security-proxy MCP server
Commit 12 Nov 2026Berfungsi sebagai gateway keamanan transparan untuk MCP server guna mencegah prompt injection, menyamarkan PII, dan menegakkan kebijakan akses.
Juga dikenal sebagai GuardBee/guardbee-mcp, security-proxy-fa4790, @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy
- Stars
- 2
- Tools
- —
- Unduhan, 30 hari
- 6.120
- Versi terbaru
- 1.39.0
- Commit terakhir
- 12 Nov 2026
- Lisensi
- MIT
Apa itu security-proxy MCP?
Berfungsi sebagai gateway keamanan transparan untuk MCP server guna mencegah prompt injection, menyamarkan PII, dan menegakkan kebijakan akses.
Ringkasan dibuat dari README proyek
Tentang security-proxy MCP server
security-proxy bertindak sebagai gateway transparan yang dirancang untuk melindungi lingkungan Model Context Protocol (MCP) dari berbagai ancaman keamanan. Proxy ini berada di antara AI client, seperti Claude Desktop atau Cursor, dan MCP server yang sudah ada untuk memberikan lapisan pertahanan tanpa memerlukan perubahan kode pada server yang mendasarinya. Proxy ini digunakan secara lokal dengan memodifikasi konfigurasi client untuk menjalankan perintah proxy yang diikuti oleh target server.
Tool ini menyediakan beberapa lapisan perlindungan, termasuk deteksi prompt injection menggunakan 27 aturan dalam bahasa Inggris dan Turki, serta masking PII untuk data sensitif seperti IBAN, kartu kredit, dan nomor paspor. Tool ini dapat beroperasi dalam mode block atau warn untuk interceptor yang berbeda. Developer dapat mengelola banyak server melalui satu kebijakan YAML tunggal dalam gateway mode, yang memungkinkan kontrol terpusat atas visibilitas tool, kebijakan akses, dan audit logging. Tool ini juga menyertakan fitur khusus seperti pemblokiran toxic-flow untuk mencegah kebocoran data antar sesi server yang berbeda dan LLM API gateway untuk mengelola provider keys serta anggaran penggunaan.
Apa yang bisa Anda lakukan dengannya
- 1Mencegah serangan prompt injectionAI client dapat menggunakan proxy ini untuk mendeteksi dan memblokir instruksi berbahaya yang tertanam dalam prompt atau hasil tool.
- 2Melindungi informasi pribadi yang sensitifDeveloper dapat memastikan bahwa data pribadi seperti nomor telepon atau connection strings disamarkan sebelum mencapai LLM.
- 3Memantau dan mengaudit aktivitas agentTim keamanan dapat menyimpan catatan semua pemanggilan tool dan permintaan melalui audit log yang dapat dikonfigurasi.
Ditulis berdasarkan README proyek. Setiap use case diperiksa terhadap kutipan dari README tersebut.
Cara menginstal security-proxy MCP
Format diverifikasi 10 Nov 2026Tambahkan ke CursorTambahkan ke GooseInstal security-proxy MCP di Claude Code
$ claude mcp add security-proxy-fa4790 -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-security-proxyInstal security-proxy MCP di Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"security-proxy-fa4790": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy"
]
}
}
}Instal security-proxy MCP di VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"security-proxy-fa4790": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy"
]
}
}
}Instal security-proxy MCP di VS Code CLI
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"security-proxy-fa4790","type":"stdio","command":"npx","args":["-y","@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy"]}'Instal security-proxy MCP di Claude Desktop
claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"security-proxy-fa4790": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy"
]
}
}
}Instal security-proxy MCP di Codex
$ codex mcp add security-proxy-fa4790 -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-security-proxyInstal security-proxy MCP di Codex config.toml
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.security-proxy-fa4790] command = "npx" args = ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy"]
Instal security-proxy MCP di Gemini CLI
$ gemini mcp add -s user security-proxy-fa4790 npx -- -y @guardbee/mcp-security-proxyInstal security-proxy MCP di Gemini settings.json
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"security-proxy-fa4790": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy"
]
}
}
}Konfigurasi
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINTOTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERSOTEL_SERVICE_NAME
| Nama | Deskripsi | Tipe |
|---|---|---|
| OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT | — | |
| OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS | — | |
| OTEL_SERVICE_NAME | — |
Pengecekan otomatis
Berjalan 13 Nov 2026Laporan lengkap →Belum diverifikasi. Sebuah server memerlukan skor 80, tidak ada temuan serius, dan data yang cukup untuk kami periksa. Cara kerja checks · Yang perlu diperbaiki untuk menambah poin
- Source repository terhubung dan dapat dijangkauguardbee/guardbee-mcp is public and reachablegithub.com/guardbee/guardbee-mcp ↗Lolos
- Nama paket mencantumkan repositori ini sebagai sumbernya@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy names guardbee/guardbee-mcp as sourcenpmjs.com/package/@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy ↗Lolos
- Provenance build (atestasi Sigstore)Sigstore attestation for @guardbee/mcp-security-proxynpmjs.com/package/@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy/v/1.39.0#prov ↗Lolos
- Lisensi open source (OSI)MITspdx.org/licenses/MIT.html ↗Lolos
- Ada commit atau release dalam satu tahun terakhirLast commit or release 2026-11-12github.com/guardbee/guardbee-mcp ↗Lolos
- OpenSSF ScorecardTidak diperiksa
- Nama package tidak mirip dengan package populerNo popular package one edit away from @guardbee/mcp-security-proxyLolos
- Tidak ada advisory kritis pada paket atau dependensinya75 resolved dependencies checked; no critical advisoryosv.dev ↗Lolos
- Tidak ada instruksi tersembunyi untuk modelInstruction aimed at the model found in the description or READMETemuan
- Tools yang bersifat destruktif telah diberi labelTidak diperiksa
- Endpoint remote merespons handshake MCPTidak diperiksa
README
Lihat di GitHub@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy
🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文 | 🇯🇵 日本語 | 🇰🇷 한국어 | 🇧🇷 Português | 🇪🇸 Español | 🇩🇪 Deutsch
A transparent security layer that sits in front of any MCP server. Blocks prompt injection attacks, masks PII in responses, and writes every request to an immutable audit log.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Claude ──► MCP Security Proxy ──► Any MCP Server
│
├─ Prompt injection detection (27 rules, EN + TR)
├─ PII + secret masking (TC, VKN, IBAN, card, phone, 22 key formats)
├─ Block or warn mode
├─ Toxic-flow (lethal trifecta) blocking
└─ Hash-chained audit log
Features
- Prompt Injection Protection — 27 rules in English and Turkish; precise ones block, generic phrases only warn
- Tool-result injection — the same patterns applied to tool results, tagged MCP06:2025. Block mode replaces the result; warn mode prepends a warning
- Session tool pin — the first
tools/listis pinned. A later description or schema change is a rug pull (MCP03:2025). Block mode keeps serving the pinned definition and refuses the drifted call - PII Masking — TC Kimlik No, VKN, IBAN, card and phone numbers (checksum-validated), passport, SGK, MERSİS, date of birth, postal and KEP addresses, email, opt-in IP/MAC/plates, 22 provider key formats, private keys and connection strings are masked in responses
- Block / Warn Mode — each interceptor can independently run in blocking or warning mode
- Audit Log — configurable log written to console or a file
- Gateway mode — several MCP servers behind one proxy, one YAML policy (allow / deny / mask / warn)
- Toxic-flow blocking — tracks the lethal trifecta across servers and blocks the egress call that would complete it
- LLM API gateway — OpenAI- and Anthropic-compatible endpoints: gateway keys instead of provider keys, PII masking and injection checks on prompts, token and spend budgets, usage and cost in the audit log
- A2A gateway — Agent2Agent calls between agents go through the gateway: callers authenticate, injection in messages and artifacts is blocked, personal data is masked, push-notification webhooks into private networks are refused, and every call is audited
- Coding-agent hooks —
guardbee-hookapplies the same policy to Claude Code's and Cursor's own shell, file and web tools - Zero Code Changes — attaches in front of any existing MCP server
Quick Start
npm install -g @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy
Add to claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"secure-filesystem": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y", "@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy",
"--", "npx", "-y",
"@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/tmp"
]
}
}
}
The proxy launches whatever comes after
--as the target MCP server.
