missing environment protection rules | MEDIUM |
| ACT-007 | Secret exfiltration patterns | HIGH |
| ACT-008 | OIDC misconfiguration | MEDIUM |
| ID | Check | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| SEC-001 | Secret scanning coverage gaps | HIGH |
| SEC-002 | Unresolved secret scanning alerts | CRITICAL |
| SEC-003 | Push protection bypasses | HIGH |
| SEC-004 | No custom secret patterns | LOW |
| SEC-005 | Overly broad secret scoping | MEDIUM |
| ID | Check | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| SUP-001 | Dependency graph not enabled | MEDIUM |
| SUP-002 | Dependabot security updates off | HIGH |
| SUP-003 | No SBOM generation | LOW |
| SUP-004 | Critical known vulnerabilities | CRITICAL |
| SUP-005 | Stale unfixed vulnerabilities (>90 days) | HIGH |
| ID | Check | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| ACC-001 | Over-permissive team access | HIGH |
| ACC-002 | External collaborators with write+ | MEDIUM |
| ACC-003 | Over-scoped GitHub Apps | HIGH |
| ACC-004 | Classic PATs with broad scopes | HIGH |
Architecture
src/
├── index.ts Entry point + MCP stdio
├── types/
│ └── index.ts CheckResult, ToolDef, ToolContext, ToolResult
├── github/
│ └── client.ts GitHubClientFactory (lazy Octokit + GraphQL)
├── protocol/
│ ├── tools.ts 39 tool definitions (Zod schemas)
│ └── mcp-server.ts MCP server + stdio transport
├── org/ Organization checks (ORG-001..010)
│ ├── security.ts 2FA, visibility, member privileges
│ ├── sso.ts SSO/SAML via GraphQL
│ ├── members.ts Outside collaborators, stale members
│ ├── apps.ts OAuth apps, GitHub App installations
│ ├── webhooks.ts Insecure webhook URLs
│ └── audit-log.ts Suspicious audit log patterns
├── repo/ Repository checks (REPO-001..013)
│ ├── branch-protection.ts Branch protection rules
│ ├── secret-scanning.ts Secret scanning + push protection
│ ├── code-scanning.ts CodeQL enabled, open alerts
│ ├── dependabot.ts Dependabot enabled, critical alerts
│ ├── settings.ts SECURITY.md, vuln reporting, forks
│ ├── webhooks.ts Insecure repo webhooks
│ ├── deploy-keys.ts Deploy key permissions
│ └── codeowners.ts CODEOWNERS file
├── actions/ GitHub Actions checks (ACT-001..008)
│ ├── injection.ts Script injection via untrusted inputs
│ ├── pr-target.ts pull_request_target + checkout
│ ├── permissions.ts GITHUB_TOKEN default permissions
│ ├── pinning.ts Unpinned third-party actions
│ ├── runners.ts Self-hosted runner exposure
│ ├── environments.ts Environment protection rules
│ ├── secrets.ts Secret exfiltration patterns
│ └── oidc.ts OIDC configuration
├── secrets/ Secret management checks (SEC-001..005)
│ ├── scanning.ts Coverage + alert triage
│ ├── push-protection.ts Push protection bypasses
│ ├── patterns.ts Custom secret patterns
│ └── scoping.ts Env/repo/org secret scoping
├── supply-chain/ Supply chain checks (SUP-001..005)
│ ├── dependency-graph.ts Dependency graph enabled
│ ├── dependabot-updates.ts Security updates config
│ ├── sbom.ts SBOM generation
│ └── vulnerabilities.ts Known vulns, stale unfixed
├── access/ Access control checks (ACC-001..004)
│ ├── teams.ts Team permission audit
│ ├── collaborators.ts External collaborators
│ ├── github-apps.ts GitHub App permissions
│ └── tokens.ts Classic vs fine-grained PATs
└── meta/ Aggregation + reporting
├── list-checks.ts CHECK_REGISTRY (45 checks)
├── summary.ts Findings aggregation
├── report.ts Markdown/JSON report
└── run-all.ts Execute all checks
Design decisions:
- Single Octokit instance — GitHub API is global (no regions). Lazy initialization on first API call.
