Audita aplicaciones web, móviles y de escritorio para identificar vulnerabilidades que permiten la ingeniería inversa y sugiere correcciones de configuración.
También conocido como GuardBee/guardbee-mcp, @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield
- Stars
- 2
- Herramientas
- 5
- Descargas, 30 días
- 2992
- Última versión
- 0.8.0
- Último commit
- 12 nov 2026
- Licencia
- MIT
¿Qué es reverse-shield MCP?
reverse-shield es un MCP server. Audita aplicaciones web, móviles y de escritorio para identificar vulnerabilidades que permiten la ingeniería inversa y sugiere correcciones de configuración. Expone 5 herramientas, como scan_artifact, suggest_fixes, scan_url.
Resumen generado a partir del README del proyecto
Acerca del MCP server de reverse-shield
Los ingenieros de seguridad y desarrolladores de aplicaciones pueden usar reverse-shield para evaluar cuánta información sensible queda expuesta en su software distribuido. Al apuntar el servidor hacia artefactos de compilación como APKs, IPAs, carpetas de Electron o web bundles, la herramienta identifica vulnerabilidades que permiten la ingeniería inversa. Detecta problemas como source maps embebidos, código sin minificar, falta de ofuscación en Flutter o .NET y secretos hardcodeados dentro de binarios o archivos de recursos.
El servidor opera de forma local y offline para escaneos de archivos, aunque también puede realizar comprobaciones remotas mediante scan_url. Utiliza parsers internos especializados para formatos como DEX, ELF, Mach-O y ASAR, lo que significa que no se requieren herramientas externas como apktool. Los usuarios pueden interactuar con el servidor a través de un cliente de IA para recibir una calificación de la A a la F sobre su postura de seguridad. Más allá de la identificación, la herramienta suggest_fixes analiza configuraciones de proyectos para Vite, Gradle o React Native para proporcionar diffs unificados para la remediación.
Qué puedes hacer con él
- 1Auditar la seguridad de aplicaciones móvilesAnaliza un APK de Android o un IPA de iOS para buscar configuraciones de depuración y falta de ofuscación.
- 2Identificar credenciales filtradasBusca en binarios, archivos de configuración y pools de recursos claves privadas y secretos expuestos.
- 3Automatizar correcciones de configuración de buildGenera parches de código para solucionar brechas de seguridad en los ajustes de compilación web o móvil.
- 4Evaluar la exposición de web bundlesComprueba un sitio web en vivo o un bundle de JS local en busca de source maps expuestos y código sin minificar.
Escrito a partir del README del proyecto. Cada caso de uso se verifica con una cita del mismo.
Cómo instalar reverse-shield MCP
Formatos verificados el 10 nov 2026Añadir a CursorAñadir a GooseInstalar reverse-shield MCP en Claude Code
$ claude mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldInstalar reverse-shield MCP en Cursor
~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Instalar reverse-shield MCP en VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Instalar reverse-shield MCP en VS Code CLI
$ code --add-mcp '{"name":"reverse-shield","type":"stdio","command":"npx","args":["-y","@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]}'Instalar reverse-shield MCP en Claude Desktop
claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Instalar reverse-shield MCP en Codex
$ codex mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldInstalar reverse-shield MCP en Codex config.toml
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.reverse-shield] command = "npx" args = ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]
Instalar reverse-shield MCP en Gemini CLI
$ gemini mcp add -s user reverse-shield npx -- -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shieldInstalar reverse-shield MCP en Gemini settings.json
~/.gemini/settings.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"
]
}
}
}Herramientas de reverse-shield MCP 5
Detectado desde el READMEscan_artifactsuggest_fixesscan_urllist_checksbundle_secret
| scan_artifact | — | |
| suggest_fixes | — | |
| scan_url | — | |
| list_checks | — | |
| bundle_secret | — |
Verificaciones automáticas
Ejecutado 13 nov 2026Informe completo →Pasó nuestras verificaciones automáticas. Esto no es una auditoría de seguridad: lee el código y dale al servidor el acceso más limitado que necesite. Cómo funcionan las verificaciones
- Repositorio de origen vinculado y accesibleAprobado
- Licencia de código abierto (OSI)Aprobado
- Commit o lanzamiento en el último añoAprobado
- El nombre del paquete no es similar a un paquete popularAprobado
- El endpoint remoto usa HTTPSNo verificado
- Las herramientas destructivas están etiquetadasAprobado
- Sin instrucciones ocultas para el modeloAprobado
- No hay avisos críticos en el paquete ni en sus dependenciasAprobado
README
Ver en GitHub@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield
🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文
An MCP server that tells you how much your shipped app gives a reverse engineer for free.