Gateway Mode: Several Servers, One Policy
Put every MCP server behind one proxy with a guardbee-proxy.yaml. init does the move for you:
npx -y @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy@^1 init --client claude-desktop # or cursor, claude-code, --file ./mcp.json
It moves each stdio server into ~/.guardbee/guardbee-proxy.yaml (mode 0600), backs up the client config and points it at the proxy. HTTP servers stay as they are and are reported, because they would bypass the policy. --dry-run prints both files without writing. Or by hand:
{
"mcpServers": {
"guardbee": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy@^1", "--config", "/path/to/guardbee-proxy.yaml"]
}
}
}
version: 1
upstreams:
github:
command: npx
args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"]
env: { GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: "${GITHUB_TOKEN}" } # read from the environment
postgres:
command: npx
args: ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-db-gateway"]
labels: # override the heuristic labels
github__get_issue: [untrusted]
github__create_pull_request: [egress]
tools: # what the agent sees (globs on <upstream>__<tool>)
hide: ["*__delete_*"]
descriptions:
github__create_issue: "Create an issue in acme/* repositories only."
rules: # first match wins
- id: no-deletes
match: { tool: "postgres__delete_*" }
action: deny # allow | deny | mask | warn | approve
- match: { tool: "postgres__query", args: { table: "salaries" } } # dotted path → value, strings are globs
action: mask
mask: { fields: [salary, iban] } # blank these JSON keys
- match: { label: destructive }
action: approve # ask the person first
taint:
mode: strict # strict | approve | warn | off
basis: capability # capability | data — data: block only egress calls that carry sensitive data
interceptors:
anomaly: # off unless set; limits per session, sliding window
enabled: true
action: warn # warn | block
callBurst: { count: 60, windowSeconds: 60 }
audit:
sink: file
filePath: ./guardbee-audit.jsonl
-
Tools and prompts appear as
<upstream>__<tool>. -
Toxic flow (lethal trifecta): each tool is labeled
untrusted,sensitive,egressordestructive(name/description heuristics, overridable underlabels). Once a session has read untrusted content (anuntrustedtool or any resource) and sensitive data (asensitivetool or any PII in a result), anegresscall is blocked instrictmode and only logged inwarnmode. The check spans servers: an issue read from GitHub plus a customer record from a CRM blocks a webhook on a third server. -
Rules match on
tool(glob),upstream,label,session(clean|tainted) andargs.maskforces PII masking for that tool even when masking is off, andmask.fieldsalso blanks the named JSON keys in text andstructuredContent. A rule'sallowdoes not skip the toxic-flow check; relabel the tool instead. -
Topics (
topics,match.topic): a rule can name a subject instead of a tool — "nothing about mergers or salaries leaves through this agent". A topic is a list of terms; text is on topic whenminMatches(default 1) different terms appear. Matching folds case and Turkish letters (BİRLEŞME=birlesme), and a term may take a suffix (maaşfindsmaaşları,satın almafindssatın almayı); quote a term to match the whole word only ('"AI"'). The rule is checked on the call's arguments, and again on what comes back — the tool result, a resource, a prompt — so a subject that only shows up in the answer is caught too:denywithholds it,maskforces PII masking andmask.fields,warnlogs,approveasks (once: not again for the answer of a call it already approved). In the LLM API gateway topic rules apply to the whole prompt, withtool: llm:<model>;approverefuses there, since an API call has no one to ask.topics: - id: ma terms: [birleşme, "satın alma", "due diligence", acquisition, merger] - id: salary terms: [maaş, bordro, payroll, salary] minMatches: 1 rules: - { id: no-ma-out, match: { topic: ma, label: egress }, action: deny } - { id: contractors, match: { topic: salary, user: "*@contractor.com" }, action: approve } - { id: ma-to-llm, match: { topic: ma, tool: "llm:gpt-*" }, action: deny } -
Tool exposure (
tools):exposeis an allowlist of globs on the name the agent sees (absent: every tool), andhideremoves tools after it. A hidden tool is left out oftools/list, so the model never reads its description (a smaller poisoning surface and fewer tokens), and a call to it is refused and counts towardanomaly.repeatedBlocks.descriptionsreplaces a tool's description with one you wrote; drift detection keeps watching the server's own. Unlike adenyrule, which refuses at call time, hiding takes the tool out of the agent's view. -
Tool poisoning at