- Uniform CheckResult — Every check returns the same structure: checkId, severity, status, details, remediation. Same pattern as cloud-audit-mcp.
- Static workflow analysis — Actions checks fetch YAML via Contents API and use regex analysis. GitHub has no parsed workflow API.
- Enterprise graceful degradation — Enterprise-only features (audit log, credential authorizations, SSO) return
NOT_APPLICABLEinstead of errors. - In-memory findings — Session-scoped findings array. No database, no persistence. Run
github_audit_summaryorgithub_audit_reportto aggregate. - 4 dependencies —
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk,@octokit/rest,@octokit/graphql,zod. Nothing else.
Authentication
| Token Type | Required Scopes |
|---|---|
| Classic PAT | repo, admin:org, admin:org_hook, admin:repo_hook |
| Fine-grained PAT (recommended) | Org: Members + Administration (read). Repo: Administration, Code scanning, Dependabot, Secret scanning, Actions, Environments, Webhooks (read) |
| GitHub App | Same repository/org permissions as fine-grained PAT |
The token is read from the GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable.
Part of the MCP Security Suite
| Project | Domain | Tools |
|---|---|---|
| hackbrowser-mcp | Browser-based security testing | 39 tools, Firefox, injection testing |
| cloud-audit-mcp | Cloud security (AWS/Azure/GCP) | 38 tools, 60+ checks |
| github-security-mcp | GitHub security posture | 39 tools, 45 checks |
Limitations
- Requires a GitHub PAT or GitHub App token with appropriate scopes
- Some checks require GitHub Enterprise Cloud (audit log, credential authorizations, SSO) — these gracefully return NOT_APPLICABLE on free/Team plans
- Actions workflow analysis is regex-based (no AST parsing) — may miss complex injection patterns
- Rate limiting: GitHub API allows 5,000 requests/hour for authenticated users. A full org audit with many repos may approach this limit
- macOS / Linux (Windows not tested)
Perguntas sobre o MCP GitHub Security Posture
Como adiciono o MCP GitHub Security Posture ao Claude Code?
Execute claude mcp add github-security-mcp -- npx -y github-security-mcp no seu terminal. Adicione --scope user para torná-lo disponível em todos os projetos.
Como adiciono o MCP GitHub Security Posture ao Cursor?
Abra ~/.cursor/mcp.json e adicione o servidor em mcpServers, usando a configuração do Cursor mostrada na seção de instalação acima.
Quais ferramentas o MCP GitHub Security Posture oferece?
Ele expõe 39 ferramentas, incluindo github_check_org_security, github_check_org_sso, github_check_org_members, github_check_org_apps, github_check_org_webhooks.
O que este MCP server permite que um agente de IA faça para a segurança do GitHub?
Ele fornece ao agente 39 ferramentas e 45 verificações de segurança para auditar configurações de organização, repositórios, workflows do Actions, secrets, supply chain e controle de acesso, reportando correções priorizadas em seguida.
Como faço para autenticar o GitHub security MCP server?
Defina uma variável de ambiente GITHUB_TOKEN; um PAT clássico ou um fine-grained PAT de apenas leitura com escopos de segurança de organização e repositório funcionam.
Ele pode analisar workflows do GitHub Actions em busca de riscos de supply chain?
Sim, ele executa 8 verificações de Actions, incluindo injeção de script, uso indevido de pull_request_target, actions sem versão fixa (unpinned), permissões de token, runners, environments, secrets e OIDC.
É necessário o GitHub Enterprise para executar essas verificações?
Não, ele utiliza a API pública gratuitamente e lida com recursos exclusivos do Enterprise de forma adequada, embora algumas verificações, como o log de auditoria da organização, exijam o Enterprise.
Como eu o conecto ao Claude Code?
Execute o comando claude mcp add apontando para o arquivo de entrada src/index.ts do servidor usando bun.