Reverse-engineering MCPs now let an agent take an app it has no source for — a web bundle, an Electron app, an APK, an iOS app, a game, a native or .NET binary — and explain how a feature works, down to the binary. This package is the other side of that: point it at your own build artifact and it reports what such a tool (or a person with jadx, ILSpy, Il2CppDumper, Hopper or the browser's devtools) would get without any effort, with the fix for each — and suggest_fixes turns those fixes into a diff against your build config.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Claude ──► reverse-shield ──► your build artifact / live site
│
├─ web source maps (shipped, inline, publicly reachable), unminified / dev bundles, keys, internal hosts, WebAssembly debug info and names
├─ electron fuses (RunAsNode, --inspect, NODE_OPTIONS, ASAR integrity), unpacked app code, code inside app.asar
├─ android APK and AAB: debuggable, R8/ProGuard missing, signing scheme, backup, plain React Native bundle, unstripped .so
├─ ios IPA and .app: Debug-configuration builds, development profiles, plain React Native bundle, .dSYM in the bundle, the executable
├─ engines Unity (IL2CPP metadata, Mono assemblies), PyInstaller, Java/Spring Boot JARs, Flutter (Dart obfuscation)
├─ native debug info, symbols, get-task-allow, hardened runtime, signing, PIE/NX/RELRO/canary (ELF, Mach-O, PE)
├─ secrets keys in everything above: dex, resources.arsc, plists, config files, Hermes bytecode, .so and executables
└─ .NET obfuscation missing, embedded PDB, leaked build paths
Everything runs locally and offline (except scan_url), with its own parsers for ASAR, the Electron fuse wire, binary AndroidManifest (AXML), DEX, ELF, Mach-O (including universal binaries and code signatures) and PE/.NET metadata — no apktool, jadx or binutils needed.
What it flags
| Check | Severity | Target | What it gives away |
|---|---|---|---|
sourcemap_embeds_source |
critical | web | Full original source via sourcesContent |
sourcemap_shipped / sourcemap_inline / sourcemap_publicly_reachable |
high | web | Original file paths and structure |
eval_devtool_bundle |
high | web | Dev bundle with each module's path |
bundle_secret |
per key type | all | A working credential in client code, an app package or a binary |
wasm_debug_info |
high | web | WebAssembly with DWARF: source files, lines, types |
unminified_bundle / dev_build_framework / wasm_name_section |
medium | web | Readable code / framework dev runtime / named WebAssembly functions |
sourcemap_reference / internal_endpoint |
low | web | Where the map lives / localhost, private IPs, staging hosts |
electron_fuse_run_as_node / electron_fuse_inspect_args |
high | electron | Node runtime or debugger inside the signed app |
electron_app_unpacked |
high | electron | App code as an editable folder |
electron_fuse_node_options / _asar_integrity_off / _load_outside_asar |
medium | electron | Code injection and ASAR tampering |
apk_debuggable |
critical | android | Debugger attach and run-as into app data |
apk_no_obfuscation / apk_js_bundle_plaintext / apk_unsigned |
high | android | jadx output with real names / readable RN bundle / no tamper evidence |
apk_allow_backup / apk_v1_only_signature |
medium | android | Data pulled via backup / Janus-style repackaging |
native_debug_info / native_debuggable_entitlement |
high | native | Source-level debug data / lldb attach |
native_symbols_not_stripped / native_no_hardened_runtime / native_injection_entitlement / native_unsigned |
medium | native | Named functions / dylib injection / patched copies run |
native_no_pie / native_no_nx |
medium | native | Exploit-friendly fixed addresses / executable stack |
native_no_relro / native_no_stack_canary / native_adhoc_signed / native_build_path_leak |
low | native | Hardening gaps and build-host details |
ios_debug_build / ios_js_bundle_plaintext / ios_dsym_shipped |
high | ios | Unoptimised code with full symbols and preview stubs / readable RN bundle / full DWARF symbols in the bundle |
ios_development_profile |
medium | ios | Debugger attach on registered devices |
unity_il2cpp_metadata / unity_mono_assemblies |
high | engines | Every class, method and string of the game / C# scripts via dnSpy |
flutter_not_obfuscated |
high | engines | Dart class and method names for blutter / reFlutter |
hermes_names_not_minified |
medium | engines | React Native function names in Hermes bytecode for hermes-dec / hbctool |
python_pyinstaller_bundle / java_not_obfuscated |
high | engines | Decompilable .pyc files / Java classes with original names |
dotnet_not_obfuscated / dotnet_embedded_pdb |
high | .NET | ILSpy/dnSpy output close to the original source |
list_checks returns the full catalog with fixes. Every result carries an A–F grade: F when anything critical (or several high findings) is exposed, A when nothing is.