tools/list(interceptors.toolPoisoning, on by default): every definition is scanned before the agent sees it — the description (yours, when you wrote one undertools.descriptions), parameter descriptions and enum values in the input schema, and the read-only annotation. It catches instructions aimed at the model (<IMPORTANT>, "do not tell the user", "ignore previous instructions"), cross-tool shadowing ("when using the X tool, always…"), requests to read.ssh/.env, hidden zero-width, bidi and ANSI characters, words with Cyrillic or Greek lookalikes, and areadOnlyHintthat the description contradicts. Inblockmode (default; followspromptInjection.actionwhen unset) a tool with a critical or high finding is left out of the list and its calls are refused; medium findings (encoded blobs) only warn. Each finding is logged once asruleId: poisoning:<pattern>. The rules are the ones@guardbee/mcp-tool-poisoning-scanneruses, now shared through guard-core. -
Credentials leaving (
interceptors.egressSecrets, on by default): before anegresstool runs, the arguments it would actually receive are checked for credentials — provider keys (AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, Slack, …), private keys and connection strings with a password; the same fixed-format rules PII masking uses, never the broad keyword ones. Data taint only knows what this session's tools returned; this also catches a key the model got from the prompt, a file or its own context.block(default; followspromptInjection.actionwhen unset) refuses the call,warnlogs it; the audit event has the credential masked either way. A PII token stays a token for an egress tool unlesspiiMasking.detokenizeForEgress, so only then is its value checked.allowToolsexempts tools by glob (a deploy tool that takes a DB URL, say). Personal data is left to PII masking and taint. -
Sampling (
interceptors.sampling, off by default): a server can ask the agent's model for a completion (sampling/createMessage) — and a malicious one can use that to smuggle instructions to the model or pull data out. Off, the proxy does not offer sampling to servers at all. On, a request is answered only while one of that server's tool calls is running, by the session that made the call (two sessions calling the same server at once: refused, since it could belong to either);includeContextis forced tonone, so a server never gets the conversation;maxTokensis capped (default 1024) and so is the number of requests per call (maxPerCall, default 3); the system prompt and messages get the injection scan;approval: trueasks the person first. The model's answer goes back to the server, so it is treated as egress: a credential or data this session saw blocks it, and personal data is masked. Events usetool: sampling:<upstream>andruleId: sampling:<check>. The capability is offered when the proxy starts, so turning it on or off needs a restart. -
Approval:
approve(a rule action, ortaint.mode: approvefor toxic flows) shows the person a yes/no form through MCP elicitation, with the tool, the reason and the arguments. Anything but an explicit yes — decline, cancel, no answer withinapproval.timeoutSeconds(default 120) — blocks the call. A client without elicitation support cannot approve, so the call is blocked with a message saying so. -
Approval in the dashboard: with
approval.channels: [elicitation, dashboard]andaudit.dashboardset, a client that cannot show a prompt no longer blocks the call outright. The request goes to the GuardBee dashboard (MCP Gateway page) with the arguments PII-masked, workspace owners and admins get a notification, and the proxy holds the call until someone approves or denies it there ortimeoutSecondspasses. Channels are tried in order; the first one that can ask gives the answer. -
Data-based taint (
taint.basis: data): the defaultcapabilitybasis blocks every egress call once a session holds untrusted and sensitive content. Withdata, the proxy keeps hashed fingerprints of what sensitive tools (and PII-bearing results) returned — personal data and credentials, id-like tokens, and runs of words — and treats an egress call as a toxic flow only when its arguments carry that data (12+ words in common, or an exact identifier; PII tokens count as their values) and the session also read untrusted content. The block message names the tool the data came from. Licence text, markdown boilerplate and text that also came back from ordinary results or from 3+ tools are ignored. Fingerprints are hashes, kept in memory per session. Trade-off: a paraphrase or a summary of the data is not caught; keepcapabilitywhere that matters. Incapabilitymode the same evidence is added to the block reason when found. -