How the trickier checks decide
- R8/ProGuard: reads class descriptors from every
classes*.dexand looks at classes under your application id (and under the packages of components your manifest names, for.debug-style ids). Dozens of descriptive class names with almost no one- or two-letter names means R8 did not run. - .NET obfuscation: reads the metadata
#Stringsheap. Known obfuscator markers (ConfuserEx, Dotfuscator, SmartAssembly, …) pass immediately; otherwise an assembly passes when at least 10% of its identifiers are one- or two-letter names, bare numbers or non-ASCII junk. Checked against an Obfuscar build (21%, passes) and 400 unobfuscated NuGet assemblies (383 flagged; the other 17 are resource-only assemblies with too few names to judge). - Private keys: only reported when base64 key material follows the PEM header — crypto libraries bundled into apps carry the header as a string constant.
- Credentials outside JavaScript: Android dex strings, the
resources.arsc/resources.pbstring pool (wherestrings.xmland google-services values end up),assets/andres/raw/; iOS plists (GoogleService-Info.plist) and the executable; JSON/plist/.env/properties/YAML files in an ASAR, a JAR (Spring Bootapplication.properties) or a build folder; Hermes bytecode,.solibraries and native/.NET binaries by their printable strings. Only fixed-format keys are matched there, as in bundles. A Google/Firebase API key in an Android or iOS package is reported as medium: those ship by design and must be restricted to the app's package name or bundle id. - Repeats: one key in 30 chunks is one finding (“also in 29 other files”), and long lists of unminified files collapse into one.
- iOS Debug builds: Xcode 16 puts a Debug build's code in
<App>.debug.dylibnext to__preview.dylib; either one in a bundle means the Debug configuration was shipped. - Unity: IL2CPP's
global-metadata.datis flagged only when its standard header is intact (protected builds encrypt it); a MonoAssembly-CSharp.dllgoes through the .NET name check. - PyInstaller: the CArchive cookie is searched across the whole file (on macOS the archive sits in its own section before the code signature); PyArmor and Nuitka builds are noted, not flagged.
- Flutter: reads the identifiers in the AOT snapshot (
libapp.so,App.framework/App).--obfuscaterenames everything the program defines to two- or three-letter names while the Dart VM's own names stay, so a snapshot passes when at least 10% of its identifiers are that short. Checked against one program built both ways with the Dart SDK'sgen_snapshot: 1% without the flag, 31% (unstripped) and 37% (stripped) with it. Fewer than 200 identifiers is a note, not a verdict. - WebAssembly: custom sections only —
.debug_*(DWARF),name(function names) andsourceMappingURL; the code itself is not judged. - Live URLs: only the site's own scripts are read. Platform-served code (HubSpot
/hs/hsstatic/, WordPress/wp-includes/) and open-source libraries (jQuery, Bootstrap, polyfills, vendor bundles) are skipped, and a reachable map whose sources are all dependencies is not reported. Internal hosts count only when they point into the site (private IPs,.internal/.corp/.lan, its own staging hosts); thelocalhostURLs frameworks ship are ignored. A Google browser key is reported as medium (restrict it to the site's referrers), and a Supabaseanonkey is not reported, since the browser is meant to hold it (aservice_rolekey still is). - React Native with Hermes: reads the bytecode's string table and function headers. Metro's minifier renames functions to one- or two-letter names; without it hermes-dec and hbctool print the source's names back. A bundle passes when at least 15% of its named functions have names that short. Checked against one bundle (lodash + zod + app code) compiled with hermesc
-Oboth ways: 1% unminified, 57% minified. Function names are read for bytecode versions 84–100 that share the v98 12-byte small-header layout; other versions, 16-byte headers, and bundles with fewer than 50 named functions are a note, not a verdict.
Quick start
{
"mcpServers": {
"guardbee-reverse-shield": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield"]
}
}
}
Then ask your agent: “How easy is it to reverse engineer ./release/MyApp.app? Fix what you can in the build config.”
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --fail-on=high
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release.apk
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan "/Applications/My App.app" --format=json
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan https://app.example.com --format=sarif > reverse-shield.sarif
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./build/MyApp.ipa
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield suggest . --format=patch | git apply # review first: suggest . prints the same as text
Tools
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
scan_artifact |
Scan a file or directory: APK, AAB, IPA, iOS or macOS .app, Electron folder, app.asar, JAR, ELF/Mach-O/PE/.NET binary, JS bundle, source map, or a build output folder (Unity and Python builds included). Optional ignore and baseline |
suggest_fixes |
Read the project's build config (Vite, webpack, Next.js, Angular, CRA, Android Gradle and manifest, React Native, electron-builder / Forge, .NET project files, Flutter) and return the changes as unified diffs. Never writes files |
scan_url |
Fetch a live page, check its same-site bundles, follow sourceMappingURL and probe <bundle>.map (third-party scripts are not fetched) |
list_checks |
The check catalog with what each finding gives away and how to fix it |
Directories are walked including dist/, build/ and out/ (that is the point); node_modules, VCS and cache folders are skipped, and a macOS .app or Electron folder found inside is scanned as one unit — its fuses, its ASAR and its own executable, not the bundled third-party frameworks.
guardbee.yml:
reverse-shield:
fail-on: high
max-files: 5000
baseline: .reverse-shield-baseline.json
exclude:
- "vendor/"
ignore: # accepted exposures: a rule id, or rule:path-substring
- bundle_secret:firebase-config.js
CI and baselines
Record what the current release exposes, then let CI fail only on what a change adds:
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --update-baseline # writes .reverse-shield-baseline.json
npx @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield scan ./dist --baseline=.reverse-shield-baseline.json --fail-on=high
# Compared to baseline (grade C → D): 1 new, 2 fixed, 4 unchanged
Findings are matched by check and location, with bundler content hashes (index-BvL4J5f8.js, 7321-dd7cb90a7de65945.js) normalised, so a rebuild does not make old findings look new. SARIF results carry baselineState (new / unchanged).
The repository ships a composite action that scans, uploads SARIF, writes a job summary and exposes grade / new-findings outputs:
- uses: GuardBee/guardbee-mcp/.github/actions/reverse-shield@main
with:
target: dist
fail-on: high
baseline: .reverse-shield-baseline.json
Library use
@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield/scan exports the scanners (scanUrl, scanPath, analyzeJavaScript, …) without the MCP server, for tools that embed reverse-shield:
import { scanUrl } from "@guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield/scan";
const result = await scanUrl("https://example.com/", { maxScripts: 15, timeoutMs: 8_000 });
console.log(result.grade, result.findings);
Limits
- Obfuscation is judged from names, not control flow: a build that only renames passes, and string encryption or control-flow flattening is not measured.
- Web checks look at what is shipped; they cannot tell whether a key is meant to be public (some, like Firebase web keys, are restricted server-side). Rotate or restrict it, then accept it with an
ignoreentry (bundle_secret:firebase-config.js). - Strings are read from dex and resource tables by their structure, from other binaries as printable runs; a key split across string constants, encrypted or assembled at runtime is not found (that is the point of doing so, but it only slows a reverse engineer down).
- Native hardening checks (PIE/NX/RELRO/canary) are exploit-mitigation signals rather than reverse-engineering ones; they are reported low/medium for that reason.
- App Store IPAs are FairPlay-encrypted on distribution; the scanner reads the IPA you export (development, ad hoc or App Store export before Apple encrypts it), which is what a jailbroken device would also yield.
suggest_fixesedits the common shapes of each config; unusual layouts (computed webpack configs, Gradle convention plugins) get no diff, and Forge and Flutter get instructions rather than a patch. Always review before applying.
License
MIT
Preguntas sobre reverse-shield MCP
¿Cómo agrego reverse-shield MCP a Claude Code?
Ejecuta claude mcp add reverse-shield -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-reverse-shield en tu terminal. Añade --scope user para que esté disponible en todos los proyectos.
¿Cómo agrego reverse-shield MCP a Cursor?
Abre ~/.cursor/mcp.json y añade el servidor en mcpServers, usando la configuración de Cursor que se muestra en la sección de instalación de arriba.
¿Qué herramientas proporciona reverse-shield MCP?
Expone 5 herramientas, incluidas scan_artifact, suggest_fixes, scan_url, list_checks, bundle_secret.
¿Qué tipos de aplicaciones se pueden escanear?
El servidor puede auditar web bundles, aplicaciones Electron, APKs, apps de iOS, juegos, binarios nativos, binarios de .NET, Unity, PyInstaller y archivos JAR de Java/Spring Boot.
¿Requiere la herramienta herramientas externas de ingeniería inversa como jadx o apktool?
No, utiliza sus propios parsers internos para varios formatos de archivo, incluyendo ASAR, DEX, ELF, Mach-O y PE.