Anomaly checks (
interceptors.anomaly): behaviour no single call shows, counted per session over a sliding window.callBurst— more than 60 tool calls in 60s (a loop, or a denial-of-wallet).sensitiveSweep— more than 25 different reads ofsensitivetools in 300s (enumerating a store record by record; re-reading the same record does not count).destructiveBurst— more than 5destructivecalls in 60s.repeatedBlocks— more than 5 calls blocked or declined in 300s (probing the policy; a client that cannot show an approval prompt does not count). Each takes{ count, windowSeconds }; the numbers above are the defaults.warnlogs the first trip of each check;blockrefuses calls over the limit until the window slides, and after repeated blocks refuses every later call in the session. Events arewarn/blockedwithruleId: anomaly:<check>, so the dashboard shows them without changes. Off unless configured. -
Quotas (
quotas): caps on tool calls over a fixed window, counted across sessions — whereinterceptors.anomalywatches one session, a quota holds when a user opens ten. Each entry hasmatch(toolanduserglobs,upstream,label,group; all optional),limit,windowSecondsandper:user(default; the OIDC user, or the session without one),session, orgateway(one budget for everyone, e.g. a paid upstream). Example:quotas: [{ id: exports, match: { label: egress, group: contractors }, limit: 20, windowSeconds: 3600 }]. Every matching quota is checked and a call counts against all of them or none; only calls that are about to reach the upstream count, so a call the policy refused does not spend quota. A full quota refuses the call with the time to retry, logsruleId: quota:<id>, and does not count towardanomaly.repeatedBlocks. Counters live in the proxy process: several replicas each keep their own. -
Policy from the dashboard:
policy: { source: dashboard, refreshSeconds: 60 }(withaudit.dashboard) takes labels, rules, taint, approval, defaults and interceptors from the workspace policy edited in the GuardBee dashboard, instead of this file. Upstreams, listen and audit stay local. The proxy fetches it at start and re-checks it with an ETag; an update applies to the next call in every session (labels from the nexttools/list). With no dashboard policy saved, the dashboard unreachable, or an invalid document, the proxy keeps the local or last good policy — it never runs without one. -
Documents (
interceptors.documents, off by default): images and blobs in tool results, embedded resources and resource reads — PDFs, screenshots, scanned pages — are read with@guardbee/mcp-document-scanner: the PDF text layer, and OCR for images and pages without text when the optionaltesseract.js(and@napi-rs/canvasfor scanned PDFs) are installed. A document holding personal data or a credential is replaced by a notice inblockmode (ruleId: documents:pii) or logged inwarnmode; its counts go intopiiHitsand taint the session like PII in text. A document that could not be read (OCR not installed, overmaxBytes) is logged asdocuments:unread.{ enabled: true, action: block, ocr: true, maxBytes: 26214400 }. -
Personal-data counts: tool responses and resource reads that contained PII carry
piiHits, a count per category (tc_kimlik,vkn,iban,credit_card,email,phone_tr; credentials assecret). Counts only, never the values, and counted even with masking off. The dashboard builds its KVKK report from them. -
Tokenize: with
interceptors.piiMasking.mode: tokenizethe model sees<pii:tc_kimlik:7f3a9b21>instead of the value and can still pass it to another tool: the proxy puts the real value back on the way to that server. Tokens live in memory for the session only, and are not turned back into values for anegresstool unlesspiiMasking.detokenizeForEgress: true. -
Prompts (
prompts/get) get the same injection scan and PII masking as tool results. -
interceptors.definitionDrift.recheck: on-changeskips the per-calltools/listand re-checks only after a server sendstools/list_changed, which the proxy also passes on to the agent. -
Build provenance (
provenance,warnby default): before a stdio upstream starts, the proxy resolves the packagenpx/pnpm dlx/bunxwould run and checks its npm provenance: a Sigstore-signed SLSA attestation (signature, certificate chain and transparency-log entry against the Sigstore trust root, fetched through TUF) whose statement names that exact tarball (sha512 = the registry'sintegrity), signed by a workflow of the repository it names, which must match the package'srepositoryfield. The command then runs pinned to the version that was checked (npx -y pkg→npx -y pkg@1.2.3), so a release published in between is not what starts.warnstarts unverified packages and logsruleId: provenance:unsigned | invalid | error | unsupported;requirerefuses them (per upstream:upstreams.<name>.provenance: off | warn | require). Results are cached per version in~/.guardbee/provenance.json(provenance.cacheFile); another tarball under a version verified before counts as tampering.provenance.offline: trueuses only the cache and the trust root on disk (pin exact versions for that). Check without starting anything:guardbee-proxy provenance --config <file>(exit code 1 when an upstream would be refused). PyPI (uvx,uv tool run): every file of the release must carry a PEP 740 attestation from its Trusted Publisher (signed by that repository's workflow, naming the file and its sha256), anduvx pkgruns asuvx pkg==<version>. Container images (docker run,podman run): the tag is resolved to a digest and the image's cosign keyless signature (sha256-<digest>.sig) is verified; the signer must be a workflow of the image owner's GitHub account forghcr.io/<owner>/…, or matchprovenance.signers("docker.io/acme/*": "https://github.com/acme/") elsewhere, and the command runs pinned toimage@sha256:….--format sarifwrites the findings as SARIF 2.1.0 for code scanning. Limits: many packages publish without provenance (they show asunsigned, as do images signed another way than cosign, such as Docker Hub'smcp/images); a private npm registry is used throughprovenance.registryornpm_config_registry, a PyPI mirror throughprovenance.pypiIndex(it needs the integrity API), and private images are not supported (anonymous registry tokens only); the single-server--form does not check.provenance: mode: warn # off | warn | require upstreams: github: command: npx args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"] provenance: require # this one must be verified to start -
Persistent tool pins (
interceptors.definitionDrift.persist, on by default in gateway mode): the definitions a server first listed (name, description, input/output schema, annotations) are pinned by SHA-256 in~/.guardbee/pins.json(pins.fileto move it; written atomically, mode 0600), so a server that rewrites a tool between two runs, after an update or a compromise, is not trusted again just because a new session started. On a change,onChange: approve(default) keeps showing the agent the approved definition and asks the person before the first call, with the old and new description side by side; once approved, the new definition is pinned.blockrefuses the call,warnlogs and uses the new one. A new tool on a known server is held the same way. Audit events (ruleId: pin:changed | pin:added | pin:removed) carry both hashes; the descriptions only withaudit.includePayloads. Manage them withguardbee-proxy pins list | approve <upstream> [tool] | reset [upstream] [tool], and seed them from CI withguardbee-proxy pins import <baseline.json> --upstream <name>(anmcp-rug-pull-detectorbaseline: same hashes). The single-server--form keeps per-session pins only. -
Audit log is hash-chained. By default it stores a SHA-256 of the arguments instead of the arguments, and no results; set
audit.includePayloads: trueto log them. Check a log withguardbee-proxy verify-audit ./guardbee-audit.jsonl. -
guardbee-proxy validate --config guardbee-proxy.yamlchecks a config without starting any server. -
Without
--config, the proxy also picks up./guardbee-proxy.yamlorGUARDBEE_PROXY_CONFIG=<file>.yaml.
The single-server -- form above keeps its 0.x behavior: tool names are not prefixed, payloads are logged, and a toxic flow is only logged as a warning.
Pertanyaan tentang security-proxy MCP
Bagaimana cara menambahkan security-proxy MCP ke Claude Code?
Jalankan claude mcp add security-proxy-fa4790 -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy di terminal Anda. Tambahkan --scope user agar tersedia di semua proyek.
Bagaimana cara menambahkan security-proxy MCP ke Cursor?
Buka ~/.cursor/mcp.json dan tambahkan server di bawah mcpServers, menggunakan config Cursor yang ditunjukkan di bagian instalasi di atas.
Apa yang dilindungi oleh security proxy ini?
Proxy ini melindungi dari serangan prompt injection, tool-result injection, serta kebocoran PII atau rahasia (secrets).
Bisakah saya menggunakannya dengan MCP server yang sudah ada?
Ya, proxy ini dapat dipasang di depan MCP server mana pun tanpa memerlukan perubahan kode sama sekali.
Bagaimana cara kerja gateway mode?
Mode ini memungkinkan Anda mengelola beberapa MCP server di balik satu proxy tunggal menggunakan satu kebijakan YAML untuk mengizinkan, menolak, menyamarkan, atau memberikan peringatan.
Apakah telemetry diaktifkan secara default?
Tidak, telemetry dinonaktifkan secara